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STATEMENT OF PARTIES 
The parties in this case are listed in the caption. In this brief, Plaintiff-Appellant Ira 
Sachs is referred to as "Plaintiff Sachs" and Defendants-Appellees Joseph S. Lesser and 
Loeb Investors, Inc., are referred to respectively as "Lesser" and "Loeb." Defendant-
Appellee United Park City Mines Company and former defendant Capital Growth 
Partners, Inc., are referred to respectively as "UPCM" and "CGP." All statutory 
references are to Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, unless otherwise indicated. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this appeal exists pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(j), and Article VIII, §1, 
of the Utah Constitution. This appeal is from a final judgment entered February 15, 2006, 
in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Tyrone E. Medley presiding. Plaintiff Sachs filed his Notice of Appeal on March 16, 
2006. The Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this Court on March 23, 2006. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment for Defendants on 
Plaintiff Sachs1 claims for declaratory judgment and breach of an express or implied 
contract, based on its conclusion that no enforceable express or implied finder's fee 
agreement existed, or that the terms of the agreement were too indefinite to be enforced, 
or were merely an agreement to agree, where genuinely disputed issues of material fact 
remain for trial and Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law? 
Standard of Appellate Review: The district court's decision to grant summary 
judgment is reviewed for correctness, granting no deference to the district court and 
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recognizing that "summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuinely 
disputed issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." Swan Creek Village Homeowners Association, 2006 WL 22, ^[15; 
Pugh v. Draper City, 2005 UT 12, f7, 114 P.3d 546, Wardlev Corp. v. Welsh, 346 Utah 
962 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah App. 1998). 
Preservation of Issue: Argument, Point I, Plaintiffs Mem. Op. Lesser/Loeb 
Motion for Summary Judgment, R.1333-1339, at 1-7; Argument, Point I, Plaintiffs 
Mem. Op. UPCM Motion for Summary Judgment, R.1636-1646, at 1-11; Tr., Hearing 
On Motions for Summary Judgment, R. 2235 at 22:20-30:3. 
2. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment for Defendants on 
Plaintiff Sachs1 claims for declaratory judgment and breach of contract, based on its 
conclusion that such claims were purportedly barred by the Utah Real Estate Brokers 
Act, §61-2-1 etseq. ("UREBA"), where genuinely disputed issues of material fact remain 
for trial and Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law? 
Standard of Appellate Review: A question of statutory interpretation is 
reviewed for correctness, without deference to the conclusions of the trial court. State of 
Utah v. Mooney, 98 P.3d 420, 424, 2004 UT 49,1J9, citing Ward v. Richfield City, 798 
P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). 
Preservation of Issue: Argument, Point II, Plaintiffs Mem. Op. Lesser/Loeb 
Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 1338-1350, at 6-18; Argument, Point II, Plaintiffs 
Mem. Op. UPCM Motion For Summary Judgment, R. 1647-1656, at 12-21; Tr. Hearing 
on Motions for Summary Judgment, R. 2235, at 30:4-36:21. 
3. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment for Defendants on 
Plaintiff Sachs' claims for declaratory judgment and breach of express or implied contract 
on the ground that they are purportedly barred by the Utah Statute of Frauds, where 
genuinely disputed issues of material fact remain for trial on these claims and Defendants 
are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Standard of Appellate Review: Application of the statute of frauds is a question 
of law that is reviewed for correctness. Orlob v. Wasatch Medical Management, 124 P.2d 
269, 275, 2005 UT App 430, citing Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, Tf23, 44 P.3d 742. 
Preservation of Issue: Argument, Point III, Plaintiffs Mem. Op. Lesser/Loeb 
Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 1350-1352, at 18-20; Argument, Point III, Plaintiffs 
Mem. Op. UPCM Motion For Summary Judgment, R. 1656-1657, at 21-22; Tr. Hearing 
on Motions for Summary Judgment, R.2235, at 36:22-37:16. 
STATUTES DETERMINATIVE OF APPEAL 
Utah Real Estate Broker's Act ("UREBA"), §61-2-1 et seq.9 Aplnt. Add. 4 
Utah Statute of Frauds, §25-5-1 et. seq., Aplnt. Add. 5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an action for declaratory judgment and breach of express or implied 
contract, to enforce an a finder's fee agreement that arose when Lesser, as Chairman of 
the Board of UPCM and President of Loeb, the majority stockholder group of UPCM, 
requested Plaintiff Sachs to find a buyer for UPCM after receiving written notice of the 
finder's fee Plaintiff Sachs would charge for his services. 
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After Sachs located one Gerald Jackson, a real estate developer in Park City, 
Utah, to buy UPCM, Jackson formed a company, Capital Growth Partners, Inc., 
("CGP"), which signed a confidentiality agreement with UPCM, and subsequently 
bought UPCM by purchasing the corporation's stock in a merger in which UPCM was the 
surviving corporation and retained all of its assets, including its real estate. 
Thereafter, Defendants refused to pay Sachs his finder's fee, based on a ruse that 
Jackson was already in a deal with UPCM President Hank Rothwell to purchase UPCM 
at the time Sachs contacted Jackson to buy UPCM. After making extensive but ultimately 
unsuccessful attempts to negotiate the payment of the finder's fee, Plaintiff Sachs brought 
this action, asserting claims against Lesser, Loeb, UPCM and CGP, for declaratory 
judgment and breach of express or implied contract, and other claims which are not 
relevant to this appeal. See, Counts I-IV, Verified Complaint And Demand For Jury Trial, 
("Verified Complaint"), at 1-20, R.l-24, 666-668. 
Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiff Sachs filed his Complaint and Jury Demand on January 21, 2004. R.l-24. 
On February 23, 2004, Lesser and Loeb moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground 
that the subject finder's fee agreement was purportedly subject to, and barred by, the New 
York Statute of Frauds. R. 51-53. UPCM and CGP joined the motion. R.54-57. 
On September 27, 2004, Judge Bruce C. Lubeck heard oral argument on the 
motion to dismiss, R. 156, and on September 29, 2004, issued a Ruling and Order 
denying the motion to dismiss. R. 157-192. 
A 
On October 13, 2004, UPCM and CGP filed their Answer, R. 193-206, and on 
October 15, 2004, Lesser and Loeb filed their Answer. R. 207-218. 
On January 20, 2005, CGP filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground 
that CGP was not a party to the finder's fee agreement and or otherwise liable for its 
alleged breach as a "successor" to UPCM. R. 525-568. 
On February 5, 2005, Plaintiff Sachs filed a Verification of Complaint. R. 666-668. 
On March 31, 2005, Lesser and Loeb filed a motion for summary judgment. R. 
1082-1084. On April 8, 2005, UPCM filed a motion for summary judgment. R. 1206-
1208. 
Disposition In The Lower Court 
On September 13, 2005, the district court granted CGP's motion for summary 
judgment. R. 2191-2190. Plaintiff Sachs does not appeal this decision. 
On December 12, 2005, the district court heard oral argument on the motions for 
summary judgment of Lesser, Loeb and UPCM, R. 2205. On February 6, 2006, the 
district court entered a Minute Entry Decision, granting the Defendants' motions and 
dismissing Plaintiffs' claims in this action. R. 2208-2212. On March 16, 2006, Plaintiff 
Sachs filed his Notice of Appeal to this Court. R. 2224-2225. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff Ira Sachs is a long time resident of Park City, Utah, and was a 
stockholder in UPCM at all relevant times. For many years, Mr. Sachs has worked as a 
business consultant, assisting businesses in resolving problems and facilitating business 
transactions from his office in Park City. Prior to the events in this case, Plaintiff Sachs 
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received, and continues to receive, an annual fee from UPCM for soliciting Quest, a 
telecommunications company, to contract with UPCM for a cell phone cite, pursuant to 
an oral agreement. See, "Plaintiffs Statement of Facts", Plaintiffs Mem. Op. Lesser and 
Loeb Motion For Summary Judgment, ("Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L"), f 1-3, R.1321; 
"Statement of Facts" in Plaintiffs Mem. Op. UPCM Motion For Summary Judgment, 
("Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM"), Tfl-3, R. 1624-1625; Verified Complaint, Tfl, 18-19, R. 2, 4-5; 
Sachs Dep., R. 1361-1362, at 20:8-24:16; Sachs Affidavit, f5-6, R.1442; Sachs UPCM 
stock certificate, R. 1482-1483. 
2. Defendant Joseph S. Lesser ("Lesser") was the Chairman of the Board of 
Directors of the Defendant United Park City Mines ("UPCM"). Lesser also served as the 
President of Defendant Loeb Investors Co. XL ("Loeb"), the controlling shareholder 
group of UCPM, and conducted business of UCPM and Loeb within the State of Utah, at 
all relevant times. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, ffif 4-5, R. 1321-1322; Pltf. Mem. Op. 
UPCM, ffif 4-5, R. 1625; Verified Complaint, | 3 , R. 2, and Answer of Lesser and Loeb, 
If 2, R. 208 (partially admitting allegations); Lesser Dep. R. 1402, at 18:17-21:24. 
3. Defendant UPCM ("UPCM") was a publicly traded New York Stock 
exchange company, with its principal place of business in Park City, Utah, and 
maintained its offices, employees and business operations, and conducted its annual 
stockholder meetings within the State of Utah at all relevant times. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. 
L&L, f 6, R. 1322; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, %69 R. 1625; Verified Complaint, 1J4, R.2; 
Sachs Affidavit, fflf 7, 9, R.1442-1443. 
4. The principal business of UPCM was the leasing, development and sale of 
its real property located in Utah, some of which UPCM was trying to develop into Resort 
Projects in Park City ("The Projects") at the time of the events concerned in this action. 
See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L , f7, R.1332; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, \1, R. 1625; Verified 
Complaint, 1ffll0-ll,R. 3-4. 
5. Hank Rothwell, the President of the UPCM, ("Rothwell"), resided in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, and conducted the business of UPCM at its principal offices in Park 
City, Utah, at all relevant times. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, % R. 1322; Pltf. Mem. Op. 
UPCM, 1J8, R. 1625; Verified Complaint, \\2, R. 4; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, f8, R. 1625. 
6. In addition to their duties as officers of UPCM, Lesser and Rothwell were 
experienced and licensed real estate brokers and investors at all relevant times. See, Pltf. 
Mem. Op. L&L, ffl[64-65, R. 1331; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, Iflf 64-65, R. 1624; Lesser 
Real Estate License Record, R.1479; Lesser Dep. R. 1400-1402, at 13:15-24; 14:11-16; 
16:13-17:18; 18:17-20:9; Rothwell Real Estate License Verification, R. 1480-1481; 
Rothwell Dep. R. 1392, 1398, at 10:16-12:25; 199:23-25. 
7. In July of 1999, acting under Rothwell's direction, UPCM entered into a 
letter of understanding with DMB Associates, Inc., ("DMB"), to form a joint venture to 
develop The Projects. After nearly a year's delay, the joint venture was formed on June 
15, 2000. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, 1J8, R. 1322; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, [^8, R. 1525; 
Verified Complaint, fflj 14-15, R.4. 
8. UPCM and DMB tried to reach an agreement on a business plan for seven 
months. When they failed to do so, the joint venture was dissolved on January 17, 2001 
7 
and UPCM became obligated to pay DMB the sum of $2,445,030.00 in development 
costs, plus accrued interest, under a letter of understanding. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, f8, 
R. 1332; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, 1f8, R. 1625; Verified Complaint, 1J15-16, R. 4; Sachs 
Dep.,R. 1378, at 118:17-119:22. 
9. At the time of the events referred herein, Plaintiff Sachs had been 
acquainted with Rothwell for 15 to 20 years. Rothwell knew Sachs was a deal maker and 
business consultant who worked on a fee basis. Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, | 9 , R.1322; Pltf. 
Mem. Op. UPCM, f9, R. 1626; Sachs Dep., R. 1365, at 51:1-6. 
10. In early 2001, Plaintiff Sachs learned of the failure of a joint venture 
between UPCM and DMB. He contacted one of his clients, Granite Land Company, and 
introduced Granite to Rothwell as a potential joint venturer for UPCM. By March 2001, 
Plaintiff Sachs had introduced key employees of Granite to Rothwell and others at a 
meeting hosted by Rothwell at the corporate offices of UPCM in Park City. Granite 
signed a confidentiality agreement with UPCM and subsequently engaged in negotiations 
regarding a possible sale or joint venture with UPCM. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, f 11, R. 
1323; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, \\ 1, R. 1626; Verified Complaint, ffi[20-22, Sachs Dep. 
1363-1366, at 42:16- 51:23; 62:7-13; Rothwell Dep. R. 1719, at 139:22-140:19. 
11. On or about May 2, 2001, Sachs met with Lesser and a mutual friend, at 
Lesser's private club in New York City. During the meeting, Lesser expressed his strong 
displeasure regarding Rothwell's handling of the failed UPCM joint venture with DMB, 
stating that, "I do not think Hank Rothwell is capable of running a New York Stock 
Exchange company." Lesser also told Sachs that he and Loeb Investors had lost faith in 
ft 
Rothwell and did not want to invest any more money in UPCM. Lesser requested Sachs 
to help him locate a joint venturer or purchaser for UPCM as quickly as possible, 
importuning Sachs to "get the job done, whether it's with Granite, or someone else, or a 
combination." See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, ffi[14-15, R. 1323; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, ffil 
14-15, R. 1626-1627; Verified Complaint, ffif 23-26, R. 5-6; Sachs Dep. R. 1368-1371, at 
73:23-86:13; 80:19-81:4; 87:8-88:25; Lesser Dep. R. 1405, at 47:18- 48:5. 
12. Although the specific amount of the finder's fee was not discussed at the 
meeting, both Lesser and Sachs understood that Plaintiff Sachs would receive a usual and 
customary finder's fee for his efforts. A usual and customary fee for assisting in locating 
a buyer for a company is 3% of the sale price of the corporation. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. 
L&L, fh 16, R. 1323; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, 1J16, R. 1627; Verified Complaint, ^ 28-29, 
R. 6; Sachs Dep. R. 1384-1386, at 95:23-96:16; 145:8-148:8; 149:15-150:5; Tesch 
Memo, R. 1484. 
13. Plaintiff Sachs does not have a real estate broker's license and was not 
acting as a broker, but as a professional business finder, in locating a buyer for UPCM, a 
New York Stock Exchange company, in response to Lessees request. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. 
L&L, 1J63, R. 1331; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, ^|63, R. 1624; Sachs Dep. R. 1384 
-1385, 145:8-148:8; Lesser Dep., R. 2202, at 44:3-13. 
14. During Sachs1 meeting with Lesser on May 2, 2001, Lesser did not mention 
or exclude Gerald Jackson, ("Jackson"), a Park City real estate developer, or any other 
person, or entity, as a potential joint venturer or purchaser Sachs might approach, except 
to say that in the event DRWK, a company UPCM was working with, located a joint 
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venturer or purchaser for UPCM, Sachs would not receive the fee. A contract between 
UPCM and DRKW dated June 14, 2001, did not include Jackson on the list of potential 
purchasers located by DRKW. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, 1J17-18, R. 1324; Pltf. Mem. 
Op. UPCM, t1f 17-18, R. 1627; Verified Complaint, f30, R. 6; Sachs Dep. R. 1369-1372, 
at 80:19-81:22; 84:1-13; 88:1-10; 92:4-19; Lesser Dep. 1403-1404, at 36:18-37:4; 43:13-
44:10-19; DRKW Agreement, R. 1467-1477 (particularly 1469-1470). 
15. Following the May 2, 2001 meeting with Lesser, Plaintiff Sachs returned 
home to Park City, Utah. Working primarily from his business office there, Plaintiff 
Sachs contacted several individuals regarding the purchase of UPCM. These individuals 
included Jackson and Bob Wells, both long time real estate developers residing in Park 
City, Utah. Plaintiff Sachs also contacted Scott Wilcox of Granite Land Company, a 
division of Granite Construction Company, a California company doing business in Utah. 
See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, fl9, R. 1324; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, If 19, R. 1627; Verified 
Complaint, f33, R. 7; Sachs Dep. R. 1371-1372, at 88:1-90:14; 90:25-92:19. 
16. On the morning of May 17, 2001, Plaintiff Sachs delivered a letter to 
Rothwell, regarding Sachsf introduction of Granite and the finder's fee he expected for his 
services: 
I write to remind you that I will expect a modest finder's fee if 
an agreement comes to fruition. This could be cash, a couple 
of prime developed lots in the new project, or some other 
consideration acceptable to both of us. While I believe we 
have an understanding as to this finder's fee, I do think that 
matters of this sort ought to be out on the table early on, and I 
hope you feel the same. Please let me know if you have any 
questions concerning such a finder's fee. 
m 
See, Aplnt. Add. 2; Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, ^21, R. 1325-1326; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, ^ 27, 
R. 1629; Verified Complaint, ffl[ 43; Letter to Rothwell from Sachs, R. 1478; Sachs Dep., 
R. 1357, 1383-1384, 1386, at 141:11-143:6; 152:23-153:13; Rothwell Dep., R. 1395, at 
152:7-18. 
17. Plaintiff Sachs testified that the "prime developed lots" owned by UPCM, 
referred to in his letter of May 17, 2001, were valued at a little over two million dollars, 
which Sachs considered a fair finder's fee finding a purchaser for a New York Stock 
exchange company such as UPCM, based on his experience and the size of the deal. See, 
Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, 1J27, R. 1326; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, f28, R. 1629; Verified 
Complaint, ftf, R. 9, Sachs Dep., R. 1384-1385, at 145:18-148:8. 
18. Plaintiff Sachs testified that the value of his service did not depend on the 
time spent, but rather the result achieved ~ in this case, using his experience and contacts 
to immediately locate a purchaser for UPCM as requested by Lesser in his phone call to 
Sachs on May 17, 2001. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, |29, R. 1326; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, 
129, R. 1629; Sachs Dep. R. 1381-1382; 1384-1385, at 133:3-134:10; 145:18-148:8; 
149:15-150:5; 
19. Plaintiff Sachs' letter of May 17, 2001, was received by Rothwell and 
transmitted to Lesser. Because Sachs had previously introduced Granite to UPCM and 
the two parties had already begun negotiations, Sachs mentioned Granite in this letter. 
However, later that afternoon, Lesser telephoned Sachs in Park City. Responding to 
Sachs* indication in the letter that Sachs would direct his efforts to finding a "potential 
buyer" or "joint venturer" for UPCM, Lesser adamantly told Sachs that, "I don't want a 
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joint venture partner. I want this sold." Lesser directed Sachs to refer any prospective 
purchasers to Rothwell at UPCM. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, ffi[30-31, R. 1326; Pltf. 
Mem. Op. UPCM, ffi[30-31, R. 1629; Verified Complaint, ffi[44-45, R. 9; Sachs Dep., R. 
1387-1388, at 156:19-157:23; 159:21-161:24. 
20. During his telephone call with Plaintiff Sachs on May 17, 2001, Lesser did 
not dispute the finder's fee proposed in Sachs' letter. Lesser did not state that Defendants 
would not pay Sachs1 the proposed finder's fee, or indicate that there was any prospective 
purchaser for UPCM at that time. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, ffi[56-58, R. 1329-1330; Pltf. 
Mem. Op. UPCM, ffi[ 56-58, R. 1633; Verified Complaint, f 56, R. 1329; Sachs Dep., R. 
1372, 1378-1379; 1390, at 92:4-19; 210:1-211:4; 121:22-123:14; 129:20-130:21. 
21. Lesser initially testified he did not recall telephoning Plaintiff Sachs on 
May 17, 2001, or the content of their conversation. However, Lesser's telephone records 
indicate that he telephoned Sachs at his office in Park City, Utah at 2:02 p.m. on May 17, 
2001, and spoke with Sachs for eleven minutes. After being shown this record, Lesser did 
not deny that he telephoned Sachs on that date. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, [^32, R. 1326; 
Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, f332, R. 1629; Lesser Dep., R. 1405-1406, at 49:6-51:25; 52:22-
53:9; Lesser's phone records for May 17, 2001, R. 1561. 
22. The following day, May 18, 2001, Sachs delivered a second letter to 
Rothwell by facsimile, confirming Lesser's preference for a purchaser for UPCM 
expressed in Lesser's phone call to Sachs on May 17, 2001. Sachs further stated that, "if 
your company's preference is sale, Granite, as I suggested in yesterday's letter is still an 
excellent prospect. Another investor, together with Granite, would make an excellent 
12 
purchaser. I am happy to re-direct my focus to obtaining such a joint venture purchaser. 
Obviously, I will keep you apprised of all proposals, whether for sale or for a joint 
venturing of the project." Rothwell and Lesser never responded to this letter or informed 
Sachs they would not pay the finder's fee Sachs had indicated he would charge for his 
services in the letter of May 17, 2001. See, Aplnt. Add. 3; Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, ffi[33, R. 
1326; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, 133, R. 1629; Verified Complaint, ^45, R. 9; Letter to 
Rothwell from Sachs dated May 18, 2001, R. 1453; Sachs Dep., R. 1357, 1387-1388, 
1390, at 154:13-158:11; 210:1-211:4; Rothwell Dep. R. 1396, at 167:21-168:3. 
23. At all relevant times, Jackson resided in Park City, Utah. Plaintiff Sachs 
initially telephoned Jackson on Sachs' cell phone from Park City and reached Jackson in 
New York where he was traveling. During Sachs' initial conversation with Jackson, 
Jackson expressed immediate interest in the information that Sachs provided him 
concerning the new opportunity to purchase UPCM that existed based on the information 
Lesser had conveyed to Sachs in their meeting on May 2, 2001. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. 
L&L, 1H20-21, R. 1324; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, ffl20-21, R. 1627-1628; Verified 
Complaint, f 33-35, R. 7; Sachs Dep., R. 1376-1378, at 112:22-118:12; Jackson Dep. R. 
1457-1460, at 17:23-18:16; 18:18-27:19. 
24. During their conversation, Jackson never told Sachs that he was already 
working on a deal with Rothwell to purchase UPCM. To the contrary, Jackson thanked 
Sachs for the information he provided and told Sachs that he would like to take the 
UPCM deal down with institutional and other investors. Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, f 22, R. 
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1324-1325; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, |22, R. 1628; Verified Complaint, % 36, R. 8; Sachs 
Dep. R. 1377-1379, at 115:22-121:21; Jackson Dep.1458-1460, at 20:18-27:19. 
25. During Sachs' initial conversation with Jackson, and pursuant to Lessees 
prior instructions to Sachs to refer any potential purchasers for UPCM to Rothwell, Sachs 
suggested that Jackson contact Rothwell at UPCM and sign a confidentiality agreement 
so that Jackson could obtain the confidential financial information concerning UPCM 
Jackson would need to make an offer to buy UPCM and to register Jackson as Sachs1 
client. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, f23, R. 1325; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, f23, R. 1628; 
Verified Complaint, t 37, R. 8; Sachs Dep. R. 1364, 1377-1378, at 48:25-29; 117:4-12, 
118:4-12; SO¥,^19, supra, at 11. 
26. Sachs told Jackson that he would also contact Rothwell to advise him of 
Jackson's interest in purchasing UPCM. Sachs invited Jackson to contact Sachs1 client, 
Granite, and offered to call Granite to see if Granite was interested in joining Jackson to 
buy UPCM. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, fflf 23-24, R. 1325; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, ffi[23-
24, R. 1628; Verified Complaint, f37; Sachs Dep. R. 1378, 1387-1388, at 119:22-120:15; 
157:24-158:12. 
27- Following his initial conversation with Jackson, Sachs contacted Scott 
Wilcox at Granite and spoke to him about the possibility of Granite going in with Jackson 
to buy UPCM. Jackson also contacted Granite at Plaintiff Sachs1 suggestion. See, Pltf. 
Mem. Op. L&L, f25, R. 1325; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, [^25, R. 1628; Sachs Dep. R. 1378, 
1387-1388, at 119:22-120:22; 135:3-18; 157:24-158:12, Jackson Dep., R. 1460-1461, at 
28:17-31:5. 
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28. Plaintiff Sachs also immediately telephoned Hank Rothwell at UPCM's 
office in Park City, Utah, from his (Sachs1) office in Park City, and informed Rothwell of 
Jackson's interest in putting together a group of investors to buy UPCM. During this 
conversation, Sachs told Rothwell that Jackson's interest in buying UPCM had been 
sparked by information Sachs had received from Lesser in their May 2, 2001 luncheon 
meeting in New York. Plaintiff Sachs did not inform Rothwell about Lesser's criticism of 
Rothwell's performance during Sachs' prior meeting with Lesser, because Sachs did not 
want to cause problems between the two men. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, |^26, R. 1325; 
Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, |26, R. 1628-1629; Verified Complaint, 1ffl39-40, R. 8. 
29. Following his initial solicitation of Jackson as a purchaser for UPCM, 
Sachs continued to communicate with Jackson by phone, facsimile and telephone. Based 
on Jackson's initial indication that he could get investors together to buy UPCM, and 
because Plaintiff Sachs believed that Jackson knew Park City very well and had the skills 
to put together a deal of this size, Sachs did not pursue any other prospective buyers for 
UPCM. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, 1HJ34-35, R. 1327; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, ffif 34-35, R. 
1630; Verified Complaint, Iff 46-47, R. 8, Sachs Dep. R. 1378, 1382-1383, at 118: 4-12; 
135:19-139:2; Jackson Dep. R. 1462 at 39:21-40:5. 
30. On June 4, 2001, Plaintiff Sachs sent Jackson a facsimile from Sachs' office 
in Park City, Utah, encouraging Jackson to contact him when Jackson had spoken with 
Rothwell regarding a confidentiality agreement. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, f36, R. 1327; 
Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, 1J36, R. 1630; Verified Complaint, [^48, R. 10; Facsimile message 
from Sachs to Jackson dated June 4, 2001, R. 1539. 
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31. Subsequently, while Plaintiff Sachs was traveling on business in Moscow, 
Russia, he received a telephone call from Jackson indicating he had contacted Rothwell 
regarding his interest in purchasing UPCM. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, 137, R. 1327; Pltf. 
Mem. Op. UPCM, 137, R. 1628; Verified Complaint, 149, R. 10; Jackson Dep, R. 1462, 
at 39:21-41:8. 
32. On July 9, 2001, Jackson entered into a confidentiality agreement with 
UPCM through Aspen Ranch Corp., a Utah corporation owned by Jackson. See, Pltf. 
Mem. Op. L&L, 138, R. 1327; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, 138, R. 1630; Verified Complaint, 
153; See, Merger Information Statement, under heading "Background of Merger", at 5-6, 
R. 1538. 
33. Jackson admits he did not sign a confidentiality agreement with UPCM 
until after Plaintiff Sachs first contacted him about purchasing UPCM. See, Pltf. Mem. 
Op. L&L, 140, R. 1327; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, 140, R. 1630; Sachs Dep. R. 1389, at 
162: 14-163: 10; Jackson Dep. R. 1461, at 31:6-16; 32:1-33:6. 
34. Jackson also admits he did not speak with Lesser about purchasing UPCM 
until after he signed the confidentiality agreement with UPCM. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, 
139, R. 1327; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, 139, R. 1630; Jackson Dep. R. 1464, at 94:10-25. 
35. On July 31, 2001, Jackson formed Capital Growth Partners ("CGP"), a 
Utah limited liability company, involving a group of investors, for the express purpose of 
purchasing UPCM by acquiring 100% of the capital stock of UPCM. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. 
L&L, 141, R. 1327; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, 141, R. 1631; Verified Complaint, 151, R. 10; 
Jackson Dep., R. 1456-1457, at 12:5-13:23; 16:5-17:1; Merger Agreement, under heading 
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"Background of the Merger", R. 1538. 
36. During the second half of 2001, Plaintiff Sachs communicated with Jackson 
frequently regarding his progress in purchasing UPCM. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, f42, 
R. 1328; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, f42, R. 1631; Sachs Affidavit, f36, R. 1448; Jackson 
Dep.,R. 1462, at 41:9-24. 
37. Jackson admits that he never told Plaintiff Sachs not to call him, or that he 
he wasn't interested in Sachs' help, or that Jackson was already in a deal with Rothwell to 
purchase UPCM. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, f43, R.1328; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, 1J43, R. 
1631; Jackson Dep.R.1462-1463, at 41:9-47:15. 
38. On October 25, 2001, Jackson's company, CGP, entered into a non-
disclosure agreement with DRKW, an investment banking firm hired by UPCM to 
facilitate the purchase of UPCM. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, f44, R. 1328; Pltf. Mem. Op. 
UPCM, 1J44, R. 1631; Verified Complaint, ^56, R. 11; See also, Merger Agreement, 
under heading "Background of the Merger", R.1527 (sixth paragraph). 
39. On February 21, 2002, CGP offered to purchase UPCM from its current 
shareholders, including the stock of Loeb Investors, for $25 per share, for a total of 
approximately $81,300,000. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, ^ 45, R. 1328; Pltf. Mem. Op. 
UPCM, TJ45, R. 1631; See also, Merger Agreement, under heading "Background of the 
Merger", R. 1528 flfl|3-4). 
40. About this time, Jackson telephoned Plaintiff Sachs in Park City, Utah. 
Jackson confirmed that Sachs' activities in soliciting him as a purchaser for UPCM and 
stated that he had no problem with Sachs receiving a large finder's fee. See, Pltf. Mem. 
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Op. L&L, 1(46, R. 1328; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, f46, R. 1631; Verified Complaint, ^58; 
Sachs Affidavit, ^38, R. 1448. 
41. Thereafter, in March and April, 2002, Plaintiff Sachs personally contacted 
Lesser, Rothwell and Craig Terry, an attorney for UPCM, from his business office in 
Park City, Utah, concerning the payment of his finder's fee, which Defendants refused to 
pay. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, f46, R. 1328; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, fte, R. 1631; 
Verified Complaint, fflf 59-64, R. 11-12; Sachs Affidavit, fflf 39-40, R. 1770. 
42. In May 2002, Plaintiff Sachs had Joe Tesch, an attorney in Park City, Utah, 
contact Rothwell regarding the payment of his finder's fee. In a meeting with Rothwell on 
May 29, 2002, Tesch informed Rothwell that his research indicated that a 3% finder's fee 
was reasonable, and that Rothwell agreed that Plaintiff Sachs "would not [find a buyer] 
for UPCM simply as a volunteer." Rothwell also admitted that had Granite purchased 
UPCM, Sachs would have been entitled to a fee, and that Lesser agreed that Sachs would 
have been entitled to a fee. Although Rothwell stated that Jackson was already working 
on buying UPCM when Sachs contacted him, Rothwell admitted he had no 
documentation to support this assertion. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, ^46-47, R. 1328; Pltf. 
Mem. Op. UPCM, fJ6-47, R. 1631; Verified Complaint, 1(59-67, R. 11-12; See, Tesch 
Memo of Meeting with Rothwell dated May 30, 2002, R. 1484. 
43. Lesser agrees that Plaintiff Sachs would have been entitled to a finder's fee 
if he had found Granite or Jackson to purchase UPCM, but denies that Plaintiff Sachs 
found Jackson to purchase UPCM. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, ^46, R. 1328; Pltf. Mem. 
Op. UPCM, f46, R. 1631; Lesser Dep. R.1411-1412, at 129:6 -130:17. 
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44. On or about June 16, 2003, Jackson, through CGP, completed a merger 
with UPCM, by purchasing "all of the outstanding common stock" of UPCM, for $21.00 
per share, for a total of $67.2 million. In the merger, UPCM became a wholly owned 
subsidiary of CGP. UPCM was the surviving corporation in the merger and retained all of 
its assets and liabilities, including its real estate. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, 1fl[49, R. 1328; 
Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, 1fl[49, R. 1631; Verified Complaint, ffl[82, R. 14; Jackson Dep., R. 
900, at 80:20-24; Rothwell Dep., R. 1396, at 169:3- 25; Agreement and Plan of Merger, 
Article I, Sec. 101 (a)-(d), R. 901-902. 
45. In July 2003, Plaintiff Sachs received information that Jackson had 
informed a Park City real estate agent, Sharon Leise, that Sachs would be paid a fee for 
bringing Jackson to purchase UPCM. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, |50, R. 1329; Pltf. Mem. 
Op. UPCM, t50, R. 1632; Sachs Dep. R. 2129, at 201:10 - 202:12. 
46. Subsequently, Plaintiff Sachs made additional requests to UPCM for the 
payment of his finder's fee for locating Jackson to purchase UPCM, but Defendants also 
denied these requests. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, \5\, R. 1329; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, 
1f5l, R. 1632; Verified Complaint, fflf 81-86, R. 14; Sachs Affidavit, | 51 , R. 1632. 
47. On August 11, 2003, Plaintiff Sachs met Jackson in Park City, Utah. 
During their conversation, Jackson indicated that Rothwell had previously informed him 
that UPCM's investment banking firm, DRKW, wasn't going to get a finder's fee because 
they had not solicited Jackson, and that Jackson had later been surprised to learn that 
DRKW had been paid, because Sachs had solicited him to purchase UPCM. Sachs told 
Jackson that he was going to New York to try to resolve his finder's fee claim with 
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Lesser, and Jackson gave Sachs his business card with the number where he could be 
reached. Subsequently, Plaintiff Sachs sent a letter to Lesser with Jackson's business card, 
and requested a meeting to resolve his claim. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, J^52, R. 1329; 
Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, ^52, R. 1632; Verified Complaint, ffi[88-91, R. 15-16; Sachs 
Affidavit, fflf 50-52, R. 1450; Facsimile and letter from Sachs to Lesser, dated August 13, 
2001, R. 862-864. 
48. Lesser admits that DRKW did not locate anyone to purchase UPCM at the 
price range set for the sale of the corporation. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, ^J53, R. 1329; 
Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, 1J53, R. 1632; Lesser Dep, R. 1404, 1410, at 44:16-19; 120:18-
121: 25. The information provided to stock holders of UPCM regarding the background 
of merger merely states that Jackson "became aware of our interest in securing an 
investor or being sold." See, "Background of the Merger", R. 1864. 
49. On August 19, 2003, Plaintiff Sachs sent another request for payment of his 
finder's fee to Rothwell at UCPM's offices in Park City, Utah. Rothwell again refused 
payment, claiming that UPCM had only viewed Sachs as the representative of Granite. 
Plaintiff Sachs then sent Rothwell additional information regarding the facts supporting 
his right to payment of the finder's fee, but no payment was forthcoming. See, Pltf. Mem. 
Op. L&L, ffi[ 54-55, R. 1329; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, ffif 54-55, R. 1632-1633; Verified 
Complaint, ffi[91-92; Fax from Rothwell to Sachs dated August 19, 2003, R. 1452. 
50. From the time of Sachs' meeting with Lesser on or about May 2, 2001, until 
the merger between UPCM and CGP closed on July 18, 2003, Lesser and Rothwell never 
informed Sachs that Jackson was excluded as a buyer for which Plaintiff Sachs could 
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receive a finder's fee, or that Sachs would not receive a finder's fee for Jackson's 
purchase of UPCM. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, 156, R. 1329-1330; Pltf. Mem. Op. 
UPCM, H56, R. 1633; Sachs Dep., R. 1372, 1378-1379, at 92: 4-19; 121:22-123:14; 
129:20-130:21; Rothwell Dep, R. 1396, at 167:20-168:9; Lesser Dep. 1412, at 133:2-21. 
51. Had Lesser and Rothwell done so, Plaintiff Sachs would have searched for 
another potential buyer for UPCM that would have outbid Jackson in order to receive the 
finder's fee. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, 159, R. 1330; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, 1 59, R. 
1633; Sachs Dep. R. 1383, at 140:14-20. 
52. Jackson, although not licensed as a real estate broker, has been a real estate 
developer in the Park City area for over fifteen years. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, f 66, R. 
1331; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, 166, R. 1634; Jackson Dep, R. 1455-1456, 1465, at 5:6-24; 
108:5-109:12. 
53. Jackson testified that during the merger of CGP and UPCM, his interests 
were being looked after by "100 lawyers." See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, 166, R. 1331; Pltf. 
Mem. Op. UPCM, 166, R. 1634; Jackson Dep. R. 1457, at 15:10-17. 
54. The merger of UPCM and CGP was a complicated commercial transaction 
in which the parties' interests were represented by numerous attorneys and consultants. 
UPCM was also represented by DRKW, an investment banking firm. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. 
L&L, 167, R. 1331; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, 167, R. 1634; Merger Agreement, 
"Information Statement", R. 1521-1533; Lesser Dep. R.1403, at 36:18-37:4. 
55. Prior to the filing of this action, Lesser, Loeb, Rothwell and UPCM were 
sued in an action alleging fraud in the merger between UPCM and CGP due to inside 
21 
dealing, styled Pennsylvania Avenue Partners v. United Park City Mines, Case No. 
030500337. In his deposition in that case, Rothwell testified under oath that he only 
knew Jackson socially, when, in fact, according to Jackson's sworn deposition testimony 
in this case, Jackson and Rothwell were partners in real estate development businesses 
and companies from 1985 through 1998, including a period of six years after Rothwell 
became President of UPCM, a highly material fact which was not disclosed to 
shareholders of UPCM in connection with the merger. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, ^|68, R. 
1331-1332; Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, 1J68, R. 1334-1335; Compare, Rothwell Dep. 
(Pennsylvania Avenue), R. 1574-1576, and Jackson Dep. R. 1458, 1465, at 21:14-18, 
107:25-109:12. See also, Rothwell Dep., R. 1392, at 12:22-13:9 (testifying that he was 
President of UPCM from September, 1991, through July 31, 2003). 
56. In the event Jackson did have an undisclosed inside deal with Rothwell to 
purchase UPCM prior to the time that Plaintiff Sachs first contacted Jackson, which 
Plaintiff Sachs disputes, Rothwell and Jackson had a motive to mislead Plaintiff Sachs to 
believe that he would receive a finder's fee for bringing Jackson in as the buyer for 
UPCM, so that Plaintiff Sachs would not go out and find another purchaser who would 
compete with Jackson to purchase LIPCM. Jackson and Rothwell also have a motive to 
support Lesser in denying Plaintiff Sachs' right to receive a finder's fee for locating 
Jackson to purchase UPCM. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. L&L, [^69, R. 1331; Pltf. Mem. Op. 
UPCM, f69; Sachs Dep. R. 1383 at 140:14-20. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I The District Court Erred In Granting Summary Judgment For 
Defendants On Plaintiffs Claims For Declaratory Judgment And 
Breach of Express Or Implied Contract, Where Genuinely Disputed 
Issues Of Material Fact Remain For Trial And Defendants Are Not 
Entitled To Summary Judgment As A Matter Of Law 
The district court erred in granting summary judgment for Defendants Lesser, 
Loeb and UPCM, on Plaintiff Sachs' claims for declaratory judgment and breach of 
express or implied finder's fee contract, based on its conclusions that there was no 
meeting of the minds, no mutual assent, that the contract is too indefinite to be enforced 
and is merely an agreement to agree. Record evidence demonstrates that genuinely 
disputed issues of material fact remain for trial on these claims. Additionally, Defendants 
are not entitled to judgment on these claims as a matter of law, because Lesser's request 
to Plaintiff Sachs to find a purchaser for UPCM, after receiving written notice of the fee 
Plaintiff would charge for his services, created an enforceable express contract under 
Utah law. The material terms of the agreement are contained in Plaintiff Sachs' written 
finder's fee offer or are shown by extrinsic evidence, and are thus sufficiently definite to 
be enforced as an express contract under Utah law. Alternatively, record evidence not 
addressed by the district court demonstrates the existence of a contract implied in fact or 
in law, and Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on 
Plaintiff Sachs' claims for quantum meruit recovery. 
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Point II The District Court Erred In Granting Summary Judgment For 
Defendants On Plaintiff Sachs1 Claims For Declaratory Judgment 
And Breach of Express Or Implied Contract, Based On Its 
Incorrect Conclusion That These Claims Are Barred Under The 
Utah Real Estate Broker's Act 
The district court erred in granting summary judgment on Plaintiff Sachs' claims 
for declaratory judgment and breach of express or implied finder's fee contract on the 
grounds that the contract is purportedly barred under the Utah Real Estate Broker's Act 
("UREBA"), because Plaintiff Sachs was not a licensed real estate broker and because 
Plaintiff Sachs agreed to receive his finder's fee in the form of "two prime developed lots 
in the new Project" owned by UPCM. Conversely, record evidence demonstrates that 
Plaintiff Sachs did not engage in any "real estate" transaction for which licensure is 
required under UREBA. 
Because UREBA is a penal statute, it must be strictly construed to avoid 
criminalizing conduct not expressly prohibited by its provisions. Thus, the parties' 
finder's fee agreement is not barred as "a business opportunity involving real estate" 
under UREBA, because this term is not defined in UREBA and on its face, is 
distinguishable from the terms "business" or "corporation." Also, because the purpose of 
UREBA is not to protect experienced, licensed real estate brokers such as Rothwell and 
Lesser, UREBA does not bar Plaintiff Sachs' finder's fee claims in this action. 
Point III The District Court Erred In Granting Summary Judgment 
For Defendants On Plaintiff Sachs' Claims For Declaratory 
Judgment And Breach of Express Or Implied Contract, 
Based On Its Incorrect Conclusion That These Claims Are 
Barred By The Utah Statute Of Frauds 
The district court erred in granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs Sachs' claims 
24 
for declaratory judgment and breach of express or implied contract on the ground that 
they are purportedly barred under §25-5-4 of the Utah Statute of Frauds as an "agreement 
involving the sale or purchase of real property." Record evidence demonstrates that the 
parties' finder's fee contract did not involve "the sale or purchase of real property" of 
UPCM and is thus not barred under §25-5-4(5) of the Utah Statute of Frauds. 
Alternatively, Plaintiff Sachs full performance of the finder's fee agreement takes the 
agreement out of the Statute of Frauds. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON SACHS' CLAIMS FOR DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT AND BREACH OF CONTRACT, WHERE 
GENUINELY DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
REMAIN FOR TRIAL AND DEFENDANTS ARE NOT 
ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
The district court granted summary judgment for Lesser, Loeb and UPCM on 
Plaintiff Sachs' claims for declaratory judgment and breach of an express or implied 
contract, based on its conclusions that 
[t]he undisputed material facts demonstrate that no enforceable 
express or implied finder's fee agreement was ever entered into... 
[and that] no reasonable minds could differ that there was no meeting 
of the minds or mutual assent on material terms of the alleged finder's 
fee agreement, that there is a lack of definiteness and material terms 
such as price, and no reasonable method to calculate price, 
manifesting an intent of the parties to be bound thereby, and that any 
finder's fee agreement was subject to further negotiation. See, Bunnell 
v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597 (Utah 1962), and Carter v. Sorensen. 90 P.3d 
637 (Utah 2004). 
Minute Entry Decision, 1J2(a), at 2, R. 2209, Aplnt. Add. 1. 
Plaintiff Sachs respectfully asserts that the district court erred in so concluding, 
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because genuinely disputed issues of material fact remain for trial and Defendants Lesser, 
Loeb and UPCM are not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law for the reasons 
discussed below. 
A. Lesser's Request, On Behalf of Loeb and UPCM, That Sachs Find A Buyer 
For UPCM, After Written Notice Of The Finder's Fee Sachs Charged For His 
Services, Resulted In An Express Or Implied Finder's Fee Contract 
1. Express Contract 
The only points of mutual agreement necessary to create a valid finder's fee 
contract are: (1) the identity of the finder; (2) the thing or person to be found; and (3) the 
fee to be paid to the finder. Plaintiff Sachs1 May 17, 2001 letter to Rothwell identifies 
Sachs as the finder, identifies the person to be found as a joint venturer or purchaser for 
UPCM, and describes the fee as "a couple of prime developed lots in the new Project, 
cash or some other consideration acceptable to both of us." Defendants1 assent to the 
agreement is supplied by Lessees request to Plaintiff Sachs to find a purchaser for UPCM 
after receiving notice of the fee Plaintiff Sachs expected for his services. See, SOF, U1[16-
22, supra, at 10-13. 
The fact that Lesser and Rothwell did not, verbally or in writing, assent to the 
finder's fee stated in Plaintiff Sachs1 letter, does not mean that "there was no meeting of 
the minds or mutual assent on the material terms of the alleged finder's fee agreement", 
or that the "contract was too indefinite" to be enforced, as the district court concluded, 
citing Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 1962).1 Minute Entry Decision, 1J2(a), at 
1
 In Bunnell supra, at 600, the Utah Supreme Court rejected the defendant Stevens' 
contention that the agreement failed to adequately set forth the price and terms relating to 
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2, R. 2209, Aplnt. Add. 1. As this Court has noted, to be considered with the foregoing 
principles of Bunnell is the further proposition that 
[T]he parties to a contract are obliged to proceed in good faith to 
cooperate in performing the contract in accordance with its expressed 
intent. A contract is not fatally defective as to price if there is an 
agreement as to some formula or method for fixing it. 
Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch, 955 P.2d 357, 366, (Utah App., 1998) quoting Ferris v. 
Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979) (Emphasis supplied) 
In Central Missouri Prof. Svcs. v. Shoemaker, 108 S.W.3d 6, 9 (Mo. App. W.D. 
2003), the Missouri Court of Appeals held that an oral fee contract existed where the 
defendant instructed the plaintiff to commence work after receiving the plaintiffs 
proposed charges for the work, citing the "well settled rule of law" that 
' [A] written offer may be orally accepted. The result is an oral contract 
embodying the terms of the writing.' Moore v. Kuehn, 602 S.W.2d 713, 
718 (Mo. App. 1980). 'Although a written contract is not signed by one 
or both of the parties, the acceptance by one of the performance of the 
other gives validity to the instrument and imposes on the acceptor the 
obligations provided by the contract.' Hahn v. Forest Hills Constr. Co., 
334 S.W.2d 383, 385-86 (Mo. App. 1960). 
The court also relied on its prior decision in Moore, supra. There, after receiving a 
proposal for various home repairs and the charges for making them, the defendant told 
the plaintiff, "The roof ought to be fixed, so get on it." Id. at 718. The court found that an 
express oral contract existed, noting that the only offer to which the defendant's 
the "Bunnell property", holding that "the receipt expressly states that such property has 
an agreed value of $15,000, and that it is to constitute part of the consideration for the 
Alta (Lodge)...." Nothing in Bunnell indicates that assent to the terms of a contract must 
be in writing to be enforceable, or that the price term of an agreement that can be shown 
by extrinsic evidence is not enforceable. 
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acceptance could have related was the plaintiffs earlier written proposal, such that its 
terms "necessarily controlled the oral contract established at that point." Central 
Missouri, supra, at 9, quoting Moore, supra, at 718. 
In Moore, supra, the Missouri Court of Appeals also explained that acceptance of 
a written offer "need not be made by the spoken or written word; it may also come 
through the offeree's conduct or failure to act", citing the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts §21(1) for the rule that 
Frequently, services are rendered under circumstances such that the 
party benefited thereby knows the terms on which they are being 
offered. If he receives the benefit of the services in silence, when he had 
a reasonable opportunity to express his rejection of the offer, he is 
assenting to the terms proposed and thus accepts the offer. 
Id. at 718-719, ffi| 12-14. 
Although the district court held that the "there is a lack of definiteness and 
material terms such as price" and that "any finder's fee agreement was subject to further 
negotiation", Minute Entry Decision, ^j2(a), at 2, R. 2209, Aplnt. Add. 1, Plaintiff Sachs 
provided undisputed sworn testimony that the "couple of prime developed lots in the new 
project" owned by UPCM referenced in his May 17, 2001 letter, had a value of 
approximately two million dollars. Plaintiff Sachs testified that this amount, representing 
about 3% of the purchase price of UPCM, was an appropriate finder's fee based on his 
experience, the expedited manner in which he found a buyer and the size of the deal. See, 
SOF,^17-18,sw/?ra,atll. 
That Lesser and Rothwell accepted the finder's fee stated in Sachs' May 17, 2001, 
letter is shown by evidence that when Lesser telephoned Sachs after receiving the letter, 
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he told Sachs to forget a joint venture partner for UPCM's Projects and to find a buyer or 
buyers for UPCM as quickly as possible, and never questioned the amount of the finder's 
fee. See, SOF, ff 19-22, 50, supra, at 11-12, 20. 
On May 18, 2001, Plaintiff Sachs sent Rothwell a follow-up letter stating, "I 
understand after a conversation yesterday with Joe Lesser, that his preference would be to 
sell the company rather than enter into a joint venture", and that "I will continue to keep 
you apprised of all proposals..." See, SOF, f22, supra, at 12-13. Thus, as of May 18, 
2001, both Lesser and Rothwell were fully aware that Plaintiff Sachs was working to find 
one or more purchasers for UPCM for the finder's fee referenced in his letter of May 17, 
2001. Despite this knowledge, and although they had numerous opportunities to do so, 
Lesser and Rothwell never informed Sachs that they had any questions about the finder's 
fee, including the amount of the fee, and never informed Sachs they would not pay him 
the finder's fee at any time prior to the date Jackson purchased UPCM. See, SOF, ^ | 20-
21, 50, supra, at 12, 20. 
Based on the foregoing evidence, a reasonable jury could find that Lesser and 
Rothwell understood the fee Plaintiff Sachs expected for his services, such that there was 
a meeting of the minds on the amount of the fee at the time Lesser requested Sachs to 
find a buyer for UPCM, and hence no need for further negotiation of the contract. Even if 
the district court considered the price term to be ambiguous, Plaintiff Sachs' testimony as 
to the amount of the fee is extrinsic evidence that must be considered by a jury, 
precluding summary judgment. Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corporation, 883 P.2d 
285, 295 (Utah App. 1994) (internal citations omitted). 
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The instant case is immediately distinguishable from Carter v. Sorensen, 2004 UT 
33, 90 P.3d 637, cited by the district court. Seey Minute Entry Decision, ^2(a) at 2, R. 
2209, Aplnt. Add. 1. There, Carter was seeking to obtain water rights under an option 
contract to repurchase land previously sold to the defendant Sorensen. The contract only 
specified an option price to repurchase the land and did not specify any separate price for 
repurchasing the water rights. Moreover, the price of the water rights could not be 
determined from extrinsic evidence. On these facts, the Utah Supreme Court sustained 
the trial court's finding that the option contract was unenforceable as to the water rights. 
Carter, supra, at ^4,5,11. By contrast, in the instant case, Plaintiff Sachs1 testimony 
regarding the value of the "couple of prime developed lots in the new Project" on which 
his finder's fee was predicated, is extrinsic evidence of the amount of the finder's fee to 
be considered by the jury, thus precluding summary judgment. See, SOF, ^16-17, supra, 
at 10-11. 
Moreover, the price term not being expressed in dollars, but by means of "cash, a 
couple of prime developed lots in the new Project, or some other consideration acceptable 
to both of us", referenced in Sachs' May 17, 2001 letter, See, SOF, ffif 16-21, supra, at 10-
12, is incidental to the agreement and no bar to its enforcement. "When the major aspects 
of a contract are specified with requisite certainty, this Court will not allow incidental 
details...in a contract...to deny specific performance." Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch, 955 
P.2d 357, 363 (Utah App. 1998), quoting Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374, 1378-79 (Utah 
1980). In Reed, the Utah Supreme Court held that even "agreements to agree," which are 
sufficiently definite, may be enforced. Id. 
Based on the foregoing, the district court's grant of summary judgment for 
Defendants on Plaintiff Sachs' claims for declaratory judgment and breach of express 
contract is incorrect and should be reversed. Additionally, under the rationale of Central 
Missouri discussed above, Lesser's oral request to Sachs to find him a purchaser for 
UPCM after receiving written notice of the finder's fee Sachs expected for his services in 
finding a joint venturer or purchaser for UPCM, constituted an oral acceptance of Sachs' 
written offer, resulting in an "express" finder's fee contract between the parties. 
Thus, the district court's finding that no express finder's fee contract was formed, is 
incorrect as a matter of law and must be reversed. 
2. Implied Contract 
Under Utah law, a plaintiff may plead alternative causes of action for breach of 
contract and breach of implied contract and go to trial on both claims. Parrish v. Tahtaras, 
318 P.2d 642, 645 (1957), citing U.R.Civ.P.54(c)(l); Morris v. Russell et ux„ 236 P.2d 
451, 454 (Utah 1951), citing U.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(2) and 54(c)(1). Thus, even if Plaintiff 
Sachs is not entitled to recover his finder's fee under an "express" contract theory, 
genuinely disputed issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on Plaintiff Sachs' 
claims for breach of an implied contract and Defendants are not entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. 
In Scheller v. Dixie Six Corp., 753 P.2d 971 (Utah App., 1988), this Court held 
When a party, for some reason, is not entitled by the express terms of a 
contract to recover payment for services rendered, he or she might 
nonetheless be entitled to recover in quantum meruit. Recovery under 
quantum meruit presupposes that no enforceable contract 
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exists... [Quantum meruit is] rooted injustice to prevent the defendant's 
enrichment at the plaintiffs expense. 
Id. at 975, citing Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 268-269 (Utah App. 1987). 
In Davies, this Court described the two branches of quantum meruit and the 
elements of proof for each branch: 
Contract implied in law, also known as quasi-contract or unjust 
enrichment, is one branch of quantum meruit. A quasi-contract is not 
a contract at all, but rather is a legal action in restitution... The 
elements of a quasi-contract or a contract implied in law, are: (1) the 
defendant received a benefit; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the 
defendant of the benefit; (3) under circumstances that would make it 
unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying for it.... 
A contract implied in fact is the second branch of quantum meruit. A 
contract implied in fact is a "contract" established by conduct. The 
elements of a contract implied in fact are: (1) the defendant requested 
the plaintiff to perform the work; (2) the plaintiff expected the 
defendant to compensate him or her for those services; and (3) the 
defendant knew or should have known that the plaintiff expected 
compensation. 
Id. at 269. (Internal citations omitted) 
In the instant case, Plaintiff Sachs presented substantial record evidence to satisfy 
the elements of both branches of quantum meruit, for damages based on a contract 
implied in law, Count III, and based on a contract implied in fact, Count IV, Verified 
Complaint, R. 1-24, creating genuinely disputed issues of material fact for trial. 
a. Quantum Meruit Based On A Contract Implied In Law 
Element No. 1: "the defendant received a benefit", Davies, supra, at 269. 
Plaintiff Sachs1 evidence demonstrates that in response to Lesserfs request, Plaintiff Sachs 
found Gerald Jackson as a buyer for UPCM, and that Jackson subsequently created an 
entity, CGP, which purchased UPCM by buying the stock of the corporation, from which 
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Defendants "received a benefit" of approximately $67.2 million. See, SOF, f 11-44, 
supra, at 8-19. 
Element No. 2: "an appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit", 
Davies, supra, at 269. Plaintiff Sachs1 evidence demonstrates that Lesser and Rothwell 
knew that Plaintiff Sachs was directing his efforts to finding a purchaser for UPCM with 
the expectation of receiving a finder's fee based on: (1) Sachs' letters of May 17 and 18, 
2001; (2) Sachs' phone call to Rothwell advising him of Jackson's interest in purchasing 
UPCM based on the information Sachs provided to Jackson; (3) the fact that Lesser and 
Rothwell never told Sachs they would not pay the finder's fee prior to the time Jackson 
purchased UPCM, and (4) that Lesser and Rothwell acknowledged the existence of the 
agreement by stating that Sachs would have received the finder's fee if his client Granite 
had purchased UPCM. See, SOF, fflf 16-22,28,41-43,56, supra, at 11-13, 17-18. 
Element No. 3: "under circumstances that would make it unjust for the 
defendant to retain the benefit without paying for it", Davies, supra, at 269. Plaintiff 
Sachs' evidence indicates that Defendants received $67.2 million as the direct result of 
Sachs' efforts in locating Jackson to buy UPCM based on a direct request from Lesser, 
after Lesser received notice of the fee Plaintiff Sachs would charge for his services. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs evidence shows that Lesser and Rothwell never told Sachs that 
Jackson was excluded as a party he could approach to buy UPCM, or that they wouldn't 
pay his fee at anytime prior to the time Jackson purchased UPCM, and that a finder's fee 
amounting to 3% of the purchase price paid for UPCM is a reasonable and customary fee 
for the services performed by Plaintiff Sachs. See, SOF, fflf 15- 56, supra, at 10-22. Thus, 
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it would be unjust for Defendants not to pay Sachs the agreed finder's fee under these 
circumstances. 
b. Plaintiff Sachs' Evidence Regarding His Claim For Quantum 
Meruit Relief Based On A Contract Implied In Fact 
Element No. 1: "the defendant requested the plaintiff to perform work", Davies, 
supra, at 269. Plaintiff Sachs presented sworn testimony that Lesser requested him to find 
a joint venturer or purchaser for UPCM in their meeting on May 2, 2001, and that on 
May 17, 2001, after receiving Sachs1 letter of the same date, Lesser telephoned Plaintiff 
Sachs and told him that he was no longer interested in a joint venturer for UPCM, and 
wanted Sachs to find him one or more parties to buy UPCM as soon as possible. See, 
SOF, ffi[ 11,16, supra, at 8-10; 
Element No. 2: "the plaintiff expected the defendant to compensate him or her 
for his services", Davies, supra, at 269. Plaintiff Sachs1 evidence shows that he sent 
Rothwell a letter on May 17, 2001 confirming his understanding that he would receive a 
finder's fee for locating a joint venturer or buyer for UPCM, and a letter on May 18, 
2001, confirming Lesser's preference for a purchaser and that he would direct his efforts 
toward finding a buyer or buyers for UPCM. See, SOF, ff16-22, supra, at 10-13. 
Element No. 3: "the defendant knew or should have known that the plaintiff 
expected compensation", Davies, supra, at 269. Plaintiff Sachs' evidence shows that the 
Defendants knew or should have known that the plaintiff expected compensation based 
on: (1) Plaintiff Sachs' letter of May 17, 2001 confirming his understanding of the fee he 
would recieve for finding a joint venturer or purchaser for UPCM; (2) Lesser's May 17 
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phone call requesting Sachs to find a purchaser for UPCM; (3) Sachsf May 18, 2001 letter 
confirming that he will focus his efforts on finding a buyer for UPCM; and (4) Plaintiff 
Sachs' telephone call to Rothwell advising him of Jacksonfs interest in purchasing UPCM 
based on Sachs1 efforts. See, SOF, ^[16-22, supra, at 11-13. 
Even assuming the parties did not agree as to the amount of the finder's fee 
described in Sachs' May 17, 2001 letter, which Plaintiff Sachs disputes, the measure of 
recovery under a contract implied in law "is the value of the benefit conferred on the 
defendant... If the amount is unexpressed, the courts will infer that the parties intended 
the amount to be the reasonable market value of the plaintiffs services." Davies, supra, 
at 269 (internal citations omitted). 
The measure of recovery under a contract implied in fact is, "the amount the 
parties intended as the contract price. If that amount is unexpressed, courts will infer that 
the parties intended the amount to be the reasonable market value of the plaintiffs 
services." Davies, supra, at 269-270, citing Kovacic, A Proposal to Simplify Quantum 
Meruit Litigation, 35 Am.U.L.Rev. 547, 556 (1986). See also, Turnkey Corp. v. 
Rappeport, 720 P.2d 115, 119 (Ariz. App. 1986) (quantum meruit recovery allowed 
where only element of contract disputed was the value of services rendered). 
Accordingly, the district court's finding that the terms of Plaintiff Sachs' finder's 
fee contract with Defendants is too indefinite to be enforced, or is merely an agreement to 
agree, is incorrect and should be reversed. Additionally, genuinely disputed issues of 
material fact concerning Plaintiffs' claims for breach of implied contract based on 
quantum meruit preclude summary judgment on these claims and require reversal of the 
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district court's decision granting summary judgment for Defendants on these claims. 
POINT II THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S FINDER'S FEE CLAIMS 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF SACHS DID NOT ENGAGE IN ANY 
TRANSACTION INVOLVING "REAL ESTATE" REQUIRING 
LICENSURE UNDER UREBA 
The district court erred in granting summary judgment for Lesser, Loeb and 
UPCM on all of Plaintiff Sachs' finder's fee claims, on the ground that such claims are 
barred by the defense of "illegality" under §61-2-1 and §61-2-18(1) of the Utah Real 
Estate Broker's Act ("UREBA"), Aplnt. Add. 4, based on findings that, 
Plaintiff did not have a real estate license... [UPCM's] principal 
business was the leasing, development and sale of real property, and 
that its' [UCPM's] only asset of significance was its real property. 
Even plaintiff attempted to negotiate compensation in the form of... 
"a couple of prime developed lots in the new project..." The Court 
further relies on upon Andalex Resources v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041 
(Utah App. 1994), and the majority rule set forth in Blackthorne 
Group, Inc. v. Pines of Newmarket Inc., 848 A.2d 725 (N.H. 2004). 
See, Minute Entry Decision, l|2(b), at 2-3, R. 2209-2210, Aplnt. Add. 1. 
As Plaintiff Sachs will demonstrate, neither UREBA nor the decisions relied on by 
the district court, preclude Plaintiff Sachs' finder's fee claims as a matter of law and 
genuinely disputed issues of material fact also preclude summary judgment on these 
claims. 
A. As A Penal Statute, UREBA Must Be Strictly Construed To Avoid 
Criminalizing Conduct Not Plainly Prohibited Under Its Provisions 
In State of Utah v. Mooney, 2004 UT 4941 h the Utah Supreme Court held that 
"a question of statutory interpretation is reviewed for correctness, without deference to 
the conclusions of the trial court" and that "the primary source of guidance in statutory 
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interpretation is the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language." 
UREBA is penal in nature. Section 61-2-17 of UREBA, Aplnt Add. 4, provides 
that violations of the Act are punishable as a "Class A Misdemeanor" for the first offense, 
with a term of imprisonment not to exceed six months, and that any second or subsequent 
violation is punishable as a third degree felony with a term of imprisonment not to exceed 
two years. Additionally, any person who receives money or its equivalent, as a 
commission, compensation, or profit by or in consequence of a violation of the act, may 
be assessed an additional penalty of not less than the amount of the money received and 
not more than three times the amount of the money received, as determined by the court. 
Because UREBA is penal in nature, it must be strictly construed to avoid 
criminalizing conduct not clearly prohibited under its provisions. "[Due process] 
guarantees do not permit enforcement of a penal statute that forbids an act in terms so 
vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at the statute's 
meaning and differ as to its application." State v. Mooney, supra, ][17. Thus, the Court 
should refuse to extend the UREBA licensing requirements beyond their plain meaning. 
In Andersen v. Johnson, 160 P.2d 725 (Utah 1945), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that an individual who accompanied a licensed real estate broker on a visit to a farm 
owner and assisted the broker in obtaining a listing on the farm, was not acting as "a real 
estate broker" or a "real estate salesman" within UREBA, such that the lack of a real 
estate broker's license did not bar his recovery on the broker's agreement to pay him a 
commission for this service. In reaching this result, the Utah Supreme Court refused to 
extend the definitions of the terms "real estate broker" and "real estate" by implication, 
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stating that "Had the legislature intended to prohibit one from assisting a real estate 
broker to secure listings, it could have done so without difficulty." Id. at 729.2 
Section 61-2-2(14) of UREBA defines the term "real estate" as including 
"leaseholds and business opportunities involving real property." (Emphasis supplied). 
Although the district court held that Plaintiffs' Sachs' efforts in finding of a buyer for 
UPCM, is "a business opportunity involving real estate" under the definition of "real 
estate" in §61-2-2 (14), the term "business opportunity involving real property" is 
nowhere defined in UREBA. Even at face value, the term "business opportunity 
involving real property" is readily distinguishable from the terms "business" and 
"corporation", which terms are not contained in the definition of "real estate" under §61-
1-2(14) of UREBA. Had the Utah Legislature desired to prohibit an individual from 
finding a buyer for a corporation or business for a fee, without being licensed under 
2
 In 1945, when the Utah Supreme Court decided Andersen, UREBA defined "real 
estate" in §82-2-2 as "leaseholds and other interests less than leaseholds." See, Aplnt. 
Add. 7, at 7. In 1953, UREBA was moved to Chapter 61, but the definition of "real 
estate" remained the same. See, §61-2-2, Id. at 10. In 1963, UREBA defined "real estate" 
as "leaseholds and business opportunities" and the term "business opportunity" was 
defined as "an existing business, business and the good will attached thereto or any one 
or combination thereof." Id., at 13. In 1983, UREBA defined "real estate" as including 
"timeshare interests" and the term "business opportunity" was amended to include a 
"business franchise." Id., at 16. In 1985, the definition of "real estate" in UREBA was 
amended to include "leaseholds, business opportunities, and all timeshare interests 
....involving real property." The term "business franchise" was removed from the 
definition of "real estate" and the definition of "business opportunity" was removed in 
its entirety. Id., at 19. (Emphasis supplied) In 1987, the definition of "real estate" was 
amended to "leaseholds and business opportunities involving real property." The term 
"business opportunities" is undefined. Id., at 21. In 1989, 1991, 1996, 1997 and 2003, 
UREBA was amended, but the definition of "real estate" was not changed. In 1996, the 
definition of "real estate" was moved to its current position at subparagraph (14). Id., at 
4. See also, 2005 Supp. (showing history of amendments to UREBA), Id. at 4. 
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UREBA, "it could have done so without difficulty." See, Andersen, supra, at 729. The 
fact that the Utah Legislature, in 1985, specifically deleted the definition of "business 
opportunity" which then included "an existing business; a business and its good will; a 
business franchise, or any combination of them", argues against an interpretation of the 
term "business opportunity" as encompassing "an existing business" or a "business and 
its good will." Because the term "business opportunity involving real property" is 
undefined in UREBA, "[T]he ambiguity in the statute is such that the scope of its ... 
prohibition cannot be decisively interpreted by lawyers, to say nothing of citizens 
untrained in the law. This weighs strongly against any interpretation that would enable 
the state to initiate criminal prosecution based on arguably legitimate conduct." State of 
Utah v. Mooney, supra, at f 18. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should strictly interpret UREBA and hold that 
its ambiguous term "business opportunity involving real estate" did not require Plaintiff 
Sachs to be licensed as a real estate broker to find a buyer for UPCM, a public 
corporation, and does not bar Plaintiff Sachs' claims to recover his finder's fee. 
B. Plaintiff Sachs Was Not Required To Be Licensed As A Real Estate 
Broker To Find A Buyer For UPCM, A New York Stock Exchange 
Corporation, Where The Buyer Purchased UPCM By Acquiring 100% Of 
Its Common Stock In A Merger In Which UPCM Was The Surviving 
Corporation And Retained Its Assets, Including Its Real Estate 
In 17 Williston on Contracts, §51.2 (4th Ed. 2006), the nature of the property 
interest represented by corporate stock is described as follows: 
Shares of stock, which represent the holder's partial but undivided 
ownership of the corporation, constitute a property interest quite distinct 
from the capital or tangible assets of the corporation. The capital is the 
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property of the artificial person, the corporation; the shares are the 
property of the several shareholders. Incorporeal in their nature, the 
shares are generally classed as personal property. The fact that the entire 
capital may be invested in real estate does not change the character of 
the shares of the corporation as personal property. Even though the 
company may exist for the sole purpose of owning and dealing in real 
estate, its shares are nevertheless personal property. 
See, Id., Full text (citing cases), Aplnt. Add. 6. 
In Utah, corporate stock has historically been considered as "personal property" 
rather than "real property." See, e.g., Nielson v. Nielson, 780 P.2d 1264, 1267 (Utah App. 
1989) (plaintiff awarded stock as personal property in divorce); Linder v. Utah Southern 
Oil Co., 269 P.2d 847, 848 (Utah 1954) (citing Utah Code Ann. (1953), §16-2-34, 
providing that: "Stock shall be deemed personal property..."; Pace v. Pace Bros. Co. et 
al., 59 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1936) (Utah statutes authorizing corporations to buy and sell 
personal property and declaring stock to be personal property do not authorize 
corporation to purchase its own stock). 
In Gruber v. Owens-Illinois Inc., 899 F.2d 1366 (3rd Cir. 1990), the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a finder's fee contract in connection with the sale 
of the stock of a corporation, part of whose assets consisted in land, was not rendered 
unenforceable because the plaintiff finder was not licensed under the Pennsylvania real 
estate broker's act, based on the "well established" principle that "The shares of a 
corporation constitute a species of property entirely distinct and different from the 
corporate property," and that "this distinction is predicated neither on the number of 
shareholders, the size of the corporation, or the nature of its assets..." Id. at 1370. 
(Internal citations and quotations omitted.) Similarly, in Silvertooth v. Kelley, 91 P.2d 
1112, 1114 (Or. 1939), the Oregon Supreme Court held that an individual did not require 
a real estate broker's license to find a purchaser for the stock of a corporation, holding 
that 
Shares of stock in a corporation are personal property (13 American 
Jurisprudence 293) even where the property of the corporation 
consists wholly of real estate: Fletcher Cyc. Corporations (Permanent 
Edition) § 5096 ... The corporation, Horse Heaven Mines, still has 
title to the real property. It was the stock in the corporation that was 
sold. 
As in Gruber and Silvertooth, it was the stock of UPCM that was sold, not its real 
property, which UPCM retained in the transaction. Thus, the purchase of such stock, 
constituting "personal property", did not involve the "sale or exchange of real property" 
requiring licensure under UREBA. 
Although the district court relies on Andalex Resources v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041 
(Utah App. 1994) to support its conclusion that Plaintiff Sachs was required to be 
licensed as a real estate broker to obtain a fee for finding Jackson to purchase UPCM, 
Minute Entry Decision, f2(b),at 2-3, R. 2209-2210, Aplnt Add. 1, Andalex involved the 
sale of coal leases that are "leaseholds" within the definition of "real estate" in §61-2-
2(14) of UREBA, whereas the stock of a public corporation is not "real estate." 
The district courfs reliance on "the majority rule set forth in Blackthorne Group, 
Inc. v. Pines of Newmarket Inc., 848 A.2d 725 (N.H. 2004)", Minute Entry Decision, Id., 
is also unwarranted. No "majority rule" is stated in Blackthorne. The only reference to 
the laws of other jurisdictions in Blackthorne is at p. 730, where the court refers to 
Kazmer-Standish Consul, v. Schoeffel Instrum., 445 A.2d 1149 (1982). There, the New 
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Jersey Supreme Court referred to the Court of Appeals and Errors decision 1933 decision 
in Kenney v. Patterson Milk & Cream Co. IIONJ.L. 141, 164 A. 274 (E & A. 1933), for 
the "majority rule" "permitting a broker to recover a commission on the personalty in the 
sale of a business that also includes real estate if the listing agreement apportions the 
commissions between personalty and realty." Kazmer, supra, at 1151-52. However, as 
the court observed in Kazmer, "unlike statutes of thirteen other jurisdictions, the New 
Jersey Act does not expressly apply to the brokering of business opportunities" Id. at 
1151, n.l (citing Utah as one of the thirteen states that apply to the brokering of business 
opportunities), 1152. (Emphasis supplied) 
Because the New Jersey real estate broker's statute differs from UREBA, and the 
definition of "business opportunities" that existed in UREBA at the time Kenney and 
Kazmer were decided, has been completely deleted from UREBA, these cases are of no 
assistance in determining whether Plaintiff Sachs' finder's fee claims are barred under the 
more recent versions of UREBA. 
Blackthorne is also distinguishable from the facts of this case, because the plaintiff 
in Blackthorne was an unlicensed real estate broker who agreed to find a buyer and 
negotiate the sale of the real property assets of a business. "The defendant and Fortis 
closed on the asset sale of the assisted living facility." Blackthorne, supra, at 727-728. 
(Emphasis supplied) Conversely, Plaintiff Sachs was not a real estate broker and did not 
offer or agree to find a buyer for UPCM's real property assets. Thus, the district court's 
grant of summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiffs finder's fee claims based on his 
lack of a broker's license under UREBA, is incorrect and must be reversed. 
4? 
C. Plaintiff Sachs1 Offer To Accept His Finder's Fee In The Form Of Two 
Prime Developed Lots Or The Equivalent In Cash Or Some Other 
Consideration, Did Not Require Him To Be Licensed Under UREBA 
The district court concluded that Plaintiff Sachs' offer to receive payment of his 
finder's fee in the form of "a couple of prime developed lots in the new project" owned 
by UPCM, brings the parties' finder's fee agreement under UREBA. See, Minute Entry 
Decision, Tf2(b), at 2-3, R. 2209-2210, Aplnt. Add. 1. This conclusion erroneously 
conflates agreements for which licensure is required under UREBA, with the nature of 
the compensation an individual may receive in an agreement for which licensure is not 
required under UREBA. Additionally, the district court furnishes no legal authority 
supporting this construction of UREBA. 
Thus, the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff Sachs' finder fee claims, based on 
Plaintiff Sachs' offer to take his finder's fee in real property owned by UPCM, is incorrect 
and should be reversed. 
D. The Purpose Of UREBA Is Not Offended By Enforcing An Agreement 
By A Principal Of A Corporation, On Behalf Of The Corporation And 
Its Majority Shareholders, To Pay A Finder's Fee To A Professional 
Business Finder For Locating A Purchaser For The Corporation 
In American Rural Cellular v. Systems Comnu 890 P.2d 1035, 1040 (Utah App. 
1995), a case for satisfaction of a mechanic's lien brought by an unlicensed contractor, 
this Court considered the common law exceptions to the general rule that an unlicensed 
contractor cannot recover payment. Quoting Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 
801 P.2d 163 (Utah App. 1990), the Court held that, "the Utah Legislature's adoption of a 
statutory bar to recovery 'does not preclude the application of the previous common law 
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exception to the general rule of non-recovery.' Id. at 169." Regarding the common law 
exception, the Court stated that 
The common law exceptions to the general rule are all grounded in 
the notion that there is no need for rigid insistence on proper licensure 
when the public is otherwise protected from the harm that the 
licensing statute was designed to prevent, that is, inept and financially 
irresponsible builders. A canvass of germane cases reveals that Utah 
courts have found several factors relevant to whether the purpose of 
the licensing statute has been met. First, the courts have emphasized 
that when the contracting party possesses knowledge and expertise in 
the field, it is not within the class of persons in need of the protection 
that the licensing statute was intended to provide. Thus, the Utah 
Supreme Court allowed an unlicensed contractor to recover when the 
contracting party was itself a licensed contractor. (Emphasis supplied. 
Internal citations omitted.) 
In American Rural this Court relied on the Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
Fillmore Products v. Western States Paving, 561 P.2d 687, 690 (Utah 1977) for the 
proposition that 
the owners, because they were themselves licensed contractors and 
therefore informed of the necessity and purpose of licensing, could 
not "invoke application of the general rule of denying relief to an 
unlicensed contractor solely because of the latter's non-licensing 
when a contract for construction is struck between them." 
American Rural supra, at 1041, quoting Fillmore, supra, at 690. 
Similarly, in this case, Lesser, the Chairman of the Board of UPCM, and President 
of Defendant Loeb Investors Co. XL, the majority shareholder of UPCM, who engaged 
Plaintiff Sachs to find a buyer for UPCM, is himself a licensed real estate broker in New 
York and has represented investors, including the Defendant Loeb Investors, for more 
than thirty years. See, SOF, ^6, supra, at 7. Hank Rothwell, the President of UPCM, to 
whom Lesser instructed Sachs to refer any potential buyers, has been employed in real 
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estate development and investment for over twenty years and is also licensed as a real 
estate broker in Utah. See, SOF, ^6, supra, at 7. These experienced and licensed real 
estate brokers certainly did not require the "protection" of the licensing provisions of 
UREBA designed to protect consumers in the residential housing market from 
unscrupulous real estate brokers, in their dealings with Plaintiff Sachs, and should not be 
permitted to invoke the licensing requirements of UREBA to defeat Plaintiff Sachs' 
finder's fee claims. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the district court's decision granting summary 
judgment on Plaintiff Sachs' finder's fee claims as barred by UREBA, should be reversed. 
POINT III THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF SACHS' CONTRACT CLAIMS AND QUANTUM 
MERUIT CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS AND GENUINELY DISPUTED ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A. The Plain Language Of The Utah Statute Of Frauds Does Not Require 
An Oral Contract To Find A Purchaser For A Corporation For A Fee 
To Be In Writing To Be Enforceable 
The district court also granted Defendants1 motion for summary judgment on 
Plaintiff Sachs1 contract and quantum meruit claims, concluding that these claims "are 
barred by the Utah Statute of Frauds, U.C.A. §25-5-4 (1998)." This conclusion is, in 
turn, based on conclusions that "it is undisputed that the alleged finder's fee agreement 
relates to the sale or purchase of real estate as the only significant asset owned by 
defendant United Park City Mines", and "that it undisputed that no writing exists that 
would satisfy the requirements of the Utah Statute of Frauds." See, Minute Entry 
Decision, f2(c), at 3-4, R. 2210-2211, Aplnt. Add.l. (Emphasis supplied) 
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Plaintiff Sachs respectfully submits of the foregoing conclusions are incorrect 
because they are based on an erroneous characterization of Plaintiff Sachs1 finder's fee 
claims in this action as involving an "agreement authorizing or employing an agent or 
broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation" under §25-5-4(5) of the Utah 
Statute of Frauds.3 Mackintosh v. Hampshire, 832 P.2d 1298, 1301-1302 (Utah App. 
1992) (reversing decision that agreement was barred by statute of frauds based on trial 
court's erroneous characterization of plaintiff s claim as one for an interest in real 
property.) 
Additionally, contrary to the district court's finding, Plaintiff Sachs presented 
substantial record evidence and argument to prove that the finder's fee agreement relates 
to finding a buyer for UPCM, the corporation, rather than finding a buyer for the real 
estate assets of UPCM. The district court fails to address this evidence, and then 
concludes, without reference to any evidence in the record, that it is "undisputed" that the 
finder's fee agreement "relates to the purchase or sale of real estate."4 See, Minute Entry 
The district court did not indicate which subsection of the Utah Statute of Frauds it 
relied on to bar the Plaintiffs' claims. Based on the district court's citation of Machan 
Hampshire Properties, Inc. v. Western Real Estate & Dev. Co., 779 P.2d 230, (Utah 
App. 1989), discussing subsection (5) of §25-5-4, Plaintiff Sachs can only surmise that 
this subsection served as the basis for the district court's decision. 
4
 In opposing Defendants' motions for summary judgment, Plaintiff Sachs presented 
substantial evidence and argument disputing the district court's conclusion that the 
finder's fee agreement relates to the "'sale or purchase of real estate" and demonstrating 
that the agreement related to finding a buyer for UPCM, the corporation, and not its real 
property assets. See, Pltf. Mem. Op. UPCM, Response to ffi[l-2, 25, R. 1606, 1619, and 
Argument, R.1650-1653; Pltf Mem Op. L&L, Response to [^38, and Argument, R. 1338-
1347; SOF, ffl[13-17, 35, 38-39, 44 supra, at 9, 16 -18. 
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Decision, ^2(c),at 3-4, R. 2210-2211, Aplnt. Add. 1. Because Sachs' finder's fee 
agreement is not "an agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase 
or sell real estate for compensation", §25-5-4(5) of the Utah Statute of Frauds does not 
apply to bar Plaintiff Sachs' finder's fee agreement with Defendants. (Emphasis supplied) 
Consequently, no writing is necessary to satisfy the statute and Plaintiff Sachs' claims for 
quantum meruit and unjust enrichment are not barred under Young v. Buchanan, 259 
P.2d 876 (Utah 1953), as the district court incorrectly concluded. See, Minute Entry 
Decision, Id. 
The Utah Statute of Frauds, U.C.A. §25-5-4 (1998), applies to six types of 
agreements. See, Aplnt. Add. 5. "The primary source of guidance in statutory 
interpretation is the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute." State of Utah v. Mooney, 
2004 UT 49, fl 1, citing Dick Simon Trucking, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 2004 UT 11, 
If 17. Under §25-5-4(5), an oral agreement "authorizing or employing an agent or broker 
to purchase or sell real estate for compensation", including agreements for finding a party 
to purchase or sell real estate, is void without a writing. Machan Hampshire Properties, 
Inc. v. Western Real Estate & Dev. Co., 779 P.2d 230, 234 (Utah App. 1989) (Emphasis 
supplied.) However, an oral agreement to find a buyer for a corporation for a fee, the 
type of agreement at issue in this case, is not among the list of agreements required to be 
in writing to be enforceable under the Utah Statute of Frauds. See, SOF, ^3, supra, at 6. 
Had the Utah Legislature desired to require such agreements to be in writing, it could 
have easily and expressly so provided. 
Because Plaintiff Sachs' finder's fee agreement with the Defendants in this case is 
47 
not required to be in writing under the plain language of the Utah Statute of Frauds, the 
district court's decision holding that Plaintiffs' finder's fee claims against Defendants are 
barred by the Utah Statute of Frauds, is incorrect and must be reversed. 
B. Plaintiff Sachs' Performance Of The Finder's Fee Agreement Permits 
Its Enforcement Even If The Utah Statute of Frauds Applies 
Section §25-5-8 of the Utah Statute of Frauds provides that 
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to abridge the 
powers of the courts to compel the specific performance of 
agreements in case of part performance thereof. 
Thus, an agreement otherwise invalid under the Utah Statute of Frauds may be 
enforced through a court's equitable prerogatives if a party, relying on the oral agreement, 
partially performs its contractual obligations. Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 801 
(Utah 1998). The doctrine of part performance was fashioned by courts of equity not to 
annul the statute of frauds, but only to prevent its being made a means of perpetrating a 
fraud. Coleman v. Dillman, 624 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1991). 
"Part performance which will avoid [the] statute of frauds may consist of any act 
which puts [the] party performing in such position that nonperformance by other [party] 
would constitute fraud." In re Madsen's Estate, 259 P.2d 595, 601 (Utah 1953). The 
standard for part performance sufficient to take the agreement outside the Utah Statute of 
Frauds is: (1) the oral contract and its terms must be clear and definite; (2) the acts done 
in performance of the contract must be equally clear and definite; and (3) the acts must be 
in reliance on the contract. Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, f22. 
As to the first prong, Plaintiff Sachs' evidence shows that his letter of March 17, 
2001, constituted an offer to find a purchaser for UPCM, the corporation, for a finder's 
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fee in the amount of "a couple of prime developed lots in the new project" owned by 
UPCM, having a value of approximately two million dollars, or the equivalent in cash, or 
some other consideration, and that Lesser accepted this offer by requesting Plaintiff to 
find a purchaser for UPCM after receiving written notice of the fee Sachs would charge 
for his services. Plaintiff Sachs' evidence also shows that Lesser and Rothwell never 
repudiated the agreement or stated they would not pay Sachs' fee prior to the time 
Jackson purchased UPCM. See, SOF, ffif 11,12,14,16-22, supra, at 8-12. 
As to the second prong, Plaintiff Sachs presented evidence to show that he 
performed clear and definite acts pursuant to the contract, including: (1) corresponding 
with the Defendants regarding the finder's fee he expected and indicating that he was 
focusing his efforts to locate a purchaser for UPCM; (2) contacting prospective 
purchasers; (3) contacting Jackson about buying UPCM; (4) advising Jackson to contact 
Rothwell to obtain an confidentiality agreement; (5) providing Jackson with a reference 
to Granite as a potential joint purchaser; (6) calling Granite to discern its interest in 
purchasing UPCM with Jackson; (7) calling Rothwell to inform him of Jackson's interest 
in purchasing UPCM based on the new information Sachs provided Jackson; (8) calling 
Jackson frequently to support him in purchasing UPCM; (9) discussing his finder's fee 
with Jackson; and (10) requesting payment of his finder's fee after Jackson bought 
UPCM. See, SOF, ffif 15-16, 18-31, 36, 40, 41-44, 46-47, 49 supra, at 10-20. 
As to the third prong, Plaintiff Sachs presented evidence showing his acts in 
reliance on the contract, including his testimony that he worked a fee basis, and that a fee 
for finding a buyer for a corporation is usual and customary; his correspondence with 
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Defendants stating his expectation of a fee for his services, and Rothweli's admission that 
Plaintiff Sachs would not have undertaken his efforts to find a purchaser for UPCM as a 
"volunteer." See, SOF, ffljl, 12-13, 16-22, 42, supra, at 9, 10-13, 18. 
At a minimum, this evidence is sufficient to raise a jury question on the issue of 
whether Plaintiffs performance is sufficient to take his finder's fee agreement outside the 
Statute of Frauds, thus precluding summary judgment. 
Because Plaintiff Sachs' finder's fee agreement is not barred by the Utah Statute of 
Frauds and/or because his full performance of the agreement takes it outside the Statute, 
the district court's decision granting summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiffs' 
claims as barred by the Statute of Frauds, is incorrect and must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff Sachs' claims against Defendants Lesser, Loeb and UPCM are not barred 
under UREBA or the Utah Statute of Frauds. The finder's fee contract at issue is 
sufficiently definite to be enforceable as an express or implied contract and genuinely 
disputed issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on these claims. 
Accordingly, the district court's contrary conclusions and decision granting summary 
judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff Sachs' claims are incorrect and must be reversed 
and the case remanded to the district court for a trial on the merits. 
DATED and respectfully submitted this 10th day of July 2006. 
L T H R Y ^ C O C L A 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IRA SACHS, : MINUTE ENTRY DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 040926707 
vs. : 
JOSEPH S. LESSER, LOEB INVESTORS : 
CO. XL, AND UNITED PARK CITY 
MINES COMPANY, CAPITAL GROWTH 
PARTNERS, AND JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
Defendants Lesser, Loeb and United Park City Mines' Motions for 
Summary Judgment were taken under advisement by the Court after the 
submission of Memoranda and oral argument by counsel. United Park City 
Mines' Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer was previously submitted 
to the Court for decision. After further review and consideration, the 
Court rules as follows. 
1 United Park City Mines1 Motion for Leave to File Amended 
Answer is granted. Leave to amend pleadings is to be freely granted when 
the Motion is not untimely, nor futile and when no prejudice results to 
the party opposing the Motion by having the new claim or defense 
adjudicated. Norman v. Arnold, 57 P. 3d 997 (Utah). In this case, the 
Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer was timely filed in accordance 
with the governing Scheduling Order. Plaintiff was on notice of the 
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defense of illegality from defendant Loeb's Answer which was adopted by 
defendant United Park City Mines. Finally, the amendment is not futile 
and plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any prejudice. 
2(a) Defendants Lesser, Loeb and United Park City Mines' Motions 
for Summary Judgment are granted. The undisputed material facts 
demonstrate that no enforceable express or implied finder's fee agreement 
was ever entered into. In this Court's view, no reasonable minds could 
differ that there was no meeting of the minds or mutual assent on 
material terms of.the alleged finder's fee agreement, that there is a 
lack of definiteness and material terms such as price, and no reasonable 
method to calculate price, manifesting an intent of the parties to be 
bound thereby, and that any finder's fee agreement was subject to further 
negotiation. See, Bunnell v. Bills , 368 P.2d 597 (Utah 1962), and 
Carter v. Sorensen, 90 P.3d 637 (Utah 2004). 
(b) Defendants Lesser, Loeb and United Park City Mines' 
Motions for Summary Judgment are granted. It is undisputed that in Utah 
no person may bring or maintain an action in any Utah court for the 
recovery of a finder's fee in connection with the sale of real estate, 
unless properly licensed, Utah Code Ann., Section 61-2-18. Further, a 
"principal real estate broker" includes any person "who, with the 
expectation of receiving valuable consideration, assists or directs in 
the procurement of prospects for or the negotiation of" the sale or 
purchase of "real estate". Finally, for purposes of our real estate 
SACHS V. LESSER PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
licensing statute, "real estate" includes leaseholds and business 
opportunities involving real estate ". In the present case, it is 
undisputed that at the relevant time, plaintiff did not have a real 
estate license. It is also undisputed that defendant United Park City 
Mines' principal business was the leasing, development and sale of real 
property, and that United Park City Mines' only asset of significance was 
its real property. Even plaintiff attempted to negotiate compensation 
in the form of "...a couple of prime developed lots in the new 
project...." Consequently, the Court finds that plaintiff's claims are 
barred by Utah Code Ann., Sections 61-2-1 and 61-2-18(1). The Court 
further relies upon Andalex Resources v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041 (Utah App. 
1994) , and the majority rule as set forth in Blackthorne Group, Inc. v. 
Pines of Newmarket, Inc., 848 A.2d 725 (N.H. 2004). 
(c) Defendants Lesser, Loeb and United Park City Mines' 
Motions for Summary Judgment are granted. The Court finds that 
plaintiff's contract claims and quantum meruit claims are barred by the 
Utah Statute of Frauds, Utah Code Ann., Section 25-5-4 (1998). In the 
present case as previously noted, it is undisputed that the alleged 
finder's fee agreement relates to the sale or purchase of real estate as 
the only significant asset owned by defendant United Park City Mines. 
It is undisputed that no writing exists that would satisfy the 
requirements of the Utah Statute of Frauds. See, Machan Hampshire 
Properties, Inc. v. Western Real Estate & Dev. Co. , 119 P.2d 230 (Utah 
3rx\tt 
SACHS V. LESSER PAGE 4 MINUTE ENTRY 
App. 1989). Additionally, quantum meruit or unjust enrichment claims 
cannot rescue claims otherwise precluded by the Utah Statute of Frauds. 
See, Young v. Buchanan, 259 P.2d 876 (Utah 1953). Finally, based upon 
the progression of this case, development of the record and briefing, it 
is appropriate for this Court to reconsider Judge Lubeck's prior 
decision. 
(d) Defendants Lesser, Loeb and United Park City Mines' 
Motions for Summary Judgment: are granted. The Court finds that 
plaintiffs' claim for Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic 
Relations Claim fails as a matter of law for failure to establish any 
genuine issue of material fact as to all of the necessary elements of 
this cause of action, as set forth in Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. 
Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982). Further, plaintiff has not filed a 
defamation claim against defendants, and defendants' denial of 
plaintiff's claims are privileged and there are no genuine issues of 
material fact as to disclosure to third parties resulting in damages. 
3 Counsel for defendants are instructed to submit an Order 
consistent with this Minute Entry and Rule 7(f). 
Dated this O day of February,/2006. 
lL^s\\ 
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HAY-te-Ol WED 04:03 PM PRINCE YEATES GELDZAHLER FAX HO. w i 524 1099 P. 02 
May 17, 2001 
Mr. H;mk Rothwcll 
Untied Park City Mines 
P.O. Box 1450 
Ptfik City, UT 
Dear Hank, 
I am delighted that my introducing United Park City Mines to Granite Land Company 
appears to be heading in the right direction and I am pleased that the confidentiality letter has been 
signed. I certainly wilt continue to do everything in uiy power to bring together a mutually 
sntis factory agreement between these two parlies. I took the opportunity to express this commitment 
lo your chairman, Joe Lessor, when he invited mc to lunch at the Sky8 Room in New York in early 
May. 
1 perceive this venture as joiniug two entities with the potential of creating one of the nation's 
premier skiing and real estate developments. In other words, I think that both parties are in the right 
place a: the right lime. 1 hope you agree. 
hxJh^ ljfcHKh with Joe Lessor, I was delighted to find that he seems to share our enthusiasm 
for ihi^QirUvcncuj^ I hope chat this feeling is generally shared by the rest of your board. Most 
polenlialATV" land development partners would still require a Granite Construction to do the 
development infrastructure. This JV partner comes with that capability. Joe gave mc his 
encojfragentent to 4£gct the job done.1' 
1 write this letter to remind you that I will expect a modest finder's fee if an agreement comes 
to fruition. This could be cash, a couple of prime developed lots in the new project, or some other 
consideration acceptable to both of us. While I believe that we have an understanding as to thu 
fuldcr's fee. 1 do think that matters of this sort ought to be oui on the table early on, and I hope that 
ycju feel the same. 
Please let mc know if you have any questions about such a finder's fee. 
I look forward to continuing our quest fo link these two parlies for everyone's benefit, 
including the shareholders who overwhelming expressed their approval. 
Very truly yours, 
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May 18,200! 
Mr. Ha^ .k Rolhweli 
United Park Ciiy Minos 
P. 0. ftox 1450 
PsrlcCiiy.UT 
Dear Hank, 
I undcrstand/aftcr a conversation yesterday with Joe Lessor, that his preference would be 
to sell ihc company rathc-r than enter into.a joint venture. 1 had referred to a joint venture in 
yesterday's letter becavsc I had understood that you would consider such a proposition (and that is 
obviously what Granite seeks), aad because a joint vesture purchaser might also work for everyone. 
Happily, if your company's preference is sale, Granite, as I sugges:ed in yesterday's letter, 
is still ;m excellent prospect. Another investor, together with Granite, would make an excellent 
purchaser. J am happy to re-direct my focus to obtaining such a joint venture purchaser. 
Obviously, I will continue to keep you apprised of all proposals, whether for sale or for a 
;oiiit venturing of the project. 
IS'rp 
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61-1-27 SECURITIES DIVISION — REAL ESTATE DIVISION 514 
(a) the publisher circulates or there is circulated on his 
behalf in this s ta te any bona fide newspaper or other 
publication of general, regular, and paid circulation which 
is not published in this state, or which is published in this 
state but has had more than % of its circulation outside 
this state during the past 12 months; or 
(b) a radio or television program originating outside 
this state is received in this state. 
(6) Section 61-1-2 and Subsection 61-1-3(3), as well as 
Section 61-1-17 so far as investment advisers are concerned, 
apply when any act instrumental in effecting prohibited 
conduct is done in this state, whether or not either party is 
then present in this s ta te . 
(7) (a) Every application for registration under this chap-
ter and every issuer which proposes to offer a security in 
this state through any person acting on an agency basis in 
the common-law sense shall file with the division, in such 
form as it prescribes by rule, an irrevocable consent 
appointing the division or the director to be his attorney 
to receive service of any lawful process in any noncriminal 
suit, action, or proceeding against him or his successor, 
executor, or administrator which arises under this chap-
ter or any rule or order hereunder after the consent has 
been filed, with the same force and validity as if served 
personally on the person filing the consent. 
(b) A person who has filed such a consent in connection 
with a previous registration or notice filing need not file 
another. 
(c) Service may be made by leaving a copy of the 
process in the office of the division, but it is not effective 
unless the plaintiff, who may be the division in a suit, 
action, or proceeding instituted by it, sends notice of the 
service and a copy of the process by registered mail to the 
defendant or respondent at his last address on file with 
the division, and the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance 
with this subsection is filed in the case on or before the 
return day of the process, if any, or within such further 
time as the court allows. 
(8) (a) When any person, including any nonresident of this 
state, engages in conduct prohibited or made actionable 
by this chapter or any rule or order hereunder, and he has 
not filed a consent to service of process under Subsection 
(7) and personal jurisdiction over him cannot otherwise be 
obtained in this state, that conduct shall be considered 
equivalent to his appointment of the division or the 
director to be his attorney to receive service of any lawful 
process in any noncriminal suit, action, or proceeding 
against him or his successor executor or administrator 
which grows out of tha t conduct and which is brought 
under this chapter or any rule or order hereunder, with 
the same force and validity as if served on him personally. 
(b) Service may be made by leaving a copy of the 
process in the office of the division, but it is not effective 
unless the plaintiff, who may be the division in a suit, 
action, or proceeding instituted by it, sends notice of the 
service and a copy of the process by registered mail to the 
defendant or respondent at his last-known address or 
takes other s teps which are reasonably calculated to give 
actual notice, and the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance 
with this subsection is filed in the case on or before the 
return day of the process, if any, or within such further 
time as the court allows. 
(9) When process is served under this section, the court, or 
the director shall order such continuance as may be necessary 
to afford the defendant or respondent reasonable opportunity 
to defend. 1997 
61-1-27. C o n s t r u c t i o n of chap te r . 
This chapter may be so construed as to effectuate its general 
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact 
it and to coordinate the interpretation and administration of 
this chapter with the related federal regulation. 1983 
61-1-28. C i t a t i o n of c h a p t e r . 
This chapter may be cited as the Utah Uniform Securities 
Act. 1983 
61-1-29. S a v i n g s c l a u s e . 
If any provision of this chapter or its application to any 
person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not 
affect other provisions or applications of the chapter which can 
be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
1983 
61-1-30. P r i o r l a w r e p e a l e d — Sav ings c lause . 
(1) The Securities Act, Title 61, Chapter 1, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 129, Laws of Utah 
1957, is hereby repealed except as saved in this section. 
(2) Prior law exclusively governs all suits, actions, prosecu-
tions, or proceedings which are pending or may be initiated on 
the basis of facts or circumstances occurring before the effec-
tive date of this chapter, except that no civil suit or action may 
be maintained to enforce any liability under prior law unless 
brought within any period of limitation which applied when 
the cause of action accrued and in any event within two years 
after the effective date of this chapter. 
(3) All effective registrations under prior law, all adminis-
trative orders relating to such registrations, and all conditions ' 
imposed upon such registrations remain in effect so long as 
they would have remained in effect if this chapter had not ' 
been passed. They are considered to have been filed, entered, 
or imposed under this chapter, but are governed by prior law. 
(4) Prior law applies in respect of any offer or sale made 
within one year after the effective date of this chapter pursu-
ant to an offering begun in good faith before its effective date 
on the basis of an exemption available under prior law. 
(5) Judicial review of all administrative orders as to which 
review proceedings have not been instituted by the effective 
date of this chapter are governed by Section 61-1-23, except 
that no review proceeding may be instituted unless the 
petition is filed within any period of limitation which applied 
to a review proceeding when the order was entered and in any 
event within 60 days after the effective date of this chapter. 
1983 
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61-2-1. L icense r e q u i r e d . 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to engage in the business, 
act in the capacity of, advertise, or assume to act as a principal 
real estate broker, associate real estate broker, or a real estate 
sales agent within this state without a license obtained under 
this chapter. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person outside the state to engage 
in the business, act in the capacity of, advertise, or assume to 
act as a principal real estate broker, associate real estate 
broker, or a real estate sales agent with respect to real estate 
located within the state without a license obtained under this 
chapter. 1996 
61-2-2. Def ini t ions . 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Associate real estate broker" and "associate bro-
ker" means any person employed or engaged as an inde-
pendent contractor by or on behalf of a licensed principal 
real estate broker to perform any act set out in Subsection 
(12) for valuable consideration, who has qualified under 
the provisions of this chapter as a principal real estate 
broker. 
(2) "Branch office" means a principal broker's real es-
tate brokerage office other than his main office. 
(3) "Commission" means the Real Estate Commission 
established under this chapter. 
(4) "Concurrence" means the entities given a concur-
ring role must jointly agree for action to be taken. 
(5) "Condominium" or "condominium unit" is as defined 
in Section 57-8-3. 
(6) "Condominium homeowners' association" means all 
of the condominium unit owners acting as a group in 
accordance with declarations and bylaws. 
(7) (a) "Condominium hotel" means one or more condo-
minium units that are operated as a hotel. 
(b) "Condominium hotel" does not mean a hotel 
consisting of condominium uni ts , all of which are 
owned by a single entity. 
(8) "Director" means the director of the Division of Real 
Estate. 
(9) "Division" means the Division of Real Estate. -
(10) "Executive director" means the director of the 
Department of Commerce. 
(11) "Main office" means the address which a principal 
broker designates with the division as his primary bro-
kerage office. 
* 
(12) "Principal real estate broker 
ker" means any person: 
(a) (i) who sells or lists for sale, buys, exchanges, 
or auctions real estate , options on real estate, or 
improvements on real es ta te with the expecta-
tion of receiving valuable consideration; or 
(ii) who advertises, offers, at tempts, or other-
wise holds himself out to be engaged in the 
business described in Subsection (12)(a)(i); 
(b) employed by or on behalf of the owner of real 
estate or by a prospective purchaser of real estate 
who performs any of the acts described in Subsection 
(12)(a), whether his compensation is at a stated 
salary, a commission basis, upon a salary and com-
mission basis, or otherwise; 
(c) who, with the expectation of receiving valuable 
consideration, manages property owned by another 
person or who advertises or otherwise holds himself 
out to be engaged in property management; 
(d) who, with the expectation of receiving valuable 
consideration, assists or directs in the procurement of 
prospects for or the negotiation of the transactions 
listed in Subsections (12)(a) and (c); and 
(e) except for mortgage lenders , title insurance 
agents, and their employees, who assists or directs in 
- the closing of any real es ta te transaction with the 
expectation of receiving valuable consideration. 
(13) (a) "Property management" means engaging in, 
with the expectation of receiving valuable consider-
ation, the management of property owned by another 
person or advertising or otherwise claiming to be 
engaged in property managemen t by: 
(i) advertising for, arranging, negotiating, of-
fering, or otherwise a t tempt ing or participating 
in a transaction calculated to secure the rental or 
leasing of real estate; 
(ii) collecting, agreeing, offering, or otherwise 
attempting to collect rent for the real estate and 
accounting for and disbursing the money col-
lected; or 
(iii) authorizing expenditures for repairs to 
the real estate, 
(b) "Property management" does not include: 
(i). hotel or motel management ; 
(ii) rental of tourist accommodations, includ-
ing hotels, motels, tour is t homes, condominiums, 
condominium hotels, mobile home park accom-
modations, campgrounds, or similar public ac-
commodations for any period of less than 30 
consecutive days, and the management activities 
associated with these renta ls ; or 
(iii) the leasing or management of surface or 
subsurface minerals or oil and gas interests, if 
the leasing or managemen t is separate from a 
sale or lease of the surface estate. 
(14) "Real estate" includes leaseholds and business 
opportunities involving real property. 
(15) "Real estate sales agent" and "sales agent" means 
any person employed or engaged as an independent 
contractor by or on behalf of a licensed principal real 
estate broker to perform for valuable consideration any 
act set out in Subsection (12). 
(16) (a) "Regular salaried employee" means an indi-
vidual who performs a service for wages or other 
remuneration, whose employer withholds federal em-
ployment taxes under a contract of hire, written or 
* oral, express or implied. 
(b) "Regular salaried employee" does not include a 
person who performs services on a project-by-project 
basis or on a commission basis . 
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(17) "Reinstatement" means restoring a license that 
has expired or has been suspended. 
(18) "Reissuance" means the process by which a lic-
ensee may obtain a license following revocation of the 
license. 
(19) "Renewal" means extending a license for an addi-
tional licensing period on or before the date the license 
expires. 1997 
61-2-3. Exempt persons and transactions. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), a license 
under this chapter is not required for: 
(i) any person who as owner or lessor performs the 
acts described in Subsection 61-2-2(12) with refer-
ence to property owned or leased by that person; 
(ii) a regular salaried employee of the owner or 
lessor of real estate who, with reference to nonresi-
dential real estate owned or leased by the employer, 
performs the acts enumerated in Subsections 61-2-
2(12)(a) and (b); 
(iii) a regular salaried employee of the owner of 
real estate who performs property management ser-
vices with reference to real estate owned by the 
employer, except that the employee may only manage 
property for one employer; 
(iv) a person who performs property management 
services for the apartments at which that person 
resides in exchange for free or reduced rent on that 
person's apartment; 
(v) a regular salaried employee of a condominium 
homeowners' association who manages real property 
subject to the declaration of condominium that estab-
lished the homeowners' association, except that the 
employee may only manage property for one condo-
minium homeowners' association; and 
(vi) a regular salaried employee of a licensed prop-
erty management company who performs support 
services, as prescribed by rule, for the property man-
agement company. 
(b) Subsection (l)(a) does not exempt from licensing: 
(i) employees engaged in the sale of properties 
regulated under Title 57, Chapter 11, Utah Uniform 
Land Sales Practices Act and Title 57, Chapter 19, 
Timeshare and Camp Resort Act; 
(ii) employees engaged in the sale of cooperative 
interests regulated under Title 57, Chapter 23, Real 
Estate Cooperative Marketing Act; or 
(iii) any person whose interest as an owner or 
lessor was obtained by him or transferred to him for 
the purpose of evading the application of this chapter, 
and not for any other legitimate business reason. 
(2) A license under this chapter is not required for: 
(a) isolated transactions by persons holding a duly 
executed power of attorney from the owner; 
(b) services rendered by an attorney at law in perform-
ing his duties as an attorney at law; 
(c) a receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, administrator, 
executor, or any person acting under order of any court; 
(d) a t rustee or its employees under a deed of trust or a 
will; or 
(e) any public utility, its officers, or regular salaried 
employees, unless performance of any of the acts set out 
in Subsection 61-2-2(12) is in connection with the sale, 
purchase, lease, or other disposition of real estate or 
investment in real estate unrelated to the principal busi-
ness activity of that public utility. 
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), a license 
under this chapter is not required for any person regis-
tered to act as a broker-dealer, agent, or investment 
advisor under the Utah and federal securities laws in the 
sale or the offer for sale of real estate if: 
(i) the real es ta te is a necessary element of a 
"security" as tha t term is defined by the Securities Act 
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 
(ii) the security is registered for sale pursuant to 
the Securities Act of 1933 or by Title 61, Chapter 1, 
Utah Uniform Securities Act. 
(b) The exemption in Subsection (3)(a) does not apply to 
exempt or resale transactions. 1996 
61-2-4. One act for c o m p e n s a t i o n qualif ies p e r s o n as 
broker or s a l e s a g e n t . 
Except as provided in Section 61-2-3, one act, for valuable 
consideration, of buying, selling, leasing, managing, or ex-
changing real estate for another, or of offering for another to 
buy, sell, lease, manage, or exchange real estate, requires the 
person performing, offering, or attempting to perform the act 
to be licensed as a principal real estate broker, an associate 
real estate broker, or a real estate sales agent as set forth in 
this chapter. 1996 
61-2-5. Divis ion of Rea l Estate created — Funct ions — 
Director appo in ted — Funct ions . 
(1) There is created within the Department of Commerce a 
Division of Real Esta te . It is responsible for the administra-
tion and enforcement of: 
(a) this chapter; 
(b) the Real Esta te Education, Research, and Recovery 
Fund under Title 61 , Chapter 2a; 
(c) Title 57, Chapter 11, Utah Uniform Land Sales 
Practices Act; 
(d) Title 57, Chapter 19, Timeshare and Camp Resort 
Act; 
(e) Title 57, Chapter 23, Real Estate Cooperative Mar-
keting Act; and 
(f) Title 61 , Chapter 2b, Real Estate Appraiser Regis-
tration and Certification Act. 
(2) The division is under the direction and control of a 
director appointed by the executive director of the department 
with the approval of the governor. The director holds his office 
at the pleasure of the governor. 
(3) The director, with the approval of the executive director, 
may employ personnel necessary to discharge the duties of the 
division at salaries to be fixed by the director according to 
standards established by the Department of Administrative 
Services. 
(4) On or before October 1 of each year, the director shall, in 
conjunction with the department , report to the governor and 
the Legislature concerning the division's work for the preced-
ing fiscal year ending J u n e 30. 
(5) The director, in conjunction with the executive director, 
shall prepare and submit to the governor and the Legislature 
a budget for the fiscal year next following the convening of the 
Legislature. 1993 
61-2-5.1. Procedures —Adjud ica t ive proceedings . 
The Division of Real Esta te shall comply with the proce-
dures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administra-
tive Procedures Act, in its adjudicative proceedings. 1997 
61-2-5.5. Real Es ta te Commiss ion created — Funct ions 
— Appointment , qualifications, and terms of 
members — E x p e n s e s . 
(1) There is created within the division a Real Estate 
Commission. The commission shall: 
(a) make rules for the administration of this chapter 
which are not inconsistent with this chapter, including: 
(i) licensing of principal brokers, associate brokers, 
sales agents, real estate companies, and branch of-
fices; 
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(ii) prelicensing and postlicensing education cur-
ricula, examination procedures, and the certification 
and conduct of real estate schools, course providers, 
and instructors; 
(iii) proper handling of funds received by real es-
tate licensees, and brokerage office procedures and 
recordkeeping requirements; 
(iv) property management; and 
(v) standards of conduct for real estate licensees; 
(b) establish, with the concurrence of the division, all 
fees as provided in this chapter and Title 61, Chapter 2a, 
Real Estate Recovery Fund Act; 
(c) conduct all administrative hearings not delegated 
by it to an administrative law judge relating to the 
licensing of any applicant, conduct of any licensee, or the 
certification or conduct of any real estate school, course 
provider, or instructor regulated under this chapter; 
(d) with the concurrence of the director, impose sanc-
tions against licensees and certificate holders as provided 
in Section 61-2-11; 
(e) advise the director on the administration and en-
forcement of any matters affecting the division and the 
real estate sales and property management industries; 
(f) advise the director on mat ters affecting the division 
budget; 
(g) advise and assist the director in conducting real 
estate seminars; and 
(h) perform other duties as provided by this chapter 
and Title 61, Chapter 2a, Real Esta te Recovery Fund Act. 
(2) (a) The commission shall be comprised of five members 
appointed by the governor and approved by the Senate. 
(b) Four of the commission members shall have at least 
five years' experience in the real estate business and shall 
hold an active principal broker, associate broker, or sales 
agent license. 
(c) One commission member shall be a member of the 
general public. 
(d) No more than one commission member may be 
appointed from any given county in the state 
(3) (a) Except as required by Subsection (b), as terms of 
current commission members expire, the governor shall 
appoint each new member or reappointed member to a 
four-year term ending June 30. 
(b) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection 
(a), the governor shall, at the time of appointment or 
reappointment, adjust the length of terms to ensure that 
the terms of commission members are staggered so that 
approximately half of the commission is appointed every 
two years. 
(c) A commission member may not serve more than one 
consecutive term. 
(d) Members of the commission shall annually select 
one member to serve as chair. 
(4) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any 
reason, the replacement shall be appointed for the unexpired 
term. 
(5) (a) Members shall receive no compensation or benefits 
for their services, but may receive per diem and expenses 
incurred in the performance of the member's official 
duties at the rates established by the Division of Finance 
under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107. 
(b) Members may decline to receive per diem and 
expenses for their service. 
(6) The commission shall meet at least monthly. The direc-
tor may call additional meetings at his discretion or upon the 
request of the chair or upon the written request of three or 
more commission members. Three members constitute a quo-
rum for the transaction of business. 1996 
61-2-6. L i c e n s i n g p r o c e d u r e s a n d r e q u i r e m e n t s . 
(1) The Real Estate Commission shall determine the quali-
fications and requirements of applicants for a principal broker, 
associate broker, or sales agent license. The division, with the 
concurrence of the commission, shall require and pass upon 
proof necessary to determine the honesty, integrity, truthful-
ness, reputation, and competency of each applicant for an 
initial license or for renewal of an existing license. The 
division, with the concurrence of the commission, shall require 
an applicant for a sales agent license to complete an approved 
educational program not to exceed 90 hours, and an applicant 
for an associate broker or principal broker license to complete 
an approved educational program not to exceed 120 hours. 
The hours required by this section mean 50 minutes of 
instruction in each 60 minutes; and the maximum number of 
program hours available to an individual is ten hours per day. 
The division, with the concurrence of the commission, shall 
require the applicant to pass an examination approved by the 
commission covering the fundamentals of the English lan-
guage, arithmetic, bookkeeping, real estate principles and 
practices, the provisions of this chapter, the rules established 
by the Real Estate Commission, and any other aspect of Utah 
real estate license law considered appropriate. Three years' 
full-time experience as a real estate sales agent or its equiva-
lent is required before any applicant may apply for, and secure 
a principal broker or associate broker license in this state. The 
commission shall establish by rule the criteria by which it will 
accept experience or special education in similar fields of 
business in lieu of the three years ' experience. 
(2) (a) The division, with the concurrence of the commis-
sion, may require an applicant to furnish a sworn state-
ment setting forth evidence satisfactory to the division of 
the applicant's reputation and competency as set forth by 
rule. 
(b) The division shall require an applicant to provide 
his social security number, which is a private record 
under Subsection 63-2-302(l)(g). 
(3) A nonresident principal broker may be licensed in this 
state by conforming to all the provisions of this chapter except 
that of residency. A nonresident associate broker or sales agent 
may become licensed in this state by conforming to all the 
provisions of this chapter except tha t of residency and by being 
employed or engaged as an independent contractor by or on 
behalf of a nonresident or resident principal broker who is 
licensed in this s tate. 
(4) An applicant who has had a real estate license revoked 
shall be relicensed as prescribed for an original application, 
but may not apply for a new license until a t least five years 
after the revocation. In the case of an applicant for a new 
license as a principal broker or associate broker, the applicant 
is not entitled to credit for experience gained prior to the 
revocation of license. 1997 
61-2-7. Form of l i cense — Display of l i c e n s e . 
The division shall issue to each licensee a wall license 
showing the name and address of the licensee. The seal of the 
state shall be affixed to each license. Each license shall contain 
any other matter prescribed by the division and shall be 
delivered or mailed to the address furnished by the licensee. 
The wall licenses of principal brokers, associate brokers, and 
sales agents who are affiliated with an office shall be kept in 
the office to be made available on request. 1991 
61-2-7.1. Change of address — Fai lure to notify. 
Each licensee or certificate holder shall notify the division in 
writing of any change of principal business location or home 
street address within ten business days of the change. In 
providing an address to the division a physical location or 
street address must be provided. Failure to notify the division 
of a change of business location is separate grounds for 
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disciplinary action against the licensee or certificate holder. A 
licensee or certificate holder will be considered to have re-
ceived any notification which has been mailed to the last 
address furnished to the division by the licensee. 1991 
61-2-7.2. Reporting requirements . 
The following must be reported in writing to the division 
within ten business days: 
(1) conviction of any criminal offense; or 
(2) filing a personal or brokerage bankruptcy. 1991 
61-2-8. Discharge of associate broker or sales agent by 
principal broker — Not ice . 
If an associate broker or sales agent is discharged by a 
principal broker, the principal broker shall, within three days, 
notify the division in writing. The principal broker shall 
address a communication to the last-known residence address 
of that associate broker or sales agent advising him that notice 
of his termination has been delivered or mailed to the division. 
It is unlawful for any associate broker or sales agent to 
perform any of the acts under this chapter, directly or indi-
rectly, from and after the date of receipt of the termination 
notice until affiliation with a principal broker has been estab-
lished. 1988 
61-2-9. Examination and l icense fees — Renewal of 
l i censes — Educat ion requirements — Activa-
tion of inact ive l i censes — Recertification — 
Licenses of firm, partnership , or association 
— Misce l l aneous fees. 
(1) (a) Upon filing an application for a principal broker, 
associate broker, or sales agent license examination, the 
applicant shall pay a nonrefundable fee as determined by 
the commission with the concurrence of the division under 
Section 63-38-3.2 for admission to the examination. 
(b) A principal broker, associate broker, or sales agent 
applicant shall pay a nonrefundable fee as determined by 
the commission with the concurrence of the division under 
Section 63-38-3.2 for issuance of an initial license or 
license renewal. 
(c) Each license issued under this subsection shall be 
issued for a period of not less than two years as deter-
mined by the division with the concurrence of the com-
mission. 
(d) (i) Any new sales agent applicant shall submit 
fingerprint cards in a form acceptable to the division 
at the time the license application is filed and shall 
consent to a fingerprint background check by the 
Utah Bureau of Criminal Identification and the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation regarding the applica-
tion. 
(ii) The division shall request the Department of 
Public Safety to complete a Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation criminal background check for each new 
sales agent applicant through the national criminal 
history system (NCIC) or any successor system. 
(iii) The cost of the background check and the 
fingerprinting shall be borne by the applicant. 
(e) (i) Any new sales agent license issued under this 
section shall be conditional, pending completion of 
the criminal background check. If the criminal back-
ground check discloses the applicant has failed to 
accurately disclose a criminal history, the license 
shall be immediately and automatically revoked. 
(ii) Any person whose conditional license has been 
revoked under Subsection (e)(i) shall be entitled to a 
post-revocation hearing to challenge the revocation. 
The hearing shall be conducted in accordance with 
Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. 
(2) (a) A license expires if it is not renewed on or before its 
expiration date. Effective January 1, 1992, as a condition 
of renewal, each active licensee shall demonstrate compe-
tence by viewing an approved real estate education video 
program and completing a supplementary workbook, or 
complete 12 hours of professional education approved by 
the division and commission within each two-year re-
newal period. The division with the concurrence of the 
commission shall certify education which may include, 
but shall not be limited to, state conventions, home study 
courses, video courses, and closed circuit television 
courses. The commission with concurrence of the division 
may exempt a licensee from this education requirement 
for a period not to exceed four years upon a finding of 
reasonable cause and under conditions established by 
rule. 
(b) For a period of 30 days after the expiration date, a 
license may be reinstated upon payment of a renewal fee 
and a late fee determined by the commission with the 
concurrence of the division under Section 63-38-3.2 and 
upon providing proof acceptable to the division and the 
commission of the licensee having completed the hours of 
education or demonstrated competence as required under 
Subsection (2)(a). 
(c) After this 30-day period, and until six months after 
the expiration date , the license may be reinstated by: 
(i) paying a renewal fee and a late fee determined 
by the commission with the concurrence of the divi-
sion under Section 63-38-3.2; 
(ii) providing to the division proof of satisfactory 
completion of the applicable hours of prelicensing 
education required under Section 61-2-6, which must 
be completed within six months prior to reinstate-
ment, or providing to the division evidence of success-
ful completion of the respective sales agent or broker 
licensing examination within six months prior to 
reinstatement; and 
(iii) providing proof acceptable to the division and 
the commission of the licensee having completed the 
hours of education or demonstrated competence as 
required under Subsection (2)(a). 
(d) A person who does not renew his license within six 
months after the expiration date shall be relicensed as 
prescribed for an original application. 
(3) As a condition for the activation of an inactive license, a 
licensee shall supply the division with proof of: 
(a) successful completion of the respective sales agent 
or broker licensing examination within six months prior 
to activation; or 
(b) the successful completion of the number of hours of 
continuing education tha t the licensee would have been 
required to complete under Subsection (2)(a) if the licens-
ee's license had been on active status, up to the number of 
hours required for original licensure. Credit shall be given 
only for education t ha t has been taken within the five 
years preceding activation, except that at least 12 hours of 
the education mus t have been taken within 12 months 
preceding activation. 
(4) A principal broker license may be granted to a corpora-
tion, partnership, or association if the corporation, partner-
ship, or association has affiliated with it an individual who has 
qualified as a principal broker under the terms of this chapter, 
and who serves in the capacity of a principal broker. Applica-
tion for the license shall be made in accordance with the rules 
adopted by the division with the concurrence of the commis-
sion. 
(5) The division may charge and collect reasonable fees 
determined by the commission with the concurrence of the 
division under Section 63-38-3.2 to cover the costs for: 
l^-ii 
519 SECURITIES DIVISION — 
(a) issuance of a new or duplicate license; 
(b) license histories or certifications; 
(c) certified copies of official documents, orders, and 
other papers and transcripts; 
(d) certifying real estate schools, courses, and instruc-
tors, the fees for which shall, notwithstanding Section 
13-1-2, be deposited in the Real Esta te Education, Re-
search, and Recovery Fund; and 
(e) other duties required by this chapter. 
(6) If a licensee submits or causes to be submitted a check, 
draft, or other negotiable ins t rument to the division for 
payment of fees, and the check, draft, or other negotiable 
instrument is dishonored, the transaction for which the pay-
ment was submitted is void and will be reversed by the 
division if payment of the applicable fee is not received in full. 
(7) The fees under this chapter and the additional license 
fee for the Real Estate Education, Research, and Recovery 
Fund under Section 61-2a-4 are in lieu of all other license fees 
or assessments that might otherwise be imposed or charged by 
the state or any of its political subdivisions, upon, or as a 
condition of, the privilege of conducting the business regulated 
by this chapter, except that a political subdivision within the 
state may charge a business license fee if the licensee main-
tains a place of business within the jurisdiction of the political 
subdivision. Unless otherwise exempt, each licensee under 
this chapter is subject to all taxes imposed under Title 59, 
Revenue and Taxation. 1997 
61-2-10. Res t r i c t ion on c o m m i s s i o n s —Affi l ia t ion w i t h 
more t h a n o n e b r o k e r — S p e c i a l i z e d l i c e n s e s 
— Des igna t ion of a g e n t s o r b r o k e r s . 
(1) It is unlawful for any associate broker or sales agent to 
accept valuable consideration for the performance of airy of the 
acts specified in this chapter from any person except the 
principal broker with whom he is affiliated and licensed. 
(2) An inactive associate broker or sales agent is not autho-
rized to conduct real estate transactions until the inactive 
associate broker or sales agent becomes affiliated with a 
licensed principal broker and submits the required documen-
tation to the division. An inactive principal broker is not 
authorized to conduct real estate transactions until the prin-
cipal broker's license is activated with the division. 
(3) No sales agent or associate broker may affiliate with 
more than one principal broker at the same time. 
(4) (a) Except as provided by rule, a principal broker may 
not be responsible for more than one real estate brokerage 
at the same time. 
(b) In addition to issuing principal broker, associate 
broker, and sales agent licenses authorizing the perfor-
mance of all of the acts set forth in Subsection 61-2-2(12), 
the division may issue specialized sales licenses and 
specialized property management licenses with the scope 
of practice limited to the specialty. An individual may hold 
a specialized license in addition to a license to act as a 
principal broker, an associate broker, or a sales agent. The 
commission may adopt rules pursuant to Title 63, Chap-
ter 46a, Utah Administrative Procedures Act, for the 
administration of this provision, including prelicensing 
and postlicensing education requirements, examination 
requirements, affiliation with real estate brokerages or 
property management companies, and other licensing 
procedures. 
(c) An individual may not be a principal broker of a 
brokerage and a sales agent or associate broker for a 
different brokerage at the same time. 
(5) Any owner, purchaser, lessor, or lessee who engages the 
services of a principal broker may designate which sales 
agents or associate brokers affiliated with t ha t principal 
broker will also represent tha t owner, purchaser, lessor, or 
lessee in the purchase, sale, lease, or exchange of real estate, 
REAL ESTATE DIVISION 61-2-11 
61-2-11. I n v e s t i g a t i o n s — S u b p o e n a p o w e r of d iv i s ion 
— G r o u n d s for d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n . 
The division may investigate or cause to be investigated the 
actions of any principal broker, associate broker, sales agent, 
real estate school, course provider, or school instructor li-
censed or certified by this s tate , or of any applicant for 
licensure or certification, or of any person who acts in any of 
those capacities within this s ta te . The division is empowered 
to subpoena witnesses, take evidence, and require by sub-
poena duces tecum the production of books, papers, contracts, 
records, other documents, or information considered relevant 
to the investigation. The division may serve subpoenas by 
certified mail. Each failure to respond to a subpoena is 
considered as a separate violation of this chapter. The com-
mission, with the concurrence of the director, may impose a 
civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $500 per violation, 
impose educational requirements, and suspend, revoke, place 
on probation, or deny renewal, re ins ta tement , or reissuance of 
any license or any certification if a t any time the licensee or 
certificate holder, whether acting as an agent or on his own 
account, is found guilty of: 
(1) making any substantial misrepresentation; 
(2) making any false promises of a character likely to 
influence, persuade, or induce; 
(3) pursuing a continued and flagrant course of misrep-
resentation, or of making false promises through agents, . 
sales agents, advertising, or otherwise; 
(4) acting for more than one par ty in a transaction 
without the informed consent of all part ies; 
(5) acting as an associate broker or sales agent while 
not licensed with a licensed principal broker, representing 
or attempting to represent a broker other than the prin-
cipal broker with whom he is affiliated, or representing as 
sales agent or having a contractual relationship similar to 
that of sales agent with other t han a licensed principal 
broker; 
(6) failing, within a reasonable time, to account for or 
to remit any monies coming into his possession that 
belong to others, or commingling those funds with his 
own, or diverting those funds from the purpose for which 
they were received; 
(7) paying or offering to pay valuable consideration, as 
defined by the commission, to any person not licensed 
under this chapter, except t ha t valuable consideration 
may be shared with a licensed principal broker of another 
jurisdiction or as provided under the Professional Corpo-
ration Act or the Limited Liability Company Act; 
(8) being unworthy or incompetent to act as a principal 
broker, associate broker, or sales agent in such manner as 
to safeguard the interests of the public; 
(9) failing to voluntarily furnish copies of all documents 
to all parties executing the documents; 
(10) failing to keep and make available for inspection 
by the division a record of each transact ion, including the 
names of buyers and sellers or lessees and lessors, the 
identification of the property, the sale or rental price, any 
monies received in trust , any agreements or instructions 
from buyers and sellers or lessees and lessors, and any 
other information required by rule; 
(11) failing to disclose, in writing, in the purchase, sale, 
or rental of property, whether the purchase, sale, or rental 
is made for himself or for an undisclosed principal; 
(12) regardless of whether the crime was related to real 
estate, being convicted of a criminal offense involving 
moral turpitude within five years of the most recent 
application, including a conviction based upon a plea of 
nolo"contendere, or a plea held in abeyance to a criminal 
offense involving moral turpi tude; 
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(13) advertising the availability of real estate or the 
services of a licensee in a false, misleading, or deceptive 
manner; 
(14) in the case of a principal broker or a licensee who 
is a branch manager, failing to exercise reasonable super-
vision over the activities of his licensees and any unli-
censed staff; 
(15) violating or disregarding this chapter, an order of 
the commission, or the rules adopted by the commission 
and the division; 
(16) breaching a fiduciary duty owed by a licensee to 
his principal in a real estate transaction; 
(17) any other conduct which constitutes dishonest 
dealing; 
(18) unprofessional conduct as defined by statute or 
rule; or 
(19) suspension, revocation, surrender, or cancellation 
of a real estate license issued by another jurisdiction, or of 
another professional license issued by this or another 
jurisdiction, based on misconduct in a professional capac-
ity that relates to character, honesty, integrity, or t ruth-
fulness. 1997 
61-2-12. Disc ip l ina ry a c t i o n — Judicial review. 
(1) (a) Before imposing an educational requirement, a civil 
penalty, revoking, suspending, placing on probation, or 
denying the renewal, reinstatement, or reissuance of any 
license or certificate based on violation of Section 61-2-11, 
the division shall give notice to the licensee or certificate 
holder and schedule an adjudicative proceeding. 
(b) If the licensee is an active sales agent or active 
associate broker, the division shall inform the principal 
broker with whom the licensee is affiliated of the charge 
and of the time and place of the hearing. 
(c) If after the hearing the commission determines tha t 
any licensee or certificate holder is guilty of a violation of 
this chapter, the license or certificate may be suspended, 
revoked, denied reissuance, or a civil penalty may be 
imposed by written order of the commission in concur-
rence with the director. 
(2) (a) Any applicant, certificate holder, licensee, or person 
aggrieved, including the complainant, may obtain judicial 
review or agency review by the executive director of any 
adverse ruling, order, or decision of the director and the 
commission. 
(b) If the applicant, certificate holder, or licensee pre-
vails in the appeal and the court finds that the state 
action was undertaken without substantial justification, 
the court may award reasonable litigation expenses to the 
applicant, certificate holder, or licensee as provided under 
Title 78, Chapter 27a, Small Business Equal Access to 
Justice Act. 
(c) (i) No order, rule, or decision of the director and the 
commission may take effect until the time for appeal 
to the court has expired. 
(ii) If an appeal is taken by a licensee, the division 
shall stay enforcement of the commission's action in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 63-46b-18. 
(iii) The appeal shall be governed by the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
(3) The commission and the director shall comply with the 
procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Admin-
istrative Procedures Act, in their adjudicative proceedings. 
1993 
61-2-13. Grounds for revocat ion of principal broker's 
l icense — Automatic inactivation of affiliated 
assoc ia te b r o k e r s ' and sales* a g e n t s l i c ense s . 
(1) Any unlawful act or any violation of this chapter com-
mitted by any real estate sales agent or associate broker 
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employed or engaged as an independent contractor by or on 
behalf of a licensed principal broker or committed by any 
employee, officer, or member of a licensed principal broker is 
cause for the revocation, suspension, or probation of the 
principal broker's license, or for the imposition of a fine 
against the principal broker in an amount not to exceed $500 
per violation. 
(2) The revocation or suspension of a principal broker 
license automatically inactivates every associate broker or 
sales agent license granted to those persons by reason of their 
affiliation with the principal broker whose license was revoked 
or suspended, pending a change of broker affiliation. A prin-
cipal broker shall, prior to the effective date of the suspension 
or revocation of his license, notify in writing every licensee 
affiliated with him of the revocation or suspension of his 
license. 1991 
61-2-13.5. Court -ordered d i sc ip l ine . 
The division shall promptly withhold, suspend, restrict, or 
reinstate the use of a license issued under this chapter if so 
ordered by a court. 1997 
61-2-14. L i s t of l i c e n s e e s to be ava i l ab le . 
The division shall make available at reasonable cost a list of 
the names and addresses of all persons licensed by it under 
this chapter. 1983 
61-2-15,61-2-16. R e p e a l e d . 1973 
61-2-17. P e n a l t y for v io lat ion of c h a p t e r . 
(1) Any individual violating this chapter, in addition to 
being subject to a license sanction or a fine ordered by the 
commission, is, upon conviction of a first violation, guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor. Any imprisonment shall be for a term 
not to exceed six months . If the violator is a corporation, it is, 
upon conviction of a first violation, guilty of a class A misde-
meanor. 
(2) Upon conviction of a second or subsequent violation, an 
individual is guilty of a third degree felony. Imprisonment 
shall be for a te rm not to exceed two years. If a corporation is 
convicted of a second or subsequent violation, it is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(3) Any officer or agent of a corporation, or any member or 
agent of a par tnersh ip or association, who personally partici-
pates in or is an accessory to any violation of this chapter by 
such corporation, par tnership , or association, is subject to the 
penalties prescribed for individuals. 
(4) If any person receives any money or its equivalent, as 
commission, compensation, or profit by or in consequence of a 
violation of this chapter, tha t person is liable for an additional 
penalty of not less t han the amount of the money received and 
not more than three times the amount of money received, as 
may be determined by the court. This penalty may be sued for 
in any court of competent jurisdiction, and recovered by any 
person aggrieved for his own use and benefit. 
(5) All fines imposed by the commission and the director 
under this chapter shall, notwithstanding Section 13-1-2, be 
deposited into the Real Estate Education, Research, and 
Recovery Fund to be used in a manner consistent with the 
requirements of the Real Estate Recovery Fund Act. 1993 
61-2-18. A c t i o n s for r e c o v e r y of compensat ion re-
stricted. 
(1) No person may bring or maintain an action in any court 
of this state for the recovery of a commission, fee, or compen-
sation for any act done or service rendered which is prohibited 
under this chapter to other than licensed principal brokers, 
unless the person was duly licensed as a principal broker at 
the time of the doing of the act or rendering the service. 
(2) No sales agent or associate broker may sue in his own 
name for the recovery of a fee, commission, or compensation 
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for services as a sales agent or associate broker unless the 
action is against the principal broker with whom he is or was 
licensed. Any action for the recovery of a fee, commission, or 
other compensation may only be instituted and brought by the 
principal broker with whom the sales agent or associate 
broker is affiliated. 1985 
61-2-19. Repealed. 1933 
61-2-20. Rights and priv i leges of real es tate l icensees . 
Real estate licensees may fill out only those legal forms 
approved by the commission and the attorney general, and 
those forms provided by statute, with the following exceptions: 
(1) Principal brokers and associate brokers maiy fill out 
any documents associated with the closing of a real estate 
transaction. 
(2) Real estate licensees may fill out real estate forms 
prepared by legal counsel of the buyer, seller, lessor, or 
lessee. 
(3) If the commission and the attorney general have not 
approved a specific form for the transaction, principal 
brokers, associate brokers, and sales agents may fill out 
real estate forms prepared by any legal counsel, including 
legal counsel retained by the brokerage to develop these 
forms. 1993 
61-2-21. Remedies and act ion for v io lat ions . 
(1) (a) If the director has reason to believe that any person 
has been or is engaging in acts constituting violations of 
this chapter, and if it appears to the director that it would 
be in the public interest to stop such acts, he shall issue 
and serve upon the person an order directing that person 
to cease and desist from those acts. 
(b) Within ten days after receiving the order, the per-
son upon whom the order is served may request an 
adjudicative proceeding. 
(c) Pending the hearing, the cease and desist order 
shall remain in effect. 
(d) If a request for a hearing is made, the division shall 
follow the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chap-
ter 46b. 
(2) (a) After the hearing, if the commission and the execu-
tive director agree that the acts of the person violate this 
chapter, the executive director shall issue an oider mak-
ing the cease and desist order permanent. 
(b) If no hearing is requested and if the person fails to 
cease the acts, or after discontinuing the acts, again 
commences the acts, the executive director shall file suit 
in the name of the Department of Commerce and the 
Division of Real Estate, in the district court in the county 
in which the acts occurred or Where the person resides or 
carries on business, to enjoin and restrain the person from 
violating this chapter. 
(c) The district courts of this state shall have jurisdic-
tion of these suits. 
(3) The remedies and action provided in this section may 
not interfere with, or prevent the prosecution of, any other 
remedies or actions including criminal proceedings. 1989 
61-2-22. Separability. 
If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any 
provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the 
remainder of this chapter shall not be affected thereby. isss 
61-2-23. Repealed. 1988 
61-2-24. Mishandl ing of trust funds. 
(1) The division may audit principal brokers'trust accounts 
or other accounts in which a licensee maintains trust funds 
under this chapter. If the division's audit shows, in the opinion 
of the division, gross mismanagement, commingling, or mis-
use of funds, the division, with the concurrence of the commis-
sion, may order a complete audit of the account by a certified 
public accountant at the licensee's expense, or take other 
action in accordance with Section 61-2-12. 
(2) The licensee may obtain agency review by the executive 
director or judicial review of any division order. 
(3) If it appears that a person has grossly mismanaged, 
commingled, or otherwise misused trust funds, the division, 
with or without prior administrative proceedings, may bring 
an action in the district court of the district where the person 
resides or maintains a place of business, or where the act or 
practice occurred or is about to occur, to enjoin the acts or 
practices and to enforce compliance with this chapter or any 
rule or order under this chapter. Upon a proper showing, the 
court shall grant injunctive relief or a temporary restraining 
order, and may appoint a receiver or conservator. The division 
is not required to post a bond in any court proceeding. 1996 
CHAPTER 2a 
REAL ESTATE RECOVERY FUND 
Section 
61-2a-l. Citation. 
61-2a-2. Purpose. 
61-2a-3. Education, Research, and Recovery Fund. 
61-2a-4. Additional license fee — Purpose. 
61-2a-5. Notice to division — Judgment against real es-
tate licensee — Fraud, misrepresentation, or 
deceit — Verified petition for order directing 
payment from fund — Limitations and proce-
dures. 
61-2a-6. Real Estate Division — Authority to act upon 
receipt of petition. 
61-2a-7. Court determination and order. 
61-2a-8. Insufficient funds to satisfy judgments — Proce-
dure and interest. 
61-2a-9. Division subrogated to judgment creditor — Au-
thority to revoke license. 
61-2a-10. Failure to comply with all provisions constitutes 
a waiver. 
61-2a-ll . Director of Department of Commerce — Author-
ity to take disciplinary action not limited. 
61-2a-12. Moneys accumulated — Excess set aside — Pur-
pose. 
61-2a-l. Citation. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Real 
Estate Recovery Fund Act." 1975 
61-2a-2. Purpose . 
The purposes of this chapter are as follows: 
(1) l b establish a Real Estate Education, Research, and 
Recovery Fund that shall reimburse the public out of the 
fund for damages up to $10,000 caused by real estate 
licensees in a real estate transaction. This chapter applies 
to damages caused by individual licensees. Reimburse-
ment may not be made for judgments against corpora-
tions, partnerships, associations, or other legal entities. 
(2) l b provide revenue for improving the real estate 
profession through education and research with the goal 
of making real estate salesmen more responsible to the 
pub l i c . 19B9 
61-2a-3. Education, Research , a n d Recovery Fund. 
There is created a segregated special trust fund to be known 
as the Real Estate Education, Research, and Recovery Fund. 
The actual interest earned on the Real Estate Education, 
Research, and Recovery Fund shall be deposited into the fund. 
At the commencement of each fiscal year, $100,000 shall be 
Tab 5 
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(a) three members shall represent nonconsumptive 
wildlife interests; 
(b) one member shall represent consumptive wildlife 
interests, and 
(c) one member shall represent agricultural interests. 
(3) (a) Except as required by Subsection (b), members are 
appointed to four-year terms of office 
(b) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection 
(a), the executive director shall, at the time of appoint-
ment or reappointment, adjust the length of terms to 
ensure that the terms of committee members are stag-
gered so that approximately half of the committee is 
appointed every two years. 
(4) When a vacancy occurs m the membership for any 
reason, the replacement shall be appointed for the unexpired 
.term. 
(5) The committee shall advise: 
(a) the Wildlife Board, regarding rules and broad policy 
affecting the program, and 
(b) the division, regarding broad administrative mat-
ters relating to the Wildlife Heritage program. 
(6) The committee may make recommendations on: 
(a) incentives and public relations strategies to develop 
and increase participation in the program; and 
(b) the funding of specific projects within the program. 
(7) (a) Members shall receive no compensation or benefits 
for their services, but may receive per diem and expenses 
incurred in the performance of the member's official 
duties at the rates established by the Division of Finance 
under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107. 
(b) Members may decline to receive per diem and 
expenses for their service. 1996 
23-26-4. Wildlife Heritage certificate — Benefits — Use 
of revenue. 
(1) (a) A resident or nonresident, 12 years of age or older, 
upon payment of $15, may receive a Wildlife Heritage 
certificate 
(b) A resident or nonresident, under 12 years of age, 
upon payment of $5, may receive a Wildlife Heritage 
certificate. 
(2) The Wildlife Heritage certificate allows the holder to 
receive the benefits and participate in the activities of the 
Wildlife Heritage program as determined by the Wildlife 
jBoard and the division. 
(3) Revenue from the sale of Wildlife Heritage certificates 
shall be used for activities and projects that fulfill the pro-
gram's purposes as specified in Section 23-26-2, including: 
(a) information and education; 
(b) the establishment and enhancement of non-
consumptive wildlife management areas tha t are man-
aged consistent with Section 23-14-18; 
(c) wildlife and ecosystem research; and 
(d) administration, development, and promotion of the 
program. 
(4) Revenue from the sale of Wildlife Heritage certificatei 
may be used for emergency feeding of wildlife. n 
23-26-5. Wildlife H e r i t a g e A c c o u n t — C o n t e n t s — Use 
of fund m o n i e s . 
(1) There is created a restricted account within the General 
Fund known as the Wildlife Heritage Account. 
(2) The contents of the account shall consist of: 
(a) revenue from the sale of Wildlife Heritage certifi-
cates; 
(b) donations received for the Wildlife Heritage pro-
gram; and 
(c) interest accrued on account monies. 
W) Monies in the account shall be used as provided in 
(Section 23-26-4. 
(4) The Wildlife Board shall report to the 1994 Legislature 
on funds received and programs developed. 1993 
TITLE 24 
FORESTRY AND FIRE CONTROL 
(Repealed by Laws 1961, ch. 53, § 21; 1973, ch. 36, § 1; 
1988, ch . 121, § 18.) 
TITLE 25 
FRAUD 
Chapter 
1. Fraudulent Conveyances [Repealed]. 
2. Sale of Merchandise in Bulk [Repealed]. 
3. Leases and Sales of Livestock [Repealed]. 
4. Marketing Wool [Repealed]. 
5. Statute of Frauds. 
6. Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
C H A P T E R I 
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES [REPEALED] 
25-1-1 t o 25-1-16. Repea l ed . 1988 
C H A P T E R 2 
SALE O F MERCHANDISE IN BULK [REPEALED] 
25-2-1 t o 25-2-5. Repea led . 1965 
CHAPTER 3 
LEASES AND SALES O F LIVESTOCK [REPEALED] 
25-3-1 t o 25-3-4. Repea l ed . 1966 
CHAPTER 4 
MARKETING WOOL [REPEALED] 
25-4-1 to 25-4-3. Repealed. 1965 
- * 
CHAPTER 5 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS ^ v 
Section 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. 
25-5-2. Wills and implied t rus ts excepted. 
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
5-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and signed. 
25-5-5. Representation as to credit of third person. 
25-5-6. Promise to answer for obligation of another — 
When not required to be in writing. 
25-5-7. Contracts by telegraph deemed written. 
25-5-8. Right to specific performance not affected. 
25-5-9. Agent may sign for pr incipal 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for 
a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or 
concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto, 
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared 
otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or 
25-5-2 FRAUD 1086 
* 
conveyance in writing subscribed by the par ty creating, grant-
ing, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his 
lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 1953 
25-5-2, Wills and implied trusts excepted . 
Section 25-5-1 shall not be construed to affect the power of 
a testator in the disposition of his real estate by last will and 
testament; nor to prevent any t rus t from arising or being 
extinguished by implication or operation of law. 1995 
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one 
year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall 
be void unless the contract, or some note or memorandum 
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the 
lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized in writing. 1953 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and 
signed. 
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or 
some 1 note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, 
signed by the par ty to be charged with the agreement: 
(1) every agreement tha t by its terms is not to be 
performed within one year from the making of the agree-
ment; 
(2) every promise to answer for the debt, default, or 
miscarriage of another; 
(3) every agreement, promise, or undertaking made 
upon consideration of marriage, except mutual promises 
to marry; 
(4) every special promise made by an executor or ad-
ministrator to answer in damages for the liabilities, or to 
pay the debts, of the testator or intestate out of his own 
estate; 
(5) every agreement authorizing or employing an agent 
or broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation; 
(6) every credit agreement. 
(a) As used in Subsection (6): 
(i) "Credit agreement" means an agreement by 
a financial institution to lend, delay, or otherwise 
modify an obligation to repay money, goods, or 
things in action, to otherwise extend credit, or to 
make any other - financial accommodation. 
"Credit "agreement" does not include the usual 
and customary agreements related to deposit 
accounts or overdrafts or other terms associated 
with deposit accounts or overdrafts. 
(ii) "Creditor" means a financial institution 
which extends credit or extends a financial ac-
commodation under a credit agreement with a 
debtor. 
(iii) "Debtor" means a person who seeks or 
obtains credit, or seeks or receives a financial 
accommodation, under a credit agreement with a 
financial institution. 
(iv) "Financial institution" means a state or 
federally chartered bank, savings and loan asso-
ciation, savings bank, industrial loan corpora-
tion, credit union, or any other institution under 
the jurisdiction of the commissioner of Financial 
Institutions as provided in Title 7, Financial 
Institutions Act. 
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (6)(e), a 
debtor or a creditor may not maintain an action on a 
credit agreement unless the agreement is in writing, 
expresses consideration, sets forth the relevant terms 
and conditions, and is signed by the party against 
whom enforcement of the agreement would be 
sought. For purposes of this act, a signed application 
* 
constitutes a signed agreement, if the creditor does 
not customarily obtain an additional signed agree-
ment from the debtor when granting the application. 
(c) The following actions do not give rise to a claim 
tha t a credit agreement is created, unless the agree-
ment satisfies the requirements of Subsection (6)(b): 
(i) the rendering of financial advice by a credi-
tor to a debtor; 
(ii) the consultation by a creditor with a 
debtor; or 
(iii) the creation for any purpose between a 
creditor and a debtor of fiduciary or other busi-
ness relationships. 
(d) Each credit agreement shall contain a clearly 
s tated typewritten or printed provision giving notice 
to the debtor tha t the writ ten agreement is a final 
expression of the agreement between the creditor and 
debtor and the wri t ten agreement may not be contra-
dicted by evidence of any alleged oral agreement. The 
provision does not have to be on the promissory note 
or other evidence of indebtedness tha t is tied to the 
credit agreement. 
(e) A credit agreement is binding and enforceable * 
without any signature by the par ty to be charged if: 
(i) the debtor is provided with a written copy 
of the terms of the agreement; 
(ii) the agreement provides tha t any use of the 
credit offered shall constitute acceptance of those 
terms; and 
1 (iii) after the debtor receives the agreement, 
the debtor, or a person authorized by the debtor/ 
requests funds pursuan t to the credit agreement 
or otherwise uses the credit offered. 1996 
25-5-5. Representation as to credit of third person. 
To charge a person upon a representation as to the credit of 
a third person, such representation, or some memorandum 
thereof, must be in writing subscribed by the party to be 
charged therewith. 1953 
25-5-6. Promise to answer for obligation of another — 
When not required to be in writing. 
A promise to answer for the obligation of another in any of 
the following cases is deemed an original obligation of the 
promisor and need not be in writing: 
(1) Where the promise is made by one who has received 
property of another upon an undertaking to apply it 
pursuant to such promise, or by one who has received a 
discharge from an obligation in whole or in part in 
consideration of such promise. 
(2) Where the creditor par ts with value or enters into 
an obligation in consideration of the obligation in respect 
to which the promise is made in terms or under circum-
stances such as to render the party making the promise 
the principal debtor and the person m whose behalf it is 
made his surety. 
(3) Where the promise, being for an antecedent obliga-
tion of another, is made upon the consideration that the 
par ty receiving it cancel the antecedent obligation, accept-
ing the new promise as a subst i tute therefor; or upon the 
consideration tha t the par ty receiving it releases the 
property of another from a levy or his person from 
imprisonment under an execution on a judgment obtained 
upon the antecedent obligation; or upon a consideration 
beneficial to the promisor, whether moving from either 
party to the antecedent obligation or from another person. 
(4) Where a factor under takes for a commission to sell 
merchandise and to guarantee the sale. 
(5) When the holder of an ins t rument for the payment 
of money upon which a third person is or may become 
1087 FRAUD 25-6-2 
liable to him transfers it in payment of a precedent debt of 
his own, or for a new consideration, and in connection 
with such transfer enters into a promise respecting such 
instrument. 1953 
25-5-7. Contracts by telegraph d e e m e d written. 
Contracts made by telegraph shall be deemed to be con-
tracts in writing, and all communications sent by telegraph 
and signed by the person sending the same, or by his author-
ity, shall be deemed to be communications in writing. 1953 
25-5-8. R i g h t to specific p e r f o r m a n c e not affected. 
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to 
abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific perfor-
mance of agreements in case of part performance thereof. 
1953 
25-5-9. A g e n t may s ign for principal . 
Every instrument required by the provisions of this chapter 
to be subscribed by any party may be subscribed by the lawful 
agent of such party. 1953 
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25-6-1. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act." 1988 
25-6-2. Definitions. 
In this chapter: 
(1) "Affiliate" means: 
(a) a person who directly or indirectly owns, con-
trols, or holds with power to vote, 20% or more of the 
outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other 
than a person who holds the securities: 
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discre-
tionary power to vote the securities; or 
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has 
not exercised the power to vote; 
(b) a corporation 20% or more of whose outstand-
ing voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, 
controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or 
a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or 
holds, with power to vote, 20% or more of the out-
standing voting securities of the debtor, other than a 
person who holds the securities: 
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power 
to Vote the securities; or 
(ii)' solely to secure a debt, if the person has 
not exercised the power to vote; 
(c) a person whose business is operated by the 
debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a person 
substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the 
debtor; or 
(d) a person who operates the debtor's business 
under a lease or other agreement or controls substan-
tially all of the debtor's assets. 
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but does 'not 
include: 
(a) property to the extent it is encumbered by a 
1
 valid lien; 
(b) property to the extent it is generally exempt 
under nonbankruptcy law; or 
(c) an interest in property held in tenancy by the 
entireties to the extent it is not subject to process by 
a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant . 
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not 
the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliqui-
dated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, 
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured. 
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim. 
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim. 
(6) "Debtor" means a person who is liable on a claim. 
(7) "Insider" includes: 
(a) if the debtor is an individual: 
(i) a relative of the debtor or of a general 
partner of the debtor; 
(ii) a partnership in which the debtor is a 
general partner; 
(iii) a general partner in a partnership de-
scribed in Subsection (7)(a)(ii); 
(iv) a corporation of which the debtor is a 
director, officer, or person in control; or 
(v) a limited liability company of which the 
debtor is a member or manager; 
(b) if the debtor is a corporation: 
(i) a director of the debtor; 
(ii) an officer of the debtor; 
(iii) a person in control of the debtor; 
(iv) a partnership in which the debtor is a 
general partner; 
(v) a general partner in a partnership de-
scribed in Subsection (7)(b)(iv); 
(vi) a limited liability company of which the 
debtor is a member or manager; or 
(vii) a relative of a general partner, director, 
officer, or person in control of the debtor; 
(c) if the debtor is a partnership: 
(i) a general par tner in the debtor; 
(ii) a relative of a general partner in, a general 
partner of, or a person in control of the debtor, 
(iii) another partnership in which the debtor is 
a general partner; 
(iv) a general partner in a partnership de-
scribed in Subsection (7)(c)(iij); 
(v) a limited liability company of which the 
debtor is a member or manager; or 
(vi) a person in control of the debtor; 
(d) if the debtor is a limited liability company: 
(i) a member or manager of the debtor; 
(ii) another limited liability company in which 
the debtor is a member or manager; 
(iii) a partnership in which the debtor is a 
general partner; 
(iv) a general partner in a partnership de-
scribed in Subsection (7)(d)(iii); 
(v) a person in control of the debtor; or 
(vi) a relative of a general partner, member, 
manager, or person in control of the debtor; 
(e) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the 
affiliate were the debtor; and 
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grainger, 2004 UT 61,504 Utah Adv. Rep. 7,96 
P»3d 927. 
Bl-1-26. Scope of the act — Service of process. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
In personam jurisdiction. 
^This section provides a substitute method for 
for personal jurisdiction over a defendant ab-
sent minimum contacts. MFS Series Trust III v. 
service of process, assuming that jurisdiction Grainger, 2004 UT 61,504 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 96 
Iver the defendant is proper, it does not provide P.3d 927. 
CHAPTER 2 
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
pection 
il-2-2. 
Nl-2-5.5. 
Sl-2-6. 
Bl-2-7.1. 
1-2-9. 
Definitions. 
Real Estate Commission cre-
ated — Functions — Appoint-
ment — Qualification and 
terms of members — Ex-
penses — Meetings. 
Licensing procedures and re-
quirements. 
Change of information — Fail-
ure to notify — Notification to 
an applicant, licensee, or cer-
tificate holder. 
Examination and license fees — 
Background check — Re-
newal of licenses — Educa-
tion requirements — Activa-
tion of inactive licenses — 
Recertification — Licenses of 
firm, partnership, or associa-
tion — Miscellaneous fees. 
Section 
61-2-11. 
61-2-11.5. 
61-2-12. 
61-2-21. 
61-2-25. 
61-2-26. 
61-2-27. 
Investigations — Subpoena 
power of division — Grounds 
for disciplinary action. 
Investigations related to an un-
divided fractionalized long-
term estate. 
Disciplinary action — Judicial 
review. 
Remedies and action for viola-
tions. 
Sales agents — Affiliated with 
broker as independent con-
tractors or employees — Pre-
sumption. 
Rulemaking required for offer 
or sale of an undivided frac-
tionalized long-term estate — 
Disclosures — Management 
agreement. 
Exclusive brokerage agreement. 
'ft-2-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Associate real estate broker" and "associate broker" means any 
person employed or engaged as an independent contractor by or on behalf 
of a licensed principal real estate broker to perform any act set out in 
Subsection (12) for valuable consideration, who has qualified under this 
chapter as a principal real estate broker. 
(2) "Branch office" means a principal broker's real estate brokerage 
office other than the principal broker's main office. 
(3) "Commission" means the Real Estate Commission established under 
this chapter. 
(4) "Concurrence" means the entities given a concurring role must 
jointly agree for action to be taken. 
(5) "Condominium" or "condominium unit" is as defined in Section 
57-8-3. 
(6) "Condominium homeowners' association" means all of the condomin-
ium unit owners acting as a group in accordance with declarations and 
bylaws. 
61-2-2 SECURITIES DIVISION — REAL ESTATE DIVISION 4 
(7) (a) "Condominium hotel" means one or more condominium unifa 
that are operated as a hotel. 
(b) "Condominium hotel" does not mean a hotel consisting
 c 
condominium units, all of which are owned by a single entity. 
(8) "Director" means the director of the Division of Real Estate. 
(9) "Division" means the Division of Real Estate. "* " r 
(10) "Executive director" means the director of the Department ojj 
Commerce. 
(11) "Main office" means the address which a principal broker de 
nates with the division as the principal broker's primary brokerage officj 
(12) "Principal real estate broker" and "principal broker" means anji 
person: 
(a) (i) who sells or lists for sale, buys, exchanges, or auctions re 
estate, options on real estate, or improvements on real estate wjft 
the expectation of receiving valuable consideration; or 
(ii) who advertises, offers, attempts, or otherwise holds Mm$$| 
out to be engaged in the business described in Subsectioii 
(12)(a)(i); 
(b) employed by or on behalf of the owner of real estate or by^ 
prospective purchaser of real estate who performs any of the acjg 
described in Subsection (12)(a), whether the person's compensation^ 
at a stated salary, a commission basis, upon a salary and commissi^  
basis, or otherwise; 
(c) who, with the expectation of receiving valuable consideration 
manages property owned by another person or who advertises oj 
otherwise holds himself out to be engaged in property management; 
(d) who, with the expectation of receiving valuable consideratiq 
assists or directs in the procurement of prospects for or the negotaaj 
tion of the transactions listed in Subsections (12)(a) and (c); and 
(e) except for mortgage lenders, title insurance agents, an4 
employees, who assists or directs in the closing of any real est 
transaction with the expectation of receiving valuable considerate* 
(13) (a) "Property management" means engaging in, with the expej 
tion of receiving valuable consideration, the management of propgj 
owned by another person or advertising or otherwise claiming i 
engaged in property management by: 
(i) advertising for, arranging, negotiating, offering, or ot&I 
wise attempting or participating in a transaction calculati 
secure the rental or leasing of real estate; 
(ii) collecting, agreeing, offering, or otherwise attemptrrifl 
collect rent for the real estate and accounting for and disbu 
the money collected; or 
(iii) authorizing expenditures for repairs to the real est$t$ 
(b) "Property management" does not include: 
(i) hotel or motel management; 
(ii) rental of tourist accommodations, including hotels, moS 
tourist homes, condominiums, condominium hotels, mobile 1$ 
park accommodations, campgrounds, or similar public accojo 
dations for any period of less than 30 consecutive days, and 
management activities associated with these rentals; or 
(iii) the leasing or management of surface or subsurface 3 
erals or oil and gas interests, if the leasing or managemen 
separate from a sale or lease of the surface estate. 
•^4 
- < 
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^jC" (14) "Real estate" includes leaseholds and business opportunities in- -*-|v~ 
* volving real property. 
(15) "Real estate sales agent" and "sales agent" mean any person 
affiliated with a licensed principal real estate broker, either as an 
independent contractor or an employee as provided in Section 61-2-25, to 
perform for valuable consideration any act set out in Subsection (12). 
(16) (a) "Regular salaried employee" means an individual who per-
forms a service for wages or other remuneration, whose employer 
withholds federal employment taxes under a contract of hire, written 
or oral, express or implied. 
(b) "Regular salaried employee" does not include a person who 
performs services on a project-by-project basis or on a commission 
t basis. 
( (17) "Reinstatement" means restoring a license that has expired or has 
been suspended. 
(18) "Reissuance" means the process by which a licensee may obtain a 
license following revocation of the license. 
(19) "Renewal" means extending a license for an additional licensing 
period on or before the date the license expires. 
(20) (a) "Undivided fractionalized long-term estate" means an owner-
ship interest in real property by two or more persons that is a: 
(i) tenancy in common; or 
(ii) any other legal form of undivided estate in real property 
including: 
(A) a fee estate; 
(B) a life estate; or 
(C) other long-term estate. 
(b) "Undivided fractionalized long-term estate" does not include a 
v» joint tenancy. „ 
History:L. 1921, ch . 110, § 2; 1925, ch. 79, tion (15) which read "'Real estate sales agent' 
§ 1; 1929, ch. 77, § 1; R.S. 1933, 82-2-2; L. and 'sa les agent 'means any person employed or 
1939r ch. 106, § 1; C. 1943, 82-2-2; L. 1963, engaged as an independent contractor by or on 
ch, 146, § 1; 1983, ch . 257, § 2; 1985, ch. 162, behalf of a licensed principal real estate broker 
§ 2; 1987, ch. 73, § 32; 1989, ch. 225, § 87; to perform for valuable consideration any act 
1991, ch. 165, § $; 1996, ch. 102, § 2; 1997, set out in Subsection (12) " 
ch.106, § 1; 2003, ch. 264, § 1; 2005, ch. 257,
 T h e 2005 amendment, effective May 2, 2005, 
;}2. added Subsection (20) and made stylistic 
L Amendment Notes . — The 2003 amend- changes in the section 
t merit, effective May 5, 2003, rewrote Subsec-
61-2-5.5* Real Estate Commission created — Functions — 
Appointment — Qualification and terms of mem-
bers — Expenses — Meetings, 
(1) There is created within the division a Real Estate Commission. The 
[tamission shall: 
(a) make rules for the administration of this chapter that are not 
inconsistent with this chapter, including: 
(i) licensing of: 
(A) principal brokers; 
(B) associate brokers; 
(C) sales agents; 
(D) real estate companies; and 
(E) branch offices; 
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CHAPTER 2 
REAL ESTATE BROKERS 
82-2-1. 
82-2-2. 
82-2-3. 
82-2-4. 
82-2-5. 
82-2-6. 
82-2-7. 
82-2-8. 
License Required. 82-2-9. 
"Real Estate Broker" — 
"Real Estate,! Denned. 
"Real Estate Salesman" De-
fined. 82-2-10. 
[Real Estate Broker or Sales-
man] — One Act for Com- 82-2-11. 
pensation Sufficient to Con-
stitute. 82-2-12. 
Securities Commission to En-
force Chapter. 82-2-13. 
License — Application for — 
Bond—Recommendation. 82-2-14. 
Id. Form—Posting—Pocket 
Cards. 82-2-15. 
Termination of Salesman's 
Employment — Notice — 82-2-16. 
Return of License and 82-2-17. 
Card. 
Broker's License — Fee — 
Carries Right to Sales-
man's License—Expiration 
—Renewal—Revocation. 
Salesman's Right to Commis-
sion Restricted. 
Revocation or Suspension of 
License—Grounds. 
Hearing Before Revocation 
or Suspension. 
Violation of Chapter Ground 
for Revocation. 
List of Licensees to Be Pub-
lished and Distributed. 
Colonization Projects — Re-
ports on. 
Id. Prerequisite to Sales. 
Penalty for Violation of 
Chapter. 
82-2-1. License Required. 
It shall be unlawful for any person, copartnership or corporation to 
engage in the business, act in the capacity of, advertise or assume to 
act as a real estate broker or a real estate salesman within this state 
without first obtaining a license under the provisions of this chapter. 
(L. 21, p. 304, §1.) 
History. 
As amended by L. 39, ch. 106, eff. May 
9, adding "copartnership or corporation" 
after "person" in first line and adding 
matter at end of second line. 
Comparable provisions. 
Cal. Gen. Laws, Act 112, § 1 (identical, 
except that concluding words are as 
follows: " * * * without first obtaining 
a license from the State Real Estate 
Division"). 
Idaho Code, §53-2205, Mont. Rev. 
Codes, § 4060 (unlawful for any person 
to engage in business, or act in capacity 
of, real estate broker without first ob-
taining license). 
Iowa Code 1939, § 1905.20 (requiring 
procurement of license from Iowa real 
estate commissioner). 
Cross-references. 
Statute of frauds, brokers' contracts 
as within, 33-5-4, subd. (5). 
Decisions from other jurisdictions. 
— Iowa. 
Written contract of exclusive agency 
for the sale of real estate held not to be 
construed as preventing the owner from 
making a sale without liability for a 
commission. Hedges Co. v. Shanahan, 
195 Iowa 1302, 190 N. W. 957. 
Employment of broker to sell real 
estate is not a renunciation or abdication 
of owner's right to sell as an incident of 
his ownership. Reeve v. Shoemaker, 200 
Iowa 983, 205 N. W. 742, 43 A. L. R. 
839. 
The existence of a contract of employ-
ment is essential to the right of a broker 
to a commission. Reeve v. Shoemaker, 
200 Iowa 983, 205 N. W. 742, 43 A. L. 
R. 839. 
A broker suing for commissions for 
making a land sale has the burden of 
proving (1) the contract of employment, 
(2) that he produced a purchaser ready, 
able and willing to purchase on terms 
satisfactory to defendant, (3) that plain-
tiff was efficient moving cause of sale, 
and (4) the implied contract to pay com-
mission for services. Wareham v. At-
kinson, 215 Iowa 1096, 247 N. W. 534. 
A. L. R. notes. 
Constitutionality of statute or ordi-
nance requiring real estate brokers to 
procure a license, 59 A. L. R. 1501. 
82-2-2, "Real Estate Broker"—"Real Estate" Defined. 
The term "real estate broker" within the meaning of this chapter 
shall include all persons, partnerships, associations and corporations, 
(p 
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foreign and domestic, who for another and for a fee, commission or 
other valuable consideration, or who with the intention or in the expec-
tation or upon the promise of receiving or collecting a fee, commission 
or other valuable consideration, sells, exchanges, purchases, rents or 
leases or negotiates the sale, exchange, purchase, rental or leasing of or 
offers or attempts or agrees to negotiate the sale, exchange, purchase, 
rental or leasing of, or lists or offers or attempts or agrees to list, or 
auctions, or offers or attempts or agrees to collect rental for the use of 
real estate or who advertises, who buys or offers to buy, sells or offers 
to sell or otherwise deals in options on real estate or the improvements 
thereon or who collects or offers or attempts or agrees to collect rental 
for the use of real estate or who advertises or holds himself, itself or 
themselves out as engaged in the business of selling, exchanging, pur-
chasing, renting or leasing real estate or assists or directs in the pro-
curing of prospects or the negotiation or closing of any transaction 
which does or is calculated to result in the sale, exchange, leasing or 
renting of any real estate. The term ''real estate broker" shall also in-
clude any person, partnership, association or corporation employed by 
or oil behalf of the owner or owners of lots or other parcels of real 
estate at a stated salary or upon a commission or upon a salary and 
commission basis or otherwise to sell such real estate or any parts 
thereof in lots or other parcels and who shall sell or exchange or offer 
or attempt or agree to negotiate the sale or exchange of any such lot or 
parcel of real estate. 
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any person, part-
nership, association or corporation who as owner or lessor shall per-
form any of the acts aforementioned with reference to property owned 
or leased by such person, partnership, association or corporation nor to 
isolated transactions by persons holding a duly executed power of 
attorney from the owner nor shall this chapter be construed to include 
in any way the services rendered by an attorney at law in performing 
his duties as such attorney at law nor shall it apply to a receiver, trus-
tee in bankruptcy, administrator, or executor, or any person acting 
under order of any court nor to a trustee under a deed of trust of a will 
nor to their employees. 
It is expressly provided that a real estate broker shall have the right 
to fill out and complete such statutory or securities commission ap-
proved forms of legal documents that may be necessary to any real 
estate transaction to which the said broker is a party as principal or 
agent. 
The term "real estate" as used in this chapter shall include lease-
holds and other interests less than leaseholds. (L. 29, p. 121, § 2.) 
History. plication and effect of statute relat-
As amended by L 39, ch. 106, eff. May ing to real estate brokers, 86 A. L. 
9, making material changes in text and R. 640. 
adding all matter after "real estate" m Broker's hen to secure his compensation 
eighth line from end of first paragraph. for procuring sale of real estate, 
58 A. L R 1497. 
A. L. R. notes. Duration of real estate broker's contract 
Authority of real estate broker to bind which specifies no time, 28 A. L. R. 
employer by representations to pur- 893. 
chaser as to the character or condi- Duty of broker to inform principal of 
tion of the property, 57 A. L. R. enhanced value of property, 53 A. 
H I . L R. 136. 
Broker from out of state as within ap- Failure of title as fault or default of 
UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 
1953 
CONTAINING THE GENEEAL AND PERMANENT LAWS OF THE 
STATE IN FORCE AT THE CLOSE OF THE TWENTY-NINTH 
LEGISLATURE, REGULAR AND FIRST 
SPECIAL SESSIONS, 1951 
TEN VOLUMES 
COMPILED, ANNOTATED AND PUBLISHED UNDER 
AUTHORITY OF CHAPTER 116 L A W S OF U I A H , 1951 
Edited by 
CHARLES L. HOPPER, AB., LLB. 
AND T H E PUBLISHER'S EDITORIAL S T A F F 
jL £ J 
VOLUME ? 
Sales to Water and Irrigation 
THE ALLEN SMITH COMPANY 
Publishers 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
61-2-2 SECURITIES COMMISSION 
Collateral References. 
Brokers<§=>3. 
12 C.J.S. Brokers § 8. 
Eeal estate brokers, 8 Am. Jur. 1016, 
Brokers § 59 et seq. 
Character and extent of liability on 
real estate broker's s ta tutory bond, 17 A. 
L. K. 2d 1012. 
Constitutionality of s ta tute or ordinance 
requiring real estate brokers to procure a 
license, 59 A. L. K. 1501. 
61-2-2. "Real estate broker"—"Real estate" defined.—The term "real 
estate broker" within the meaning of this chapter shall include all persons, 
partnerships, associations and corporations, foreign and domestic, who for 
another and for a fee, commission or other valuable consideration, or who 
with the intention or in the expectation or upon the promise of receiving 
or collecting a fee, commission or other valuable consideration, sells, 
exchanges, purchases, rents or leases or negotiates the sale, exchange, 
purchase, rental or leasing of or offers or attempts or agrees to negotiate 
the sale, exchange, purchase, rental or leasing of, or lists or offers or 
attempts or agrees to list, or auctions, or offers or attempts or agrees to 
collect rental for the use of real estate or who advertises, who buys or 
offers to buy, sells or offers to sell or otherwise deals in options on real 
estate or the improvements thereon or who collects or offers or attempts 
or agrees to collect rental for the use of real estate or who advertises or 
holds himself, itself or themselves out as engaged in the business of selling, 
exchanging, purchasing, renting or leasing real estate or assists or directs 
in the procuring of prospects or the negotiation or closing of any trans-
action which does or is calculated to result in the sale, exchange, leasing 
or renting of any real estate. The term "real estate broker" shall also 
include any person, partnership, association or corporation employed by 
or on behalf of the owner or owners of lots or other parcels of real estate 
at a stated salary or upon a commission or upon a salary and commission 
basis or otherwise to sell such real estate or any parts thereof in lots or 
other parcels and who shall sell or exchange or offer or attempt or agree to 
negotiate the sale or exchange of any such lot or parcel of real estate. 
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any person, partner-
ship, association or corporation who as owner or lessor shall perform any 
of the acts aforementioned with reference to property owned or leased by 
such person, partnership, association or corporation nor to isolated trans-
actions by persons holding a duly executed power of attorney from the 
owner nor shall this chapter be construed to include in any way the services 
rendered by an attorney at law in performing his duties as such attorney 
at law nor shall it apply to a receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, administrator, 
or executor, or any person acting under order of any court nor to a trustee 
under a deed of trust of a will nor io their employees. 
It is expressly provided that a real estate broker shall have the right 
to fill out and complete such statutory or securities commission approved 
forms of legal documents that may be necessary to any real estate trans-
action to which the said broker is a party as principal or agent. 
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ing (1) the contract of employment, (2) 
that he produced a purchaser ready, able 
and willing to purchase on terms satis-
factory to defendant, (3) that plaintiff was 
•efficient moving cause of sale, and (4) the 
implied contract to pay commission for 
services. Wareham v. Atkinson, 215 Iowa 
1096, 247 N. W. 534. 
REAL ESTATE BROKERS 61-2-3 
The term "real estate" as used in this chapter shall include leaseholds /\ 
and other interests less than leaseholds. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 110, § 2 ; 1925, ch. 
79, § 1; 1929, ch. 77, § 1; R. S. 1933, 82-2-2; 
I* 1939, ch. 106, § 1 ; C. 1943, 82-2-2. 
Compiler's Note. 
The 1939 amendment made mater ia l 
changes in text and added the last sen-
tence of the first paragraph. 
1. Construction and application. 
Plaintiff, who by oral agreement assisted 
licensed broker in obtaining listing of 
certain land, could not be deprived of his 
commission when land was sold by broker, 
since plaintiff was neither real estate 
broker as defined in this section nor real 
estate salesman as defined in 61-2-3. And 
erson v. Johnson, 108 U. 417, 160 P . 2d 725. 
Collateral References. 
Brokers<S=>2. 
12 C.J.S. Brokers § 1. 
Authority of real estate broker to b ind 
employer by representations to purchaser 
as to the character or condition of the 
property, 57 A. L. R. 111. 
Broker from out of state as within ap-
plication and effect of s ta tu te re la t ing to 
real estate brokers, 86 A. L. R. 640. 
Broker's lien to secure his compensation 
for procuring sale of real estate, 58 A. 
L. R. 1497. 
Broker's r ight to commission where cus-
tomer repudiates or fails to complete con-
tract or promise which is oral or not spe 
cifically enforceable, 12 A. L. R. 2d 1410. 
Duration of real estate broker 's contract 
which specifies no time, 28 A. L. R. 893. 
Duty of broker to inform principal of 
enhanced value of property, 53 A. L. R. 
136. 
Failure of t i t le as fault or default of 
owner within exception in contractual pro 
vision denying broker's r ight to commis-
sions if sale is not closed, 56 A. L. R. 913. 
Liabil i ty of broker to purchaser for 
overstat ing lowest price at which owner 
is willing to sell, 8 A. L. R. 1383. 
Liabil i ty of real estate agent or broker 
to employer because of unfit character of 
purchaser or tenant procured by him, 60 
A. L. R. 1379. 
Real estate broker's rights and remedies 
in respect of property or proceeds for pay-
ment or security of his compensation, 125 
A. L. R. 921. 
Real estate broker's right to commis-
sions as affected by owner's ignorance of 
fact tha t purchaser had been contacted 
by broker, 142 A. L. R. 275. 
^ Real estate broker's right to commis-
sion where purchaser refuses to go through 
with executory contract because of reck-
less misrepresentation made to him by 
broker respecting property, 9 A. L. R. 2d 
504. 
Relative l ights and liabilities of vendor 
and his broker to down payment or earnest 
•money forfeited by vendee for default 
under real estate contract, 9 A. L. R. 2d 
495. 
Right of real estate broker to commis-
sions where he was unable to procure an 
offer of the owner's price from one whom 
he interested, and who subsequently, with-
out his intervention, purchased at tha t 
price, 9 A. L. R. 1194. 
Right of real estate broker to list com-
peting properties of different owners, 71 
A. L. R. 699. 
Skill and care required of real estate 
broker, 62 A. L. R. 1357. 
What deviation in prospective vendee's 
proposal from vendoi's terms precludes 
broker from recovering commission for 
producing a ready, willing, and able 
vendee, 18 A. L. R. 2d 376. 
Who is real estate agent, salesman, or 
broker within meaning of statute, 56 A. 
L. R. 480, 167 A. L. R. 774. 
61-2-3. "Real estate salesman" defined.—The term "real estate sales-
man" shall mean and include any person employed or engaged by or on 
behalf of a licensed real estate broker to do or to deal in any act or trans-
action set out or comprehended by the definition of a real estate broker 
in section 61-2-2 for compensation or otherwise 
History: L. 1921, ch. L10, § 2 ; 1925, ch. 61-2-2" appeared in Code 1943 as "section 
" " ~ 82-2-2." 
1. Broker or salesman defined. 
One who merely assists a real estate 
broker to secure listings does not come 
within the provisions of our real estate 
brokers ' law. He does not come within 
the definition of a real estate broker or 
79, § 1 ; 1929, ch. 77, § 1 ; R. S. 1933, 
82-2-3; L. 1939, ch. 106, § 1; C. 1943, 
82-2-3. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1939 amendment rewrote t ex t of 
entire section. 
The reference in this section to "section 
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been tiled, entered, or imposed under this act, but are governed by 
prior law. 
(4) Prior law applies in respect of any offer or sale made within 
one year alter the effective date of this act pursuant to an offering 
begun in good faith before its effective date on the basis of an exemption 
available under prior law. 
(5) Judicial review of all administrative orders as to which review 
proceedings have not been instituted by the effective date of this act are 
governed by section 61-1-23, except that no review proceeding may be 
instituted unless the petition is filed within any period of limitation 
which applied to a review proceeding when the order was entered and 
in any event within sixty days after the effective date of this act. 
Approved March 21, 1963. 
CHAPTER 146 
H. B. No. 124. (Passed March 14, 1963. In effect May 14, 1963.) 
REAL ESTATE BROKER 
An Act Relating to Real Estate Brokers, Providing That the Securities 
Commission May Issue Cease and Desist Orders and Seek Injunctive 
Relief for Violations of the Chapter; and Amending Sections 61-2-2, 
61-2-5, 61-2-9, and 61-2-11, 61-2-19, Utah Code Annotated 1953, Relat-
ing to the Duties of Real Estate Brokers and Providing That Business 
Opportunities Shall Be Included in the Definition of Real Estate; 
Increasing Compensation of Board of Real Estate Examiners; Pro-
viding for Certain Changes in Fees; Providing that Brokers May 
Share Commissions With Licensed Brokers in Other Jurisdictions; 
and Adding Sections 61-2-21 and 61-2-22 to Prescribe Course of Ac-
tion in Case of Violations and Savings Clause. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Sections Amended. 
Sections 61-2-2, 61-2-5, 61-2-6, 61-2-9 and 61-2-11, 61-2-19, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, are amended to read: 
61-2-2. "Real Estate Broker"—"Real Estate" Defined. 
The term "real estate broker" within the meaning of this chapter 
shall include all persons, partnerships, associations and corporations, 
foreign and domestic, who for another and for a fee, commission or 
other valuable consideration, or who with the intention or in the expec-
tation or upon the promise of receiving or collecting a fee, commission 
or other valuable consideration, sells, exchanges, purchases, rents or 
leases or negotiates the sale, exchange, purchase, rental or leasing of, 
or offers or attempts or agrees to negotiate the sale, exchange, pur-
chase, rental or leasing of, or lists or offers or attempts or agrees to 
list, or auctions, or offers or attempts or agrees to collect rental for 
the use of real estate or who advertises, who buys or offers to buy, sells 
Ch. 146 Securities [522] 
or offers to sell or otherwise deals in options on real estate or the im-
provements* thereon or who collects or offers or attempts or agrees 
to collect rental for the use of real estate or who advertises or holds 
himself, itself or themselves out as engaged in the business of selling, 
exchanging, purchasing, renting or leasing real estate, or assists or 
directs in the procuring of prospects or the negotiation or closing of 
any transaction which does or is calculated to result in the sale, ex-
change, leasing or renting of any real estate. The term "real estate 
broker" shall also include any person, partnership, association or 
corporation employed by or on behalf of the owner or owners of lots 
or other parcels of real estate at a stated salary or upon a commission 
or upon a salary and commission basis or otherwise to sell such real 
estate or any parts thereof in lots or other parcels and who shall sell 
or exchange or offer or attempt or agree to negotiate the sale or ex-
change of any such lot or parcel of real estate. 
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any person, partner-
ship, association or corporation who as owner or lessor shall perform 
any of the acts aforementioned with reference to property owned or 
leased by such person, partnership, association or corporation nor to 
isolated transactions by persons holding a duly executed power of 
attornejr from the owner nor shall this chapter be construed to include 
in any way the services rendered by an attorney at law in performing 
his duties as such attorney at law nor shall it apply to a receiver, 
trustee, in bankruptcy, administrator, or executor, or any person acting 
under order of any court nor to a trustee under a deed of trust of a 
will nor to their employees. 
The term "real estate" as used in this chapter shall include leaseholds 31^ 
and business opportunities. * 
The term "business opportunity" as used in this Chapter shall mean 
and include an existing business, business and the good will attached 
thereto or any one or combination thereof. 
61-2-5. Securities Commission—Board of Real Estate Examiners. 
(a) It shall be the duty of the State securities commission, herein 
referred to as the commission, to administer and provide for the en-
forcement of all provisions of this chapter. A board of real estate 
examiners, herein referred to as the board, and the office of real estate 
director, herein referred to as the director, are hereby established under 
the appointment, direction and supervision of the securities commis-
sion. The commission shall appoint a board of three real estate exam-
iners, each of whom shall, for at least five years prior to the date of 
his appointment, have been engaged in the real estate business, and 
shall have been a licensed real estate broker in the State of Utah for 
three years next prior to his appointment. Not more than one member 
of the board shall be appointed from any one county in the state. The 
board members shall be appointed for terms of one year, two years 
and three years, upon creation of the board, and upon expiration of the 
respective terms, new appointments shall be made for terms of three 
years. The board of real estate examiners shall, upon its own motion 
or upon the verified complaint in writing of any person, cause to be 
made an investigation of the conduct of any licensee mentioned in the 
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE AMENDMENTS - SUNSET REVIEW 
By Senator Carhng 
AN ACT RELATING TO REAL ESTATE; CLARIFYING THE ROLE OF THE DIVISION OF 
REAL ESTATE AND ITS DUTIES; MAKING CHANGES IN THE LICENSING OF BRO-
KERS AND SALESMEN; PROVIDING FOR THE LICENSING OF PRINCIPAL BROKERS; 
AND PROVIDING TECHNICAL CHANGES. 
THIS ACT AMENDS SECTIONS 61-2-1, 61-2-4, 61-2-7, 61-2-8, 61-2-10, 61-2-13, 61-2-14, 61-2-
17, 61-2-18, AND 61-2-20, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, SECTION 61-2-2, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 146, LAWS OF UTAH 
1963, SECTION 61-2-6, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAP-
TER 194, LAWS OF UTAH 1979, AND SECTIONS 61-2-9, 61-2-11, 61-2-12, AND 61-2-21, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 225, LAWS OF 
UTAH 1981; ENACTS SECTION 61-2-5.5, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953; REPEALS 
AND REENACTS SECTION 61-2-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AND SECTION 61-
2-5, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 225, LAWS OF 
UTAH 1981; AND REPEALS SECTION 61-2-19, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS 
LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 193, LAWS OF UTAH 1969. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section amended. 
Section 61-2-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is amended to read: 
61-2-1. License required. 
It [shall be] is unlawful for any person[, copartnership or corporation] to 
engage in the business, act in the capacity of, advertise or assume to act as a 
principal real estate broker, real estate broker, or a real estate salesman 
within this state without [first obtaining] a license obtained under [the provi 
sions of] this chapter. 
Section 2. Section amended. 
Section 61-2-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by Chapter 
146, Laws of Utah 1963, is amended to read: 
61-2-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) [The term] "Principal real estate broker" and "principal broker" 
[within the meaning of this chapter shall] means: (a) [include] all persons[T 
partnerships, associations and corporations, foreign and domestic,] who for 
another and for [a fee, commission or other] valuable consideration, or who 
with the intention or in the expectation or upon the promise of receiving or 
collecting [a—fee^—commission—er—other] valuable consideration, sells, 
exchanges, purchases, rents or leases or negotiates the sale, exchange, pur-
chase, rental or leasing of, or offers or attempts or agrees to negotiate the 
sale, exchange, purchase, rental or leasing of, or lists or offers or attempts or 
agrees to list, or auctions, or offers or attempts or agrees to collect rental for 
the use of real estate or who advertises, who buys or offers to buy, sells or 
offers to sell or otherwise deals in options on real estate or the improvements 
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thereon or who collects or offers or attempts or agrees to collect rental for 
the use of real estate or who advertises or holds himself, itself or themselves 
out as engaged in the business of selling, exchanging, purchasing, renting or 
leasing real estate, or assists or directs in the procuring of prospects or the 
negotiation or closing of any transaction which does or is calculated to result 
in the sale, exchange, leasing or renting of any real estateH ; and (b) [The 
term "real estate broker" shall also include] any person, [partnership, associa 
tion or corporation] employed by or on behalf of the owner or owners of lots 
or other parcels of real estate at a stated salary or upon a commission or 
upon a salary and commission basis or otherwise to sell such real estate or 
any parts thereof in lots or other parcels and who [shall sell or exchange or 
offer or attempt or agree] sells, exchanges or offers or attempts or agrees to 
negotiate the sale or exchange of any such lot or parcel of real estate. 
[The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any person, partnership, 
association or corporation who as owner or lessor shall perform any of the 
acts aforementioned with reference to property owned or leased by such 
person, partnership, association or corporation nor to isolated transactions by 
persons holding a duly executed power of attorney from the owner nor shall 
this chapter be construed to include in any way the services rendered by an 
attorney at law in performing his duties as such attorney at law nor shall it 
apply to a receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, administrator, or executor, or any 
person acting under order of any court nor to a trustee under a deed of trust 
of (or) a will nor to their employees.] 
(2) "Real estate broker" and "broker" means any person employed or 
engaged by or on behalf of a licensed principal real estate broker to perform 
any act set out in subsection (1) for valuable consideration, who has qualified 
under the provisions of this chapter as a real estate broker. 
(3) "Real estate salesman" and "salesman" means any person employed 
or engaged by or on behalf of a licensed principal real estate broker to per-
form any act set out in subsection (1) for valuable consideration. 
(4) [The term "real] 'Real estate" [as used in this chapter shall include] 
includes leaseholds^ [aft4] business opportunities, and all timeshare interests 
(including but not limited to fee simple, club membership, limited partner-
ship, and beneficiary interests in a timeshare trust). 
(5) [The term "business] "Business opportunity" [as used in this chapter 
shall mean and include] means an existing business, a business and [the] its 
good will^ [attached thereto] a business franchise, or any [one or] combina-
tion[thereof] of them. 
Section 3. Section repealed and reenacted. 
Section 61-2-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is repealed and reenacted to 
read: 
61-2-3, Exempt persons and transactions. 
This chapter does not apply to: (1) any person who as owner or lessor 
performs the acts set out in section 61-2-2(1) with reference to property 
owned or leased by such person; (2) isolated transactions by persons holding 
a duly executed power of attorney from the owner; (3) services rendered by 
an attorney at law in performing his duties as an attorney at law; (4) a 
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CHAPTER 162 
H. B. No. 284 
Passed February 27, 1985 
Effective April 29, 1985 
REAL ESTATE AMENDMENTS 
By Richard J Bradford 
AN ACT RELATING TO THE SECURITIES 
COMMISSION; REVISING THE REAL 
ESTATE BROKERS CHAPTER; REDEFINING 
TERMS; REQUIRING THE DIVISION OF 
REAL ESTATE AND THE REAL ESTATE 
COMMISSION TO WORK IN CONCURRENCE 
WITH EACH OTHER; CHANGING THE 
APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS; REVISING 
NONRESIDENT LICENSURE REQUIRE-
MENTS; CHANGING THE FORM OF THE 
LICENSE AND RENEWAL DATE; GIVING 
THE DIVISION SUBPOENA POWER IN 
INVESTIGATIONS; ADDING TO PROHIBITED 
CONDUCT; CHANGING SOME APPEAL PRO-
CEDURES; PROVIDING FINES TO BE DEPOS-
ITED IN THE REAL ESTATE RECOVERY 
FUND; REQUIRING FORM APPROVAL; PRO-
VIDING FOR LICENSE FEE RENEWAL; LIM-
ITING THE AMOUNT RECOVERABLE FROM 
THE REAL ESTATE RECOVERY FUND; AND 
PROVIDING FOR REVOCATION OF LICEN-
SURE. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOL LOWS 
AMENDS: 
61 2 1, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
257, LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
61-2 2, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
257, LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
61-2-3, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 257, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
61 2 4, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
257, LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
61-2-5, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 257, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
61-2-5 5, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 257, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
61-2-6, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
257, LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
61-2-7, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
257, LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
61-2-8, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
257, LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
61-2-9, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
15, LAWS OF UTAH 1984, SECOND SPE-
CIAL SESSION, WHICH TAKES EFFECT 
JULY 1, 1985 
61-2-23, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 254, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
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61-2 10, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
257, LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
61-2-11, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
257, LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
61-2-12, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
257, LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
61-2 13, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
257, LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
61-2-17, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
257, LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
61-2-18, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
257, LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
61-2-20, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
257, LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
61-2 22, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 146, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1963 
612 23, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 254, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
61-2a-4, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
256, LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
61-2a-5, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
256, LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
61 2a 9, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 
256, LAWS OF UTAH 1983 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah 
Section 1. Section Amended. 
Section 61 2 1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 257, Laws of Utah 1983, 
is amended to read 
61-2-1. License required. 
It is unlawful for any person to engage in the 
business, act in the capacity of, advertise, or 
assume to act as a principal real estate broker, asso 
ciate real estate broker, or a real estate [salesman] 
sales agent within this state without a license 
obtained under this chapter 
Section 2. Section Amended. 
Section 61-2-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 257, Laws of Utah 1983, 
is amended to read 
61-2-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter 
(1) "Principal real estate broker" and "principal 
broker" means 
(a) (all persons) any person who for another 
and for valuable consideration, or who with the 
intention or in the expectation or upon the promise 
of receiving or collecting valuable consideration, 
sells, exchanges, purchases, rents, or leases or 
negotiates the sale, exchange, purchase, rental, or 
leasing of, or offers or attempts or agrees to negoti-
ate the sale, exchange, purchase, rental, or leasing 
of, or lists or offers or attempts or agrees to list, or 
auctions, or offers or attempts or agrees to collect 
rental for the use of real estate or who advertises, 
/? 
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who buys or offers to buy, sells or offers to sell, or 
otherwise deals in options on real estate or the 
improvements thereon or who collects or offers or 
attempts or agrees to collect rental for the use of 
real estate or who advertises or holds himself, itself, 
or themselves out as engaged in the business of sell-
ing, exchanging, purchasing, renting, or leasing real 
estate, or assists or directs in the procuring of pros-
pects or the negotiation or closing of any transac-
tion which does or is calculated to result in the sale, 
exchange, leasing, or renting of any real estate, and 
(b) any person, employed by or on behalf of the 
owner or owners of lots or other parcels of real 
estate at a stated salary or upon a commission or 
upon a salary and commission basis or otherwise to 
sell such real estate or any parts thereof in lots or 
other parcels and who sells, exchanges, or offers or 
attempts or agrees to negotiate the sale or exchange 
of any such lot or parcel of real estate 
(2) "Associate real estate broker" and "associ 
ate broker" means any person employed or 
engaged as an independent contractor by or on 
behalf of a licensed principal real estate broker to 
perform any act set out in Subsection (1) for valu-
able consideration, who has qualified under the 
provisions of this chapter as a principal real estate 
broker 
(3) "Real estate [salesman] sales agent" and 
"[salesman] sales agent" means any person 
employed or engaged as an independent contractor 
61-2-3. Exempt persons and transactions. 
This chapter does not apply to 
(1) any person who as owner or lessor performs 
the acts set out in [section] Subsection 61-2 2 (1) 
with reference to property owned or leased by such 
person, 
(2) isolated transactions by persons holding a 
duly executed power of attorney from the owner, 
(3) services rendered by an attorney at law m 
performing his duties as an attorney at law, 
(4) a receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, adminis-
trator, or executor, or any person acting under 
order of any court, 
(5) a trustee or its employees under a deed of 
trust or a will [or their employees], or 
(6) any public utility or [to] the officers or regu-
lar employees thereof, unless performance of any of 
the acts set out in Subsection 61-2-2 (1) is in con-
nection with the sale, purchase, lease, or other dis-
position of real estate or investment therein unre-
lated to the principal business activity of such public 
utility 
Section 4. Section Amended. 
Section 612 4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 257, Laws of Utah 1983, 
is amended to read 
by or on behalf of a licensed principal real estate 
broker to perform any act set out in Subsection (1) 
for valuable consideration , . , „ . 
(4) "Real estate" includes leaseholds, b u s i n e s s ^ s d l m g ' l e a s m g ' 0 r e x c h a n S i n g r e a l e s t a t e f o r 
opportunities, and all timeshare interests (mcludmg / r - a n o t h e r > o r o f offering for another to buy, sell 
but not limited to fee simple, club membership 
limited partnership, and beneficiary interests in a 
timeshare trust) involving real property 
(5) ["Business opportunity" means an existing^Ik^ 
business, a business and its good will, a business Tfr 
franchise, or any combination of them] "Commis-
sion" means the Real Estate Commission estab-
lished under this chapter 
(6) "Concurrence" means the entities given a 
concurring role must jointly agree for action to be 
taken 
(7) "Director" means the director of the Divi-
sion of Real Estate 
(8) "Division" means the Division of Real 
Estate 
(9) "Executive director" means the director of 
the Department of Business Regulation 
Section 3. Section Amended. 
Section 61-2-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
enacted by Chapter 257, Laws of Utah 1983, is 
amended to read 
61-2-4. One act for compensation qualifies person 
as broker or sales agent. 
One act, for valuable consideration, of buying, 
lease, or exchange real estate, [qualifies] requires 
the person performing, offering, or attempting to 
perform the act to be licensed as a principal real 
estate broker, [a] an associate real estate broker, or 
real estate [salesman under] sales agent as set 
forth in this chapter 
Section 5. Section Amended. 
Section 61-2-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
enacted by Chapter 257, Laws of Utah 1983, is 
amended to read 
61-2-5. Division of Real Estate created — Func-
tions — Director appointed — Functions. 
(1) There is created within the Department of 
Business Regulation a Division ot Real Estate It is 
responsible for the administration and enforcement 
of this chapter, the Real Estate Education, 
Research, and Recovery Fund, and the Utah Uni-
form Land and Timeshare Sales Practices Act 
(2) The division [shall be] is under the direction 
and control of a director appointed by the executive 
director of the department with the approval of the 
governor The director [shall hold] holds his office 
at the pleasure of the governor 
(3) The director, with the approval of the exec-
utive director, may employ personnel necessary to 
discharge the duties of the division at salaries to be 
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interest in a project is essentially noncommercial. 
For purposes of this subsection, the offering of 
fewer than ten interests in a project \s cons\dered 
essentially noncommercial. 
Section 32. Section Amended. 
Section 61-2-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 162, Laws of Utah 1985, is 
amended to read. 
61-2-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
[(2)] (1) "Associate real estate broker" and 
"associate broker" means any person employed oi 
engaged as an independent contractor by or on 
behalf of a licensed principal real estate broker to 
perform any act set out in Subsection [ft)] (7) for 
valuable consideration, who has qualified under the 
provisions of this chapter as a principal real estate 
broker. 
[(5)] 0 "Commission" means the Real Estate 
Commission established under this chapter. 
[(6)1 (3] "Concurrence" means the entities given a 
concurring role must jointly agree for action to be 
taken. 
IF)] (4) "Director" means the director of the 
Division of Real Estate 
[(#)] (5} "Division" means the Division of Real 
Estate. 
[(9)] (6) "Executive director" means the director 
of the Department of Business Regulation. 
KW1 iZi "Principal real estate broker" and 
"principal broker" means: 
(a) any person who for another and for valuable 
consideration, or who with the intention or in the 
expectation or upon the promise of receiving or 
collecting valuable consideration, sells, exchanges, 
purchases, rents, or leases or negotiates the sale, 
exchange, purchase, rental, or leasing of, or offers 
or attempts or agrees to negotiate the sale, exch-
ange, purchase, rental, or leasing of, or lists or 
offers or attempts or agrees to list, or auctions, or 
offers or attempts or agrees to collect rental for the 
use of real estate or who advertises, who buys or 
offers to buy, sells or offers to sell, or otherwise 
deals in options on real estate or the improvements 
thereon or who collects or offers or attempts or 
agrees to collect rental for the use of real estate or 
who advertises or holds himself, itself, or themselves 
out as engaged in the business of selling, exchan-
ging, purchasing, renting, or leasing real estate, or 
assists or directs in the procuring of prospects or the 
negotiation or closing of any transaction which does 
or is calculated to result in the sale, exchange, 
leasing, or renting of any real estate; and 
(b) any person, employed by or on behalf of the 
owner or owners of lots or other parcels of real 
estate at a stated salary or upon a commission or 
upon a salary and commission basis or otherwise to 
sell such real estate or any parts thereof m lots or 
other parcels and who sells, exchanges, or offers or 
attempts or agrees to negotiate the sale or exchange 
of any such lot or parcel of real estate. 
K4i] (8) "Real estate" includes leaseholds[T] and 
business opportunities [, and all timeshare interests 
tah 1987 
(mcluding but not limited to fee simple, club mem 
bcrship, limited partnership, and beneficiary inter-
ests in a timeshare trust)] involving real property. 
[(3)] (9) 'Real estate sales agent" and "sales 
agent" means any person employed or engaged as an 
independent contractor by or on behalf of a licensed 
principal real estate broker to perform any act set 
out in Subsection [(4)] {7} for valuable considera-
tion. 
Section 33. Section Amended. 
Section 61-2-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapters 162 and 235, Laws of 
Utah 1985, is amended to read: 
61-2-3. Exempt persons and transactions. 
This chapter does not apply to: 
(1) any person who as owner or lessor performs 
the acts set out in Subsection 61-2-2 {(!)] (7) with 
reference to property owned or leased by that 
person; 
(2) isolated transactions by persons holding a duly 
executed power of attorney from the owner; 
(3) services rendered by an attorney at law in 
performing his duties as an attorney at law; 
(4) a receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, administr-
ator, executor, or any person acting under order of 
any court; 
(5) a trustee or its employees under a deed of trust 
or a will; 
(6) any public utility or [the] its officers or regular 
employees [e£4t], unless performance of any of the 
acts set out in Subsection 61-2-2 [(4)] (7) is in 
connection with the sale, purchase, lease, or other 
disposition of real estate or investment [therem] in 
real estate unrelated to the principal business activity 
of that public utility; or 
(7) any person registered to act as a broker-
dealer, agent, or investment advisor under the Utah 
and federal securities laws in the sale of, or offer to 
sell, real estate where the real estate is a necessary 
element of a "security" as that term is defined by 
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exch-
ange Act of 1934 and which security is registered for 
sale pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 or by the 
Utah Uniform Securities Act. This exemption does 
not apply to exempt or resale transactions. 
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shall serve until their respective successors are ap-
pointed and qualified. 
(4) The board shall meet a t least quarterly on a 
regular date to be fixed by the board and a t such oth-
er times at the call of the director or any two mem-
bers of the board. Four members shall constitute a 
quorum for the transaction of business. Actions of 
the board shall require a vote of a majority of those 
present. 
(5) Each member of the board shall, by sworn and 
written statement filed with the Department of 
[business regulation] Commerce and the lieutenant 
governor, disclose any position of employment or 
ownership interest that the member has with re-
spect to any entity or business subject to the juris-
diction of the division. This s tatement shall be filed 
upon appointment and must be appropriately 
amended whenever significant changes occur in 
matters covered by the statement. 
(6) The members of the board shall receive no 
salary but shall be paid a per diem allowance, as pro-
vided by law, for each day actually spent m the per-
formance of their duties, and travel expenses as al-
lowed under Section 63-1-15 and the rules and reg-
ulations promulgated under tha t section. 
Sect ion 87. Sect ion Amended. 
Section 61-2-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 73, Laws of Utah 1987, is 
amended to read 
61-2-2 . Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Associate real estate broker" and "associate 
broker" means any person employed or engaged as 
an independent contractor by or on behalf of a li-
censed principal real estate broker to perform any 
act set out in Subsection (7) for valuable consider-
ation, who has qualified under the provisions of this 
chapter as a principal real estate broker. 
(2) "Commission" means the Real Estate Commis-
sion established under this chapter. 
(3) "Concurrence" means the entities given a con-
curring role must jointly agree for action to be tak-
en. 
(4) "Director" means the director of the Division of 
Real Estate. 
(5) "Division" means the Division of Real Estate. 
(6) "Executive director" means the director of the 
Department of [Business Regulation] Commerce. 
(7) "Principal real estate broker" and "principal 
broker" means: 
(a) any person who for another and for valuable 
consideration, or who with the intention or in the ex-
pectation or upon the promise of receiving or collect-
ing valuable consideration, sells, exchanges, pur-
chases, rents, or leases or negotiates the sale, ex-
change, purchase, rental, or leasing of, or offers or 
a t tempts or agrees to negotiate the sale, exchange, 
purchase, rental, or leasing of, or lists or offers or at-
tempts or agrees to list, or auctions, or offers or at-
tempts or agrees to collect rental for the use of real 
estate or who advertises, who buys or offers to buy, 
sells or offers to sell, or otherwise deals in options on 
real estate or the improvements thereon or who col-
lects or offers or at tempts or agrees to collect rental 
for the use of real estate or who advertises or holds 
himself, itself, or themselves out as engaged in the 
business of selling, exchanging, purchasing, rent-
ing, or leasing real estate, or assists or directs in the 
procuring of prospects or the negotiation or closing 
of any transaction which does or is calculated to re-
sult in the sale, exchange, leasing, or renting of any 
real estate; and 
(b) any person, employed by or on behalf of the 
owner or owners of lots or other parcels of real estate 
at a stated salary or upon a commission or upon a 
salary and commission basis or otherwise to sell 
such real estate or any parts thereof in lots or other 
parcels and who sells, exchanges, or offers or at-
tempts or agrees to negotiate the sale or exchange of 
any such lot or parcel of real estate. 
(8) "Real estate" includes leaseholds and business 
opportunities involving real property. 
(9) "Real estate sales agent" and "sales agent" 
means any person employed or engaged as an inde-
pendent contractor by or on behalf of a licensed prin-
cipal real estate broker to perform any act set out in 
Subsection (7) for valuable consideration. 
Sect ion 88. Sect ion Amended . 
Section 61-2-5 , Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 182, Laws of Utah 1988, is 
amended to read: 
61-2-5 . Divis ion of Real Estate created — 
Funct ions — Director appointed — Func-
t ions . 
(1) There is created within the Department of 
[Business Regulation] Commerce a Division of Real 
Estate. It is responsible for the administration and 
enforcement of this chapter, the Real Estate Educa-
tion, Research, and Recovery Fund, the Utah Uni-
form Land Sales Practices Act, and the Timeshare 
and Camp Resort Act. 
(2) The division is under the direction and control 
of a director appointed by the executive director of 
the department with the approval of the governor. 
The director holds his office a t the pleasure of the 
governor. 
(3) The director, with the approval of the executive 
director, may employ personnel necessary to dis-
charge the duties of the division a t salaries to be 
fixed by the director according to standards estab-
lished by the Department of Administrative Ser-
vices. 
(4) On or before the first day of October of each 
year the director shall, in conjunction with the de-
partment, report to the governor and the Legisla-
ture concerning the division's work for the preced-
ing fiscal year ending J u n e 30. 
(5) The director, in conjunction with the executive 
director, shall prepare and submit to the governor 
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12 • a statement whether or not the developer has 
ever been* 
<ai convicted of <» ielony, or any misdemeanor m-
vohing theft, fraud, or dishonesty; or 
(b) enjoined from, assessed any civil penalty for, or 
found to have engaged in the violation of any law de-
signed to protect consumers, 
<3> a brief description of the developer's experi-
ence in timeshare, camp resort, or any other real es-
tate development, 
(4) a brief description of the interest which is being 
offered in the project; 
(5) a description of any provisions to protect the 
purchaser's interest from loss due to foreclosure on 
any underlying financial obligation of the project; 
(6) a statement of the maximum number of inter-
ests in the project to be marketed, and a commit-
ment that this maximum number will not be exceed-
ed unless disclosed by filing an amendment to the 
registration as provided in Section 57-19-9 prior to 
the amendment becoming effective; 
(7) any event which has occurred as of the date of 
the offer which may have a material adverse effect 
on the operation of the project; and 
(8) any other information the director considers 
necessary for the protection of purchasers-
Sect ion 7. Section Amended. 
Section 57-19-20, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
enacted by Chapter 73, Laws of Utah 1987, is 
amended to read: 
57-19-20. Injunctive relief— Cease and de-
s ist order. 
(1) Whenever it appears to the director that any 
person has engaged or is about to engage in any act 
or practice constituting a violation of any provision 
of this chapter, and that it would be in the public in-
terest to stop those acts or practices, the director 
may either: 
(a) seek injunctive relief as provided in Rule 65 A, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; or 
(b) issue an administrative cease and desist order. 
(2) If an administrative cease and desist order is 
issued pursuant to Subsection (1), the person upon 
whom the order is served may, within ten days after 
receiving the order, request tha t a hearing be held 
before an administrative law judge. [The director 
shall schedule the hearing within 15 day3 after re-
ceipt of the request from the person upon whom the 
order was served and give notice of the hearing in 
writing to him] If a request for a hearing is made, 
the division shall follow the procedures and require-
ments of Chapter 46b, Title 63, Administrative Pro-
cedures Act. Pending the hearing, the order re-
mains in effect. 
(3) If, at the hearing, a finding is made that there 
has been a violation of this chapter, the director, 
with the concurrence of the executive director, may 
issue an order making the cease and desist order 
permanent If no hearing is requested, and if the 
person fails to cease the act or practice, or after dis-
continuing the act or practice again commences it, 
the director shall file suit in the district court of the 
county in which the act or practice occurred, or 
where the person resides or carries on business, to 
enjoin and restrain the person from violating this 
chapter 
<4) Whether or not the director has issued a cease 
and desist order, the attorney general, in the name 
of the state or of the director, may bring an action in 
any court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin any act 
or practice constituting a violation of any provision 
of this chapter, and to enforce compliance with this 
chapter or any rule or order under this chapter. 
Upon a proper showing, a permanent or temporary 
injunction, restraining order, or writ of mandamus 
shall be granted. 
Sect ion 8. Sec t ion Amended . 
Section 61-2-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 225, Laws of Utah 1989, is 
amended to read: 
61-2-2 . Definit ions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Associate real estate broker" and "associate 
broker" means any person employed or engaged as 
an independent contractor by or on behalf of a li-
censed principal real estate broker to perform any 
act set out in Subsection [ffl] (9) for valuable consid-
eration, who has qualified under the provisions of 
this chapter as a principal real estate broker. 
(2) "Branch office" means a principal broker's real 
estate brokerage office other than his main office. 
[(2)] (3) "Commission" means the Real Estate 
Commission established under this chapter. 
[(&)] (4) "Concurrence" means the entities given a 
concurring role must jointly agree for action to be 
taken 
[(4)1 (5) "Director" means the director of the Divi-
sion of Real Estate. 
[f&)3 (6) "Division" means the Division of Real Es-
ta te . 
[(£}] (7) "Executive director" means the director of 
the Department of Commerce. 
(8) "Main office" means the address which a prin-
cipal broker designates with the division as his pri-
mary brokerage office. 
[f74] (£0 "Principal real estate broker" and "princi-
pal broker" means[r4a4] any person: 
(a)(i) who [for another and for valuable consider-
ation, or who with the intention or in the expecta-
tion or upon the promise of receiving or collecting 
v-aluablc consideration,] sells or lists for sale, buys, 
exchanges, [purchasco, rents, or Icascs-Of-negott-
ofTor ofifefs-or a t tempt^er-agrccs to ncgottate-t-he 
sale, exchanger purchaser rcntal^-frr- leasing of, -or 
lists or offers or-attempts or agrees—fee-hst; 1 or auc-
tionsirft^frffcrs of a t tempts or-agrccs to collect-rertt-
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al for the use of] real estate [or who advertises, who 
buys or offers to buy, sells or offers to sell, or other-
wise dea4s-tfi], options on real estate, or [the] im-
provements [thereon or who collects or offers or at-
tempts or agTCC3 to collect rental for the use of real 
estate] on real estate with the expectation ofreceiv-
ing valuable consideration; or 
(ii) who advertises, offers, attempts, or otherwise 
holds himself!, itself, or themselves] out [as] to be 
engaged in the business [of selling, exchanging, pur-
chasing, renting, or leasing real estate, or assists or 
directs in the procuring of prospects or the negoti-
ation or closing of any transaction which docs or is 
calculated to result in the sale, exchange, leasing, or 
renting of any real estate] described in Subsection 
(j); [and] 
(b) [any person,] employed by or on behalf of the 
owner [or owners of lota or other parcels] of real es-
tate or by a prospective purchaser of real estate who 
performs any of the acts described in Subsection (a), 
whether his compensation is a t a stated salary [or 
upon], a commission [er] basis, upon a salary and 
commission basis, or otherwise [to sell 3uch real es-
tate or any parts thereof in lots or other parcels and 
who sells, exchanges, or offers or attempts or agrees 
to negotiate the sale or exchange of any such lot or 
(c) who, with the expectation of receiving valuable 
consideration, manages property owned by another 
person or who advertises or otherwise holds himself 
out to be engaged in property management by: 
(i) advertising for, arranging, negotiating, offer-
ing, or otherwise at tempting or participating in a 
transaction calculated to secure the rental or leas-
ingof real estate; 
(ii) collecting, agreeing, offering, or otherwise at-
tempting to collect rent for the real estate and ac-
counting for and disbursing the money collected; or 
(iii) ordering or otherwise arranging for repairs to 
the real estate; 
(d) who, with the expectation of receiving valuable 
consideration, assists or directs in the procurement 
of prospects for or the negotiation of the transac-
tions listed in Subsections (a) and (c); and 
(e) except for mortgage lenders, title insurance 
agents, and their employees, who assists or directs 
in the closing of any real estate transaction with the 
expectation of receiving valuable consideration. 
[(&)] (10) "Real estate" includes leaseholds and 
business opportunities involving real property. 
[(9)] (11) "Real estate sales agent" and "sales 
agent" means any person employed or engaged as 
an independent contractor by or on behalf of a li-
censed principal real estate broker to perform for 
valuable consideration any act set out in Subsection 
[(7) for vaktable-eerisidcration] (9). 
Section 9. Sec t ion Amended . 
Section 61-2-3 , Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapters 48 and 73, Laws of Utah 
1987, is amended to read: 
61-2--3. Exempt persons and transactions. 
This chapter does not apply to: 
(1) any person who as owner or lessor performs 
the acts set out in Subsection 61-2-2 [(£)] (9) with 
reference to property owned or leased by tha t per-
son or any regular salaried employee of that person, 
except that this exemption does not apply to em-
ployees engaged in sales of property intended for 
residential use or engaged in the sales of properties 
regulated under Chapter 11, Title 57, Utah Uniform 
Land Sales Practices Act, nor does it apply to any 
person whose interest as an owner or lessor was ob-
tained by him or transferred to him for the purpose 
of evading the application of this chapter and not for 
any other legitimate business reason; 
(2) isolated transactions by persons holding a duly 
executed power of attorney from the owner; 
(3) services rendered by an attorney at law in per-
forming his duties as an attorney at law; 
(4) a receiver, t rustee in bankruptcy, administra-
tor, executor, or any person acting under order of 
any court; 
(5) a trustee or its employees under a deed of t rus t 
or a will; 
(6) any public utility, its officers, or regular em-
ployees, unless performance of any of the acts set 
out in Subsection 61-2 -2 [(7-)] (9) is in connection 
with the sale, purchase, lease, or other disposition of 
real estate or investment in real estate unrelated to 
the principal business activity of that public utility; 
or 
(7) any person registered to act as a broker-deal-
er, agent, or investment advisor under the Utah and 
federal securities laws in the sale or the offer for sale 
of real estate, where the real estate is a necessary 
element of a "security" as that term is defined by the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 and which security is registered for sale 
pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 or by [the] 
Chapter 1, Title 61 , Utah Uniform Securities Act. 
This exemption does not apply to exempt or resale 
transactions. 
Sect ion 10. Sec t ion Amended. 
Section 61-2-5 .5 , Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 48, Laws of Utah 1987, is 
amended to read: 
61-2-5.5. Real Estate Commission created — 
Funct ions — Appointment , qualif ications, 
terms, and compensat ion of members — 
Meetings . 
(1) There is created within the division a Real Es-
tate Commission. The commission shall: 
[(a) promulgate rules relating to the licensing and 
conduct of principal brokers, associate brokers, 
sales agents, real estate schools, and school instruc-
(a) make rules for the administration of this chap-
ter which are not inconsistent with this chapter, in-
cluding: 
(i) licensing of principal brokers, associate bro-
kers, sales agents, real estate companies, and 
branch offices; 
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DIVISION OF 
REAL ESTATE AMENDMENTS 
Sponsor Gerry A Adair 
AN ACT RELATING TO THE DIVISION OF 
REAL ESTATE; ADDING CERTAIN 
DEFINITIONS; EXEMPTING CERTAIN 
PERSONS FROM LICENSING 
REQUIREMENTS; REVISING THE DUTIES 
OF THE REAL ESTATE COMMISSION; 
MODIFYING CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS 
FOR LICENSING; REVISING MANDATES 
IMPOSED ON BROKERS; CREATING A 
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MISHANDLING 
OF TRUST FUNDS; AND MAKING 
TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS. 
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 
1953 as follows 
AMENDS: 
61-2-1, as last amended by Chapter 162, Laws of 
Utah 1985 
61-2-2, as last amended by Chapter 165, Laws of 
Utah 1991 
61-2-3, as last amended by Chapters 165 and 262, 
Laws of Utah 1991 
61-2-4, as last amended by Chapter 162, Laws of 
Utah 1985 
61-2-5 5, as last amended by Chapter L65, Laws of 
Utah 1991 
61-2-9, as last amended by Chapter 313, Laws of 
Utah 1994 
61-2-10, as last amended by Chapter 186, Laws of 
Utah 1995 
61-2-11, as last amended by Chapter 146, Laws of 
Utah 1993 
ENACTS: 
61-2-24, Utah Code Annotated 1953 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah 
Section 1. Section 61-2-1 is amended to 
read: 
61-2-1. License required. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to engage in the 
business, act in the capacity of, advertise, or assume 
to act as a pnncipal real estate broker, associate 
real estate broker, or a real estate sales agent 
within this state without a license obtained under 
this chapter 
(2) It is unlawful for any person outside the state 
to engage in the business, act in the capacity of, 
advertise, or assume to act as a pnncipal real estate 
broker, associate real estate broker, or a real estate 
sales agent with respect to real estate located 
within the state without a license obtained under 
this chapter 
Section 2. Section 61-2-2 is amended to 
read: 
61-2-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter 
(1) "Associate real estate broker" and "associate 
broker" means any person employed or engaged as 
an independent contractor by or on behalf of a 
licensed pnncipal real estate broker to perform any 
act set out in Subsection [(&)] (12) for valuable 
consideration, who has qualified under the 
provisions of this chapter as a principal real estate 
broker 
(2) "Branch office*' means a principal broker's real 
estate brokerage office other than his main office 
(3) "Commission" means the Real Estate 
Commission established under this chapter 
(4) "Concurrence" means the entities given a 
concurring role must jointly agree for action to be 
taken 
(5) "Condominium" or "condominium unit" is as 
defined in Section 57-8-3 
(6) "Condominium homeowners' association" 
means all of the condominium unit owners acting as 
a group m accordance with declarations and 
bylaws 
(7) (a) "Condominium hotel" means one or more 
condominium units that are operated as a hotel 
(b) "Condominium hotel" does not mean a hotel 
consisting of condominium units, all of which are 
owned by a single entity 
[(&)] (8) "Director" means the director of the 
Division of Real Estate 
[(&)] (9) "Division" means the Division of Real 
Estate 
[£7)3 (10) "Executive director" means the director 
of the Department of Commerce 
[(&)] (11) "Mam office" means the address which a 
pnncipal broker designates with the division as his 
pnmary brokerage office 
[W] (12) "Principal real estate broker" and 
"pnncipal broker" means any person 
(a) d) who sells or lists for sale, buys, exchanges, 
or auctions real estate, options on real estate, or 
improvements on real estate with the expectation of 
receiving valuable consideration, or 
(a) who advertises, offers, attempts, or otherwise 
holds himself out to be engaged in the business 
descnbed in Subsection d), 
(b) employed by or on behalf of the owner of real 
estate or by a prospective purchaser of real estate 
who performs any of the acts described in 
Subsection (a), whether his compensation is at a 
stated salary, a commission basis, upon a salary and 
commission basis, or otherwise, j C7 
(c) who, with the expectation otreceiving 
valuable consideration, manages property owned 
Q O C 
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by another person or who advertises or otherwise 
holds himself out to be engaged in property 
management [by-f]; 
IW advertising for, arranging, negotiating, 
offering, or otherwise attempting or participating 
in a transaction calculated to secure the rental or 
leasing of real estate^] 
[(ii)—collecting, agreeing, offering, or otherwise 
attempting to collect rent for the real estate and 
accounting for and disbursing the money collected; 
<*] 
[(iii) ordering or otherwise arranging for repairs 
to the real estate;] 
(d) who, with the expectation of receiving 
valuable consideration, assists or directs in the 
procurement of prospects for or the negotiation of 
the transactions listed in Subsections (12Xa) and 
(c); and 
(e) except for mortgage lenders, title insurance 
agents, and their employees, who assists or directs 
in the closing of any real estate transaction with the 
expectation of receiving valuable consideration. 
(13) (a) "Property management" means engaging 
in, with the expectation of receiving valuable 
consideration, the management of property owned 
by another person or advertising or otherwise 
claiming to be engaged in property management by: 
(i) advertising for, arranging, negotiating, 
offering, or otherwise at tempting or participating 
in a transaction calculated to secure the rental or 
leasing of real estate; 
(ii) collecting, agreeing, offering, or otherwise 
attempting to collect rent for the real estate and 
accounting for and disbursing the money collected; 
or 
(iii) authorizing expenditures for repairs to the 
real estate, 
(b) "Property management" does not include: 
(i) hotel management unless the hotel is a 
condominium hotel; or 
(ii) the leasing or management of surface or 
subsurface minerals or oil and gas interests, if the 
leasing or management is separate from a sale or 
lease of the surface estate. 
[(44)] (14) "Real estate" includes leaseholds and 
business opportunities involving real property. 
[UU] (15) "Real estate sales agent" and "sales 
agent" means any person employed or engaged as 
an independent contractor by or on behalf of a 
licensed principal real estate broker to perform for 
valuable consideration any act set out in Subsection 
[W](12). 
(16) (a) "Regular salaried employee" means an 
individual who performs a service for wages or 
other remuneration, whose employer withholds 
federal employment taxes under a contract of hire, 
written or oral, express or implied. 
(b) "Regular salaried employee" does not include 
a person who performs services on a 
project-by-project basis or on a commission basis. 
(17) "Reinstatement" means restoring a license 
that has expired or has been suspended. 
(18) "Reissuance" means the process by which a 
licensee may obtain a license following revocation of 
the licensed 
(19) "Renewal" means extending a license for an 
additional licensing period on or before the date the 
license expires. 
Sect ion 3. Sect ion 61-2-3 is amended to 
read: 
61-2-3 . Exempt persons and transactions. 
[This] (1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection 
(1Kb), a license under this chapter [does] is not 
[apply-to] required for: 
[(4M*)] (i) any person who as owner or lessor 
performs the acts [sot out] described in Subsection 
61-2-2 [(d)] (12) with reference to property owned 
or leased by that person [or any regular salaried 
employee of that person]; 
(ii) a regular salaried employee of the owner or 
lessor of real estate who, with reference to 
nonresidential real estate owned or leased by the 
employer, performs the acts enumerated in 
Subsections 61-2-2(12Xa) and (b); 
(iii) a regular salaried employee of the owner of 
real estate who performs property management 
services with reference to real estate owned by the 
employer, except tha t the employee may only 
manage property for one employer; 
(iv) a person who performs property management 
services for the apartments at which that person 
resides in exchange for free or reduced rent on tha t 
person's apartment; 
(v) a regular salaried employee of a condominium 
homeowners' association who manages real 
property subject to the declaration of condominium 
that established the homeowners' association, 
except that the employee may only manage 
property for one condominium homeowners' 
association; and 
(vi) a regular salaried employee of a licensed 
property management company who performs 
support services, as prescribed by rule, for the 
property management company 
(b) [the exemption in] Subsection (l)(a) does not 
[apply to] exempt from licensing: 
[(i-) employees engaged in the sale of property 
intended for residential use;] 
[(4*)] (i) employees engaged in the sale of 
properties regulated under Title 57, Chapter 11, 
Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices Act and Title 
57, Chapter 19, Timeshare and Camp Resort Act: 
[(iii)] (ii) employees engaged in the sale of 
cooperative interests regulated under Title 57, 
Chapter 23, Real Estate Cooperative Marketing 
Act; or 
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NIGHTLY RENTAL PROPERTY 
MANAGERS 
Sponsor AlankMynn 
AN ACT RELATING TO SECURITIES, REAL 
ESTATE DIVISION; AMENDING THE 
DEFINITION OF PROPERTY 
MANAGEMENT TO EXCLUDE RENTAL OF 
CERTAIN PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS 
FOR ANY PERIOD LESS THAN 30 
CONSECUTIVE DAYS AND THE 
MANAGEMENT OF THESE RENTALS; AND 
MAKING TECHNICAL CHANGES. 
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 
1953 as follows 
AMENDS: 
61-2-2, as last amended by Chapter 102, Laws of 
Utah 1996 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah 
Section 1. Section 61-2-2 is amended to 
read: 
61-2-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter 
(1) "Associate real estate broker" and "associate 
broker" means any person employed or engaged as 
an independent contractor by or on behalf of a 
licensed principal real estate broker to perform any 
act set out in Subsection (12) for valuable 
consideration, who has qualified under the 
provisions of this chapter as a principal real estate 
broker 
(2) "Branch office" means a principal broker's real 
estate brokerage office other than his main office 
(3) "Commission" means the Real Estate 
Commission established under this chapter 
(4) "Concurrence" means the entities given a 
concurnng role must jointly agree for action to be 
taken 
(5) "Condominium" or "condominium unit" is as 
defined in Section 57-8-3 
(6) "Condominium homeowners' association" 
means all of the condominium unit owners acting as 
a group in accordance with declarations and 
bylaws 
(7) (a) "Condominium hotel" means one or more 
condominium units that are operated as a hotel 
(b) "Condominium hotel" does not mean a hotel 
consisting of condominium units, all of which are 
owned by a single entity 
(8) "Director" means the director of the Division 
of Real Estate 
(9) "Division" means the Division of Real Estate 
(10) "Executive director" means the director of 
the Department of Commerce 
(11) "Main office" means the address which a 
principal broker designates with the division as his 
primary brokerage office 
(12) "Pnncipal real estate broker" and "principal 
broker" means any person 
(a) d) who sells or lists for sale, buys, exchanges, 
or auctions real estate, options on real estate, or 
improvements on real estate with the expectation of 
receiving valuable consideration or 
(n) who advertises, offers attempts or otherwise 
holds himself out to be engaged in the business 
descnbed in Subsection (12Xa)(i), 
(b) employed by or on behalf of the owner of real 
estate or by a prospective purchaser of real estate 
who performs any of the acts described in 
Subsection (12)(a), whether his compensation is at a 
stated salary, a commission basis upon a salary and 
commission basis, or otherwise, 
(c) who, with the expectation of receiving 
valuable consideration, manages property owned 
by another person or who advertises or otherwise 
holds himself out to be engaged in property 
management, 
(d) who, with the expectation of receiving 
valuable consideration, assists or directs in the 
procurement of prospects for or the negotiation of 
the transactions listed in Subsections (12Xa) and 
(c), and 
(e) except for mortgage lenders title insurance 
agents, and their employees, who assists or directs 
in the closing of any real estate transaction with the 
expectation of receiving valuable consideration 
(13) (a) "Property management" means engaging 
in, with the expectation of receiving valuable 
consideration, the management of property owned 
by another person or advertising or otherwise 
claiming to be engaged in property management by 
d) advertising for, arranging negotiating, 
offering, or otherwise attempting or participating 
in a transaction calculated to secure the lental or 
leasing of real estate 
(n) collecting agreeing offering, or otherwise 
attempting to collect rent for the real estate and 
accounting for and disbursing the money collected, 
or 
(m) authorizing expenditures for repairs to the 
real estate 
(b) "Property management" does not include 
d) hotel or motel management [unless the hotel-is 
a condominium hotel], [or] 
(n) rental of tourist accommodations including 
hotels motels tourist hemes condominiums 
condominium hotels mobile home paik 
accommodations campgrounds or similar public 
accommodations for any period of less than 30 
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consecutive days, and the management activities 
associated with these rentals, or 
[M] (in) the leasing or management of surface or 
subsurface minerals or oil and gas interests, if the 
leasing or management is separate from a sale or 
lease of the surface estate 
(14) "Real estate" includes leaseholds and 
business opportunities involving real property 
(15) "Real estate sales agent" and "sales agent" 
means any person employed or engaged as an 
independent contractor by or on behalf of a licensed 
pnncipal real estate broker to perform for valuable 
consideration any act set out in Subsection (12) 
(16) (a) "Regular salaried employee" means an 
individual who performs a service for wages or 
other remuneration, whose employer withholds 
federal employment taxes under a contract of hire, 
written or oral, express or implied 
(b) "Regular salaned employee" does not include 
a person who performs services on a 
project-by-project basis or on a commission basis 
(17) "Reinstatement" means restoring a license 
that has expired or has been suspended 
(18) "Reissuance" means the process by which a 
licensee may obtain a license following revocation of 
the license 
(19) "Renewal" means extending a license for an 
additional licensing period on or before the date the 
license expires 
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE -
DEFINITIONS AMENDMENTS 
Sponsor. John L Valentine 
This act modi f ies the Securi t ies D i v i s i o n -
Real E s t a t e Div i s ion sec t ion of t h e U t a h 
Code . The ac t e s tab l i shes that a real e s ta t e 
s a l e s a g e n t may be engaged e i t h e r as a n 
i n d e p e n d e n t contractor or as an e m p l o y e e 
of a l i c ensed principal real e s ta te broker. 
The act e s tab l i shes that the re la t ionsh ip 
b e t w e e n a sa les agent and broker is a n 
i n d e p e n d e n t contractor re la t ionsh ip u n l e s s 
there is c lear and conv inc ing e v i d e n c e that 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p w a s in tended by the part i e s 
to be a n e m p l o y e r employee re la t ionsh ip . 
T h e ac t m a k e s technica l c h a n g e s to t h e 
r e n e w a l of a principal broker's, a s s o c i a t e 
broker's , or sa les agent's l i cense . T h e ac t 
m a k e s t echnica l c h a n g e s to the p r o c e s s of 
ac t iva t ing a n inact ive l icense . 
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 
1953 as follows 
AMENDS: 
61-2 -2 , as last amended by Chapter 106, Laws of 
Utah 1997 
61-2-9 , as last amended by Chapter 351, Laws of 
Utah 1997 
ENACTS: 
61-2-25, Utah Code Annotated 1953 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Sec t ion 1. Sec t ion 61-2-2 is a m e n d e d to 
read: 
61-2-2 . Def in i t ions . 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Associate real estate broker" and "associate 
broker" means any person employed or engaged as 
an independent contractor by or on behalf of a 
licensed principal real estate broker to perform any 
act set out in Subsection (12) for valuable 
consideration, who has qualified under the 
provisions of this chapter as a principal real estate 
broker. 
(2) "Branch office" means a principal broker's real 
estate brokerage office other than his main office. 
(3) "Commission" means the Real Estate 
Commission established under this chapter. 
(4) "Concurrence" means the entities given a 
concurring role must jointly agree for action to be 
taken. 
(5) "Condominium" or "condominium unit" is as 
defined in Section 57-8-3 . 
(6) "Condominium homeowners" association" 
means all of the condominium unit owners acting as 
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a group in accordance with declarations and 
bylaws. 
(7) (a) "Condominium hotel" means one or more 
condominium units that are operated as a hotel. 
(b) "Condominium hotel" does not mean a hotel 
consisting of condominium units, all of which are 
owned by a single entity. 
(8) "Director" means the director of the Division 
of Real Estate. 
(9) "Division" means the Division of Real Estate. 
(10) "Executive director" means the director of 
the Department of Commerce. 
(11) "Main office" means the address which a 
principal broker designates with the division as his 
primary brokerage office. 
(12) "Principal real estate broker" and "principal 
broker" means any person: 
(a) (i) who sells or lists for sale, buys, exchanges, 
or auctions real estate, options on real estate, or 
improvements on real estate with the expectation of 
receiving valuable consideration; or 
(ii) who advertises, offers, attempts, or otherwise 
holds himself out to be engaged in the business 
described in Subsection (12)(a)(i); 
(b) employed by or on behalf of the owner of real 
estate or by a prospective purchaser of real estate 
who performs any of the acts described in 
Subsection (12)(a), whether his compensation is at a 
stated salary, a commission basis, upon a salary and 
commission basis, or otherwise; 
(c) who, with the expectation of receiving 
valuable consideration, manages property owned 
by another person or who advertises or otherwise 
holds himself out to be engaged in property 
management; 
(d) who, with the expectation of receiving 
valuable consideration, assists or directs in the 
procurement of prospects for or the negotiation of 
the transactions listed in Subsections (12)(a) and 
(c); and 
(e) except for mortgage lenders, title insurance 
agents, and their employees, who assists or directs 
in the closing of any real estate transaction with the 
expectation of receiving valuable consideration. 
(13) (a) "Property management" means engaging 
in, with the expectation of receiving valuable 
consideration, the management of property owned 
by another person or advertising or otherwise 
claiming to be engaged in property management by: 
(i) advertising for, arranging, negotiating, 
offering, or otherwise attempting or participating 
in a transaction calculated to secure the rental or 
leasing of real estate; 
(ii) collecting, agreeing, offering, or otherwise 
attempting to collect rent for the real estate and 
accounting for and disbursing the money collected, 
or 
(iii) authorizing expenditures for repairs to the 
real estate. 
:
 3^/ 12 
G e n e r a l Sei 
General Session - 2003 Ch. 264 
(b) "Property management" does not include: 
(i) hotel or motel management; 
(ii) rental of tourist accommodations, including 
hotels, motels, tourist homes, condominiums, 
condominium hotels, mobile home park 
accommodations, campgrounds, or similar public 
accommodations for any period of less than 30 
consecutive days, and the management activities 
associated with these rentals; or 
(iii) the leasing or management of surface or 
subsurface minerals or oil and gas interests, if the 
leasing or management is separate from a sale or 
lease of the surface estate. 
(14) "Real estate** includes leaseholds and 
business opportunities involving real property. 
(15) "Real estate sales agent" and "sales agent" 
[moans] mean any person [employed or engaged as 
an independent oontraotor by or on behalf ofl 
affiliated with a licensed principal real estate 
broker, ei ther as an independent contractor or an 
employee as provided in Section 61-2-25, to 
perform for valuable consideration any act set out in 
Subsection (12). 
(16) (a) "Regular salaried employee" means an 
individual who performs a service for wages or 
other remuneration, whose employer withholds 
federal employment taxes under a contract of hire, 
wri t ten or oral, express or implied. 
(b) "Regular salaried employee*' does not include 
a person who performs services on a 
project-by-project basis or on a commission basis. 
(17) "Reinstatement" means restoring a license 
tha t has expired or has been suspended. 
(18) "Reissuance" means the process by which a 
licensee may obtain a license following revocation of 
the license. 
(19) "Renewal" means extending a license for an 
additional licensing period on or before the date the 
license expires. 
S e c t i o n 2 . Sect ion 61-2-9 i s a m e n d e d to 
read: 
61-2 -9 . Examinat ion and l i c ense fees — 
R e n e w a l of l icenses — E d u c a t i o n 
requ irements - - Act ivat ion of inact ive 
l i c e n s e s — Recertif ication — L icenses of 
firm, partnership , or a s s o c i a t i o n — 
Misce l laneous fees. 
(1) (a) Upon filing an application for a principal 
broker, associate broker, or sales agent license 
examination, the applicant shall pay a 
nonrefundable fee as determined by the 
commission with the concurrence of the division 
under Section 63-38-3.2 for admission to the 
examination. 
(b) A principal broker, associate broker, or sales 
agent applicant shall pay a nonrefundable fee as 
determined by the commission with the 
concurrence of the division under Section 
63 -38-3.2 for issuance of an initial license or license 
renewal. 
(c) Each license issued under this subsection 
shall be issued for a period of not less than two years 
as determined by the division with the concurrence 
of the commission. 
(d) (i) Any new sales agent applicant shall submit 
fingerprint cards in a form acceptable to the 
division a t the time the license application is filed 
and shall consent to a fingerprint background check 
by the Utah Bureau of Criminal Identification and 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding the 
application. 
(ii) The division shall request the Department of 
Public Safety to complete a Federal Bureau of 
Investigation criminal background check for each 
new sales agent applicant through the national 
criminal history system (NCIC) or any successor 
system. 
(iii) The cost of the background check and the 
fingerprinting shall be borne by the applicant. 
(e) (i) Any new sales agent license issued under 
th is section shall be conditional, pending 
completion of the criminal background check. If the 
cr iminal background check discloses the applicant 
has failed to accurately disclose a criminal history, 
the license shall be immediately and automatically 
revoked. 
(ii) Any person whose conditional license has 
been revoked under Subsection (l)(e)(i) shall be 
ent i t led to a post-revocation hearing to challenge 
the revocation. The hearing shall be conducted in 
accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrat ive Procedures Act. 
(2) fa) A license expires if it is not renewed on or 
before its expiration date. Effective January 1, 
1992, as a condition of renewal, each active licensee 
shall demonstrate competence by viewing an 
approved real estate education video program and 
complet ing a supplementary workbook, or complete 
12 hours of professional education approved by the 
division and commission within each two-year 
renewal period. The division with the concurrence 
of the commission shall certify education which 
may include, but shall not be limited to, state 
conventions, home study courses, video courses, 
and closed circuit television courses. The 
commission with concurrence of the division may 
exempt a licensee from this education requirement 
for a period not to exceed four years upon a finding 
of reasonable cause and under conditions 
es tabl ished by rule. 
(b) For a period of 30 days after the expiration 
date , a license may be reinstated upon payment of a 
renewal fee and a late fee determined by the 
commission with the concurrence of the division 
unde r Section 63-38-3.2 and upon providing proof 
acceptable to the division and the commission of the 
licensee having completed the hours of education or 
demons t ra ted competence as required under 
Subsection (2)(a). 
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&x)] (S) in general, any interest or ins t rument 
monly known as a "security," or any certificate 
est or participation in, temporary or interim 
ffificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant 
f|ight to subscribe to or purchase any of the 
ping. 
^ (ii) "Security" does not include any: 
(A) insurance or endowment policy or 
iity contract under which an insurance 
i§>any promises to pay money in a lump sum or 
dically for life or some other specified period; 
11(B) interest in a limited liability company in 
shHhe limited liability company is formed as 
<>f an estate plan where all of the members are 
1 by blood or marriage, there are five or fewer 
ers, or the person claiming this exception can 
ethat all of the members are actively engaged 
he management of the limited liability 
ny[. Evidence]; or 
a whole long-term estate in real property; 
an undivided fractionalized long-term estate 
tgeal property that consists of ten or fewer owners^ 
P) 
an undivided fractionalized long-term jpjfite in real property that consists of more than 
P&twners if, when the real property estate is 
^bject to a management agreement-
BJ|M the management agreement permits a 
jpnple majority of owners of the real property 
Bwfafh frk r»/-»f r o n o x j r n r fr» f o r m i n o f c i f h a t n a n a n r a m o n f Bjfefate to not renew or to ter inate the management 
Bgfeement at the earlier of the end of the 
B&faagement agreement's current term, or 180 days 
jterjthe day on which the owners give notice of 
Bjnnination to the manager; 
j lpb) the management agreement prohibits, 
rctly or indirectly, the lending of the proceeds 
ied from the real property estate or the use or 
JB of its assets to any person or entity affiliated 
under common control of the manager; and 
" the management agreement complies with 
jjjjther requirement imposed by rule by the Real 
8 Commission under Section 61-2-26 . 
IT For purposes of Subsection (l)(x)(ii)(B), 
pee that members vote or have the right to 
or the right to information concerning the 
and affairs of the limited liability 
ny, or the right to participate in 
gement, shall not establish, without more, 
B&all members are actively engaged in the 
pment of the limited liability company. 
m (y) "State" means any state, territory, or 
sion of the United States, the District of 
fibia, and Puerto Rico. 
3' 
Bgffi) "Undivided fractionalized long-term 
ite" means an ownership interest in real 
perty by two or more persons tha t is a: 
Ktenancy in common; or 
(B) any other legal form of undivided estate in 
real property including: 
(I) a fee estate; 
(II) a life estate, or 
(III) other long-term estate. 
(ii) "Undivided fractionalized long-term estate" 
does not include a joint tenancy. 
[(26) (a)] (aa) (i) "Viatical settlement interest" 
means the entire interest or any fractional interest 
in any of the following that is the subject of a viatical 
settlement: 
[(i)] (A) a life insurance policy, or 
[(H)] (B) the death benefit under a life insurance 
policy 
[(b)] (ii) "Viatical settlement interest" does not 
include the initial purchase from the viator by a 
provider of viatical settlements. 
(bb) "Whole long-term estate" means a person or 
persons through joint tenancy owns real property 
through. 
(i) a fee estate; 
(ii) a life estate; or 
(iii) other long-term estate. 
[(22)] (cc) "Working days" means 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., 
Monday through Friday, exclusive of legal holidays 
listed in Section 63-13-2. 
(2) A term not defined in [Section 61-1-13] this 
section shall have the meaning as established by 
division rule. The meaning of a term neither 
defined in this section nor by rule of the division 
shall be the meaning commonly accepted in the 
business community 
(3) (a) This Subsection (3) applies to: 
(i) the offer or sale of a real property estate 
exempted from the definition of security under 
Subsection (l)(x)(ii)(C); or 
(ii) the offer or sale of an undivided fractionalized 
long-term estate that is the offer of a security. 
(b) A person who, directly or indirectly receives 
compensation in connection with the offer or sale as 
provided in this Subsection (3) of a real property 
estate is not an agent, broker-dealer, investment 
adviser, or investor adviser representative under 
this chapter if that person is licensed under Chapter 
2, Division of Real Estate, as: 
(i) a principal real estate broker; 
(ii) an associate real estate broker; or 
(iii) a real estate sales agent. 
(4) The list of real property estates excluded from 
the definition of securities under Subsection 
(l)(x)(ii)(C) is not an exclusive list of real property 
estates or interests that are not a security. 
S e c t i o n 2. Sec t ion 61-2-2 is a m e n d e d t o 
r e a d : 
61-2-2 . Def in i t ions . 
Ch. 257 General Session - 2005 
As used in this chapter 
(1) "Associate real estate broker" and "associate 
broker" means any person employed or engaged as 
an independent contractor by or on behalf of a 
licensed principal real estate broker to perform any 
act set out in Subsection (12) for valuable 
consideration, who has qualified under [the 
provisions of] this chapter as a principal real estate 
broker 
(2) ''Branch office" means a principal broker's real 
estate brokerage office other than [his] the 
principal broker's mam office 
(3) "Commission" means the Real Esta te 
Commission established under this chapter 
(4) "Concurrence" means the entities given a 
concurring role must jointly agree for action to be 
taken 
(5) "Condominium" or "condominium unit" is as 
defined in Section 57-8-3 
(6) "Condominium homeowners' association" 
means all of the condominium unit owners acting as 
a group m accordance with declarations and 
bylaws 
(7) (a) ''Condominium hotel" means one oi more 
condominium units that are operated as a hotel 
(b) "Condominium hotel" does not mean a hotel 
consisting of condominium units, all of which are 
owned by a single entity 
(8) "Director" means the director of the Division 
of Real Estate 
(9) "Division" means the Division of Real Estate 
(10) "Executive director" means the director of 
the Department of Commerce 
(11) "Main office" means the address which a 
principal broker designates with the division as 
[his] the principal broker's primary brokerage 
office 
(12) "Principal real estate broker" and "principal 
broker" means any person 
(a) d) who sells or lists for sale, buys, exchanges, 
or auctions real estate, options on real estate, or 
improvements on real estate with the expectation of 
receiving valuable consideration, or 
(n) who advertises, offers, attempts, or otherwise 
holds himself out to be engaged in the business 
described in Subsection (12)(a)(i), 
(b) employed by or on behalf of the owner of real 
estate or by a prospective purchaser of real estate 
who performs any of the acts described in 
Subsection (12)(a), whether [his] the person's 
compensation is at a stated salary, a commission 
basis, upon a salary and commission basis, or 
otherwise, 
(c) who, with the expectation of receiving 
valuable consideration, manages property owned 
by another person or who advertises or otherwise 
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holds himself out to be engaged in property 
management, 
(d) who, with the expectation of receiving 
valuable consideration, assists or directs in the 
procurement of prospects for or the negotiation of 
the transactions listed in Subsections (12)(a) and 
(c), and 
(e) except for mortgage lenders, title insurance 
agents, and their employees, who assists or directs 
in the closing of any real estate transaction with the 
expectation of receiving valuable consideration 
(13) (a) "Property management" means engaging 
in, with the expectation of receiving valuable 
consideration, the management of property owned 
by another person or advertising or otherwise 
claiming to be engaged in property management by 
(l) advertising for, arranging, negotiating, 
offering, or otherwise at tempting or participating 
in a transaction calculated to secure the rental or 
leasing of real estate, 
(n) collecting, agreeing, offering, or otherwise 
attempting to collect rent for the real estate and 
accounting for and disbursing the money collected, 
(in) authorizing expenditures for repairs to the 
real estate 
(b) "Property management" does not mclude 
(l) hotel or motel management, 
(n) rental of tourist accommodations, including 
hotels, motels, tourist homes, condominiums, 
condominium hotels, mobile home park 
accommodations, campgrounds, or similar public 
accommodations for any period of less than 30 
consecutive days, and the management activities 
associated with these rentals, or 
(m) the leasing or management of surface or 
subsurface minerals or oil and gas interests, if the 
leasing or management is separate from a sale or 
lease of the surface estate 
(14) "Real estate" includes leaseholds and 
business opportunities involving real property 
(15) "Real estate sales agent" and "sales agent" 
mean any person affiliated with a licensed principal 
real estate broker, either as an independent 
contractor or an employee as provided in Section 
61-2-25, to perform for valuable consideration any 
act set out in Subsection (12) 
(16) (a) "Regular salaried employee" means an 
individual who performs a service for wages or 
other remuneration, whose employer withholds 
federal employment taxes under a contract of hire, 
written or oral, express or implied 
(b) "Regular salaried employee" does not mclude 
a person who performs services on a 
project-by-project basis or on a commission basis 
(17) "Reinstatement" means restoring a license 
that has expired or has been suspended 
(18) "Reissuance" means the process by which a 
licensee may obtain a license following revocation of 
the license 
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